基于保荐信用监管处罚的承销商声誉机制运行机理研究

发布时间：2018-04-10 07:21

本文选题：保荐信用监管处罚　切入点：声誉机制　出处：《安徽工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：保荐人制度的推行是新股发行制度的重大变革(陈冬华,2009)。保荐人的行为举动关系到IPO企业、投资者及各个利益相关者的利益,甚至是关系到金融市场的长期稳定发展,可以说具有“牵一发而动全身”的关键作用。然而,保荐人制度实施至今十余年来,在一片溢美声中,忧思之语也不绝于耳。现实中接连发生的“光大证券风波”、“万福生科”财务造假事件等保荐人丑闻事件频频曝光,也将保荐人制度推向风口浪尖,保荐人“合谋造假”“只荐不保”的标签也将公众关注的焦点拉回至审视承销商声誉及证监会证券监管处罚的效率效果上来(章铁生,2016)。在证监会保荐信用监管处罚的约束机制下,承销商声誉机制如何运行,以及会给保荐人的经济行为带来怎样的影响呢?本文的研究思路是:首先,探究证监会的保荐信用监管处罚对保荐人市场份额的影响。受到证监会保荐信用监管处罚的保荐人之后年份市场份额相比于未受到证监会保荐信用监管处罚的保荐人市场份额会显著下降。在此基础之上,考察受到证监会保荐信用监管处罚的保荐人在之后年份保荐业务中所作出的努力,发现相比于未受到保荐信用监管处罚的保荐人,受到保荐信用监管处罚的保荐人IPO抑价会显著降低。最后,考察受到证监会信用监管处罚的保荐人谨慎执业,降低IPO抑价的行为是否能够使其市场份额恢复,从而恢复其受损声誉。本文以2005-2015年保荐人及其保荐上市的IPO企业为研究样本,通过对比IPO抑价程度检验受到证监会信用监管处罚的保荐人在声誉恢复中做出的努力,发现受到证监会信用监管处罚的保荐人在IPO定价上更为谨慎,IPO抑价程度更低;本文进一步检验了受到证监会信用监管处罚的保荐人为修复受损声誉做出努力的动力机制,发现相比于未受到证监会保荐信用监管处罚的保荐人,受到证监会保荐信用监管处罚的保荐人在之后年份市场份额会显著下降,但在做出恢复声誉的努力后,市场份额有所回升,尤其是对于规模较大的保荐人其努力成效更为明显。本文的研究发现对于完善保荐人信用监管制度,发挥声誉机制规范保荐人行为,提高资本市场资源配置效率及金融市场健康稳定运行具有一定的借鉴意义。
[Abstract]:The implementation of the sponsor system is a major change in the IPO system (Chen Donghua, 2009). The sponsor's behavior related to IPO companies, investors and other stakeholders, even in relation to the financial market's long-term stable development, can be said to have a key role of "domino". However, since ten years of the implementation of the sponsor system, in a spill in the language of Bel, and also occurred in reality can be heard without end. "Everbright Securities storm", "Edmond branch of financial fraud scandal frequently sponsors events such as exposure, will also sponsor system to sponsor" fraud conspiracy "in the teeth of the storm," not only recommended protection the label will also be the focus of public attention back to examine the reputation of underwriters and the Securities Regulatory Commission punishment efficiency effect (Zhang Tiesheng, 2016). The Commission sponsor credit supervision punishment The constraint mechanism, how to run the underwriter reputation mechanism, and how to bring the impact to the economic behavior of sponsors? The idea of this paper is: firstly, explore the impact of the Commission's regulatory penalties on the sponsor sponsor credit market share. By the Commission sponsor credit supervision punishment after years of market share compared to sponsor to by the Commission sponsor creditsupervision punishment sponsor market share will decline significantly. On the basis of investigation by the Commission sponsor credit supervision punishment after year to sponsor sponsor business efforts, found that compared to the sponsor credit supervision has not been punished by the sponsor, the sponsor sponsor creditsupervision punishment IPO underpricing significantly reduced. Finally, investigation by the Commission Credit Regulatory penalties sponsor cautious practice, reduce the underpricing of IPO behavior is not able to The market share of recovery, so as to restore its reputation. The 2005-2015 year sponsor and sponsor IPO enterprises listed as the research sample, by comparing the IPO underpricing Inspection Commission credit supervision punishment by sponsors in reputation restoration efforts, found by the Commission Credit Regulatory penalties sponsor in IPO pricing more cautious, IPO underpricing is lower; the further inspection by the Commission regulation of credit punishment mechanism to make the sponsor for the repair of damaged reputation, not by the Commission found that compared to the sponsor credit supervision punishment by the Commission sponsor, sponsor creditsupervision penalty sponsor will significantly decrease the market share in the year after. But in making efforts to restore his reputation after the market rebounded, especially for larger sponsors of their efforts more clearly The findings of this research. To improve the sponsor credit supervision system, develop the reputation mechanism to regulate the behavior of the sponsor, has a certain significance to improve the efficiency of capital market allocation of resources and financial market healthy and stable operation.

【学位授予单位】：安徽工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51

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