卖空机制对企业盈余管理影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-22 03:11

本文选题：卖空机制 + 真实盈余管理　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文以2010年3月我国融资融券制度的推出为背景,利用上市公司2008年至2015年的相关数据,通过构建双重差分模型检验了卖空机制对上市公司盈余管理行为的作用机制。本文发现,基于对应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理之间的“替代”作用的分析,卖空机制对上市公司不同类别的盈余管理行为有不同的影响。其中,卖空机制对上市公司的应计盈余管理行为具有抑制作用,但对上市公司的真实盈余管理行为具有促进作用。这说明,卖空机制目前对上市公司的盈余管理行为的影响依然是肤浅的,只能对其表面的盈余管理行为起到约束作用。而对于更加隐蔽的真实盈余管理行为却并没有显著的抑制作用,反而促使上市公司管理层寻求更高水平的真实盈余管理来替代应计盈余管理水平降低所带来的影响。这也说明了上市公司管理层在面对外部监管加强时其行为的复杂性。另外,本文通过对研究样本从外部机构投资者和内部管理层激励机制两个角度进行分组,研究了卖空机制的公司治理效应的发挥所依赖的公司治理环境。并发现,高机构投资者持股比例有助于卖空机制公司治理效应的发挥,但是即使是机构投资者持股比例高的组,上市公司的真实盈余管理水平依然在卖空机制推出之后有所增加,这说明,机构投资者的公司治理效应也比较有限。而上市公司设计的管理层薪酬契约在一定程度上增大了管理层进行盈余操纵的动机,这也是管理层寻求更高水平的真实盈余管理行为对应计盈余管理进行替代的动因之一。
[Abstract]:This paper, based on the introduction of the financial margin system in China in March 2010, uses the related data of the listed companies from 2008 to 2015 to test the mechanism of the effect of short selling mechanism to the earnings management of listed companies through the construction of a dual difference model. The short selling mechanism has different effects on the earnings management behavior of different categories of listed companies. The short selling mechanism has a inhibitory effect on the accrued earnings management behavior of listed companies, but it can promote the real earnings management behavior of listed companies. This shows that the short selling mechanism is currently on the earnings management of listed companies. The effect is still superficial and only restrains the earnings management behavior on its surface, but it has no significant inhibitory effect on the more concealed real earnings management behavior, but on the contrary, it encourages the management of listed companies to seek a higher level of real earnings management to reduce the level of earnings management. This also illustrates the complexity of the behavior of the listed company management in the face of external supervision and strengthening. In addition, by grouping the research samples from two perspectives of the external institutional investors and the internal management incentive mechanism, this paper studies the corporate governance environment that the corporate governance effect of the short selling mechanism is dependent on. The shareholding ratio of high institutional investors contributes to the exertion of the corporate governance effect of short selling mechanism, but even the group with high proportion of institutional investors, the real earnings management level of listed companies is still increasing after the introduction of short selling mechanism, which shows that the corporate governance effect of institutional investors is also limited. The management salary contract has increased the motivation of management in a certain degree, which is one of the reasons for the management to seek a higher level of real earnings management to replace the earnings management.

【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】