大股东认购行为对定向增发折价率影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-05-12 12:49

本文选题：定向增发 + 大股东认购　；参考：《云南财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：定向增发在我国其实算是一件新生事物。2005年之前鲜有定向增发案例,个别增发也极不规范。然而股权分置改革的推进和陆续出台的法律规范为之后定向增发在我国的发展打下基础。从2013年开始,我国上市公司定向增发呈现井喷式的增长。2015年全年上市公司实施定向增发近900次,较2014年几乎增长100%,近似于2008年至2012年的定向增发总数。然而伴随爆发式增长,随之而来的是各种定增乱象。大股东凭借自身对上市公司的控制权,通过定向增发侵蚀上市公司资产,扰动市场秩序。造成这种现状的原因有我国资本市场不成熟、上市公司股权结构不合理、公司治理机制不完善以及缺乏理性的投资者等。但根本原因在于定向增发中大量存在的套利空间刺激了大股东的逐利动机。因此探究大股东是如何通过定向增发攫取上市公司利益具有非常重要的意义。当前国内外对定向增发的研究主要集中在其对公司短期股价表现的宣告效应和长期业绩影响上,对大股东侵占中小股东利益的研究主要集中在资产侵蚀和特殊财务安排上,把二者结合在一起,研究大股东通过定向增发攫取上市公司利益侵占中小股东利益的研究比较少。而在这些研究中,对上市公司大股东在定向增发过程中起的具体作用研究的结论又不是很明确。本文在前人研究的基础上,结合我国当前现状,选取2012年至2015年全部沪深A股定向增发数据,剔除数据不全的样本后,共计1186个样本来研究大股东认购比例和定向增发折价率之间的关系。研究结果显示大股东认购会对定向增发折价率有一个显著的正向影响,说明大股东在上市公司定向增发过程中确实存在通过自身对上市公司控制能力,低价认购上市公司股份获取超额收益,侵害中小股东利益的情况。同时市场对定向增发中的大股东逐利动机能够有所识别,并对其认购行为持消极态度,使得定向增发无法达到最优效率。因此,为了保护中小股东利益,也为了使定向增发能够更好地发挥作用,有必要制定更严格的相关规定,使定向增发定价过程更为公平透明。
[Abstract]:Private placement is a new thing in our country. Before 2005, there are few cases of additional directional issuance, and individual additional issuance is also extremely irregular. However, the promotion of the split share structure reform and the introduction of legal norms lay the foundation for the development of directional additional issuance in China. Since 2013, China's listed companies have shown a blowout growth. In 2015, the listed companies implemented nearly 900 additional directional offerings, almost 100 times more than in 2014, which is similar to the total number of targeted additional offerings from 2008 to 2012. However, with explosive growth, there is a variety of fixed chaos. By virtue of their own control over the listed companies, the majority shareholders erode the assets of the listed companies and disturb the market order. The reasons for this situation are the immature capital market, the unreasonable ownership structure of listed companies, the imperfect corporate governance mechanism and the lack of rational investors. But the fundamental reason is that the large amount of arbitrage space in the directional placement stimulates the profit motive of the large shareholders. Therefore, it is of great significance to explore how large shareholders grab the interests of listed companies through targeted issuance. At present, domestic and foreign researches on directional placement mainly focus on the announcement effect and long-term performance of the company's short-term stock price performance, while the research on the large shareholders' encroachment on the interests of minority shareholders is mainly focused on asset erosion and special financial arrangements. Combining the two, there is less research on the large shareholders grabbing the interests of the listed companies through the directional additional issuance, and the interests of the minority shareholders. In these studies, the conclusion of the research on the role of large shareholders of listed companies in the process of directional placement is not very clear. On the basis of previous studies, this paper selects all the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share directional additional issuance data from 2012 to 2015, combining with the current situation in China, and excludes the incomplete data samples. A total of 1186 samples were used to study the relationship between the subscription ratio of large shareholders and the discount rate of directional additional offering. The results show that the subscription of large shareholders will have a significant positive effect on the discount rate of directional additional offering, which indicates that the majority shareholders do have the ability to control the listed company through their own ability in the process of directional additional offering. Low-priced shares of listed companies to obtain excess income, against the interests of small and medium shareholders. At the same time, the market can recognize the motivation of the large shareholders to pursue the profit, and hold a negative attitude towards their subscription behavior, which makes it impossible to achieve the optimal efficiency. Therefore, in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders, but also to make the placement of additional offerings can play a better role, it is necessary to formulate more stringent relevant regulations, so that the pricing process of directional placement is more fair and transparent.
【学位授予单位】：云南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51

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