股权结构对于我国上市公司大股东行为的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-17 23:08

本文选题：大股东行为　切入点：治理　出处：《上海社会科学院》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：股权集中和大股东已经成为公司治理的潮流,大股东在公司中有着举足轻重的地位,其行为深刻影响到企业的发展。本文将研究中国上市公司股权结构对大股东行为的影响,在本文不仅探讨大股东掏空上市公司行为,也分析大股东参与公司治理,监督管理者的行为。从本文的分析来看,大股东的存在可以克服股权分散情况下的股东搭便车问题,改善公司的治理,避免信息不对称问题。通过监督管理者改善公司的经营活动,提升公司价值;但是另一方面,大股东的存在意味获得了对公司的相对或绝对控制权,大股东往往为了追求控制权私人收益而掏空上市公司,这样的掏空成本将由全体股东来承担。如何抑制大股东的掏空行为?从LLSV模型来看,良好的投资者保护机制,可以遏制大股东掏空行为,维护中小股东的投资信心,促进证券市场的繁荣发展。在法律体系完善的情况下,股权制衡可以抑制大股东的掏空行为,提升公司的价值。从委托代理理论来看,大股东的存在与管理之间构成了委托代理关系,一定程度上可以监督管理者行为,但是大股东也会掏空上市公司,侵占中小股东权益。如果中小股东作为一个有效委托人寻找代理人制约大股东的行为,就可以将自身的福利损失控制在一定范围中,抑制大股东的掏空行为。但是,在我国缺乏有效的投资者保护机制下,大股东侵占中小股东权益的违法成本较小,大股东并没有积极监督管理者降低公司的代理成本。高度的股权集中也方便了大股东的掏空行为,尤其是我国上市公司中股东资金占用问题严重给公司价值和中小股东权益带来了巨大的负面影响。在缺乏投资者保护体制的情况下,中小股东受损的权益得不到有效和及时的保障。同时,在我国上市公司中股权制衡度较低,难以发挥真正制衡大股东行为的作用,甚至会存在大股东之间相互勾结转移公司资产的行为。通过本文的实证结果来看,当第一大股东持股比例过于集中或分散都不利于抑制其对公司的掏空行为,也不利于提高公司价值。只有当第一大股东的持股比例保持在对公司相对控股的区间中,第一大股东才能积极参与公司治理降低公司代理成本,减少对上市公司的掏空程度,促进公司价值的提高。当前,我国股权制衡的程度并不高,但是一定程度上降低了上市公司的代理成本。但是,其他大股东不能有效监督和抑制第一大股东掏空行为,所以在提升公司价值方面并不显著。值得注意的是,在我国第二大股东持股比例的提升,对于上市公司价值的提升产生负面影响。所以,当第一大股东持股比例保持在30%-50%的区间,且第二大股东持股比例不能过高,形成多元大股东制衡的股权结构将有利于我国上市公司的长远发展。所以本文提出了完善我国上市公司股权结构改善大股东行为的意见:构建合理有效的股权制衡度,保持大股东合理的持股比例,该持股比例既不会过低受到外来入侵者的掠夺,也不会过高造成大股东的行为缺乏有效的制约与监管;完善我国的法律法规,加大对大股东掏空行为的处罚力度,建立中小投资保护机制;提升中小股东的话语权,完善中小股东的利益诉求渠道,让中小股东能够合理利用手中的投票权维护自己和公司的权益。
[Abstract]:Ownership concentration and corporate governance of large shareholders has become a trend of large shareholders has a pivotal position in the company, the profound influence to the development of enterprises. This paper will study the influence of the ownership structure of listed companies Chinese behavior of large shareholders, in this paper not only discusses the major shareholder tunneling behavior of listed companies, but also to participate in corporate governance analysis large shareholders, supervision and management behavior. From the analysis, the existence of large shareholders can overcome the dispersed ownership of shareholders under the free rider problem, improve corporate governance, avoid the problem of asymmetric information. Through the supervision and management to improve the company's business activities, enhance the value of the company; but on the other hand, the major shareholder of the is obtained on the company's relative or absolute control, large shareholders tend to pursue private benefits of control and tunneling of listed companies, the cost will be emptied by all Shareholders to bear. How to inhibit the controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior? From the LLSV model, investor protection mechanism, can restrain the behavior of large shareholders, small shareholders to maintain investor confidence, promote the prosperity and development of the securities market. In the legal system perfect, the tunneling behavior of power balance can inhibit the major shareholder of the shares, lifting the value of the company. From the principal-agent theory, the principal-agent relationship between the shareholders and the management structure, to a certain extent can supervise the management behavior of large shareholders, but also will be emptied of listed companies, occupy the interests of small shareholders. If the shareholders as a valid client search agent to restrict the behavior of large shareholders. You can own the welfare loss of control in a certain range, the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholder. However, in our country lacks effective protection mechanism for investors, large shareholders The cost of illegal occupation of small and medium and small shareholders, big shareholders did not actively supervise managers to reduce the agency cost. Highly concentrated ownership also facilitates the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders, especially in China's listed companies shareholders funds serious to the value of the company and the interests of small shareholders has brought great negative impact on the lack of. Investor protection system under the condition of small shareholders rights are not effective and timely protection. At the same time, in China's listed companies equity balance degree is low, so it is really difficult to play the role of balancing the behavior of large shareholders, even the existence of collusion between major shareholders transfer of the assets of the company through the empirical results of this paper are the behavior. See, when the proportion of the first shareholder is too centralized or decentralized are not conducive to the suppression of the tunneling behavior of the company, is not conducive to increasing the value of the company. Only when the A large shareholder stake in the company to keep the interval relative holdings, the first major shareholders to actively participate in corporate governance can reduce agency cost, reduce the extent of tunneling of listed companies, to promote the improvement of corporate value. At present, China's equity balance degree is not high, but to some extent reduce the agency costs of listed companies. However, the other major shareholders cannot effectively supervise and restrain the first tunneling behavior of large shareholders, so to enhance the value of the company is not significant. It is worth noting that, in China's second largest shareholding ratio increase, have a negative impact on enhancing the value of listed companies. So, when the proportion of the first largest shareholder in the range of 30%-50%, and the second largest shareholder equity ratio is not too high, the formation of the balance equity structure of multiple large shareholders of Listed Companies in China will be conducive to the long-term development of so. This paper improve the ownership structure of Listed Companies in China to improve the behavior of large shareholder Views: build a reasonable and effective equity balance degree, holding proportion of large shareholders reasonably, the shareholding ratio is not too low by foreign invaders plunder, is not caused by excessive large shareholders' behavior lacks restriction and effective supervision; improve laws and regulations in China, increase penalties for the tunneling of major shareholders, the establishment of small and medium-sized investment protection mechanism; the promotion of small and medium shareholders the right to speak, to improve the interests of small shareholders demand channel, so that medium and small shareholders can reasonably use your vote to maintain themselves and the interests of the company.

【学位授予单位】：上海社会科学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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