CEO任期与股价崩盘风险

发布时间：2018-03-09 13:19

本文选题：股价崩盘风险　切入点：CEO任期　出处：《华东师范大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：2008年的爆发的全球金融危机,以及2015年以来出现的千股跌停、千股涨停,千股跌停又涨停和熔断的发生,都严重地干扰了资本市场有序运行,给投资者造成巨大的心理恐慌,股价"暴跌"现象引起了投资界、国家政策制定相关部门以及学术界的广泛关注。但是,到目前为止关于股价崩盘风险的研究大都集中于公司内外部特征进行阐述,鲜有学者深入挖掘管理者特征的崩盘效应。基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、高层梯队理论等理论基础,依托CSMAR数据库选取中国A股上市公司2008-2015年的相关数据,本文主要研究在CEO任职的不同阶段,股价崩盘风险是否会有显著的差异,并探索CEO任期是如何影响股价崩盘风险的。因此,本文引入盈余管理、会计稳健性与非效率投资,来分析其是否在CEO任期与股价崩盘风险的关系中存在中介传导作用。此外,本文引入内部控制效率来探索其对CEO任期崩盘效应是否存在治理机制。本文研究发现:(1)CEO任期与股价崩盘风险呈U型关系,随着CEO任期的延伸,股价崩盘风险会逐渐降低,但在临近CEO离任时股价崩盘风险会升高。(2)在CEO任期与股价崩盘风险的U型关系中,会计稳健性发挥了完全的中介效应,非效率投资发挥了部分中介效应,盈余管理并未发挥中介作用;(3)高效率的内部控制能够有效降低公司股价崩盘风险,缓和CEO任期与股价崩盘风险之间的U型关系;(4)相比于国有企业,非国有企业CEO任期与股价崩盘风险的U型关系更强。本文的主要贡献在于:(1)丰富了关于CEO任期崩盘效应,会计稳健性与非效率投资在其中发挥中介效应,高效的内部控制发挥治理效应等方面的相关文献;(2)有助于上市公司董事会、监事会、股东大会及证券监管部门从CEO任期、会计稳健性与非效率投资方面加强治理和监管,以稳定资本市场秩序;(3)能够促进政策制定部门完善内部控制制度的建设,降低资本市场运作风险。
[Abstract]:The global financial crisis that broke out in 2008, as well as the thousands of stocks that have fallen since 2015, the price limits of thousands of stocks, and the occurrence of price limits and breakers of thousands of shares, have seriously disrupted the orderly operation of the capital markets, causing great psychological panic to investors. The stock price "plummeting" phenomenon has attracted extensive attention from the investment community, relevant departments of national policy making and academia. However, so far, most of the research on the risk of stock price collapse has focused on the internal and external characteristics of the company. Based on the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, high-level echelon theory and so on, based on the CSMAR database, this paper selects the relevant data of China A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2015. This paper mainly studies whether there are significant differences in the risk of stock price collapse in different stages of CEO tenure, and explores how the tenure of CEO affects the risk of stock price collapse. Therefore, this paper introduces earnings management, accounting conservatism and inefficient investment. To analyze whether there is an intermediary transmission in the relationship between CEO tenure and the risk of a stock price collapse. This paper introduces the efficiency of internal control to explore whether there is a governance mechanism for the effect of CEO tenure collapse. This paper finds that there is a U-shaped relationship between the tenure of CEO and the risk of stock price collapse. With the extension of the tenure of CEO, the risk of stock price collapse decreases gradually. However, near the departure of CEO, the risk of stock price collapse will increase. 2) in the U-shaped relationship between the tenure of CEO and the risk of stock price collapse, accounting conservatism plays a complete intermediary effect, and inefficient investment plays a part of intermediary effect. Earnings Management does not play an intermediary role) efficient internal controls can effectively reduce the risk of a company's share price crash and ease the U-shaped relationship between CEO tenure and the risk of a stock crash. The main contribution of this paper is to enrich the effect of CEO tenure collapse, accounting conservatism and non-efficiency investment play an intermediary role in the relationship between the tenure of non-state-owned enterprises and the risk of stock price collapse, the main contribution of this paper lies in the enrichment of the effect of CEO tenure collapse, in which accounting conservatism and non-efficiency investment play an intermediary role. The effective internal control exerts the governance effect and so on the related literature is helpful to the listed company board of directors, the board of supervisors, the shareholder general meeting and the securities supervision department from the CEO term of office, the accounting conservatism and the inefficient investment aspect strengthens the governance and the supervision, In order to stabilize the order of capital market, it can promote the establishment of internal control system and reduce the risk of capital market operation.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.91

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