安泰集团大股东掏空行为研究

发布时间：2018-05-13 03:14

本文选题：大股东 + 掏空行为　；参考：《湘潭大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：一直以来,大股东对上市公司的“掏空”行为在全球多个国家均有发生,“掏空”的方式也愈发复杂和隐蔽。据资料显示,近十几年中,我国证券市场有近十分之一的资金流失都是由上市公司大股东“掏空”行为所致。因此,深入分析大股东“掏空”行为,对实现资本市场长远有序地发展具有一定的现实意义。本文主要研究大股东的“掏空”行为,共分为五个部分。第一部分,从大股东“掏空”的原因、方式、“掏空”对公司业绩以及资本市场的影响等几个方面,对国内外相关文献进行了梳理。第二部分,从概念上界定了大股东”掏空“行为,并以委托代理理论、利益相关者理论和控制权私人收益理论为基础,分析了大股东“掏空”行为产生的原因。第三部分,选取安泰集团为案例公司,通过对其大股东“掏空”事件的回顾,分析发现安泰集团大股东主要通过关联方资金占用、违规为关联方提供担保等方式“掏空”上市公司。第四部分,利用安泰集团近五年的财务数据,对大股东的“掏空”行为进行了后果和原因分析,发现安泰集团大股东“掏空”行为对企业未来的持续经营造成了非常恶劣的影响。同时研究发现,导致大股东产生“掏空”行为的原因包括中小股东不作为、大股东与关联方之间关系复杂、公司内部治理结构不合理、外部监管力度不足等几个方面。第五部分,针对上述原因,提出了制约安泰集团大股东“掏空”行为的建议。本文采取了理论结合实际的方法,对大股东“掏空”行为进行了系统地分析。一方面丰富了已有文献在相关方面的研究;另一方面,能让中小股东更为清楚地了解大股东“掏空”行为,并增强防范意识。同时,本文以案例公司的角度提出了几点建议,对制约大股东“掏空”行为、提升公司治理水平具有一定的参考性意义。
[Abstract]:For a long time, the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders on listed companies has occurred in many countries around the world, and the way of "tunneling" has become more complex and covert. According to the data, in the past ten years, nearly 1/10 of the capital loss in China's securities market is caused by the "hollowing" behavior of the major shareholders of listed companies. Therefore, it is of practical significance to analyze the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders in order to realize the long-term orderly development of capital market. This paper mainly studies the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders, which is divided into five parts. The first part, from the major shareholders "tunneling" reasons, ways, "tunneling" on the company's performance and the impact of the capital market, and other aspects of the relevant literature at home and abroad have been combed. In the second part, the author defines the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders conceptually, and analyzes the causes of the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders based on the principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory and private income theory of control. The third part, select Antai Group as the case company, through the review of the "tunneling" event of its major shareholders, we find that the majority shareholders of Antai Group mainly through the related party funds occupied. Violation of the related party to provide security and other ways to "empty" listed companies. The fourth part, using the financial data of Antai Group in the past five years, analyzes the consequences and causes of the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders. It is found that the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders of Aetai Group has a very bad effect on the future operation of the company. At the same time, it is found that the causes of the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders include the omission of minority shareholders, the complexity of the relationship between major shareholders and related parties, the unreasonable internal governance structure of the company, the insufficient external supervision and so on. The fifth part, in view of the above reasons, puts forward the suggestion of restricting Antai Group's "tunneling" behavior. In this paper, theoretical and practical methods are adopted to systematically analyze the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders. On the one hand, it enriches the relevant research in the literature; on the other hand, it can make the minority shareholders understand the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders more clearly, and enhance the awareness of prevention. At the same time, this paper puts forward some suggestions from the angle of case company, which has certain reference significance for restricting the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders and improving the corporate governance level.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F406.7;F426.7;F832.51

【参考文献】