买方压力、机构持股与分析师预测偏差

发布时间：2018-05-26 14:43

本文选题：利益冲突 + 买方客户压力　；参考：《证券市场导报》2017年10期

【摘要】：资本市场中,证券分析师面临机构投资者的买方压力,从而更倾向于发布乐观预测。同时,机构投资者作为公司股东,会在一定程度上对公司相关信息存在监督作用。正是在这种背景下,本文考察买方客户压力、机构持股特征对于证券分析师盈余预测偏差的影响。研究发现:第一,来自买方客户压力的利益冲突,会显著增强分析师预测的乐观偏差;第二,公司层面的机构持股程度具有监督效应,并明显降低了分析师预测乐观偏差;第三,在边际上,机构持股比例的提高,对于因买方客户压力而导致的分析师乐观偏差存在明显的修正作用。本文研究对于监管部门进一步规范资本市场信息传递以及投资者如何理解分析师预测具有明晰的参考意义。
[Abstract]:In capital markets, securities analysts face pressure from institutional investors to buy money and are more likely to issue optimistic forecasts. At the same time, institutional investors, as shareholders of the company, will supervise the company information to a certain extent. It is in this context that this paper examines the influence of buyer's customer pressure and institutional ownership characteristics on the bias of earnings forecast of securities analysts. The results show that: first, the conflicts of interest from the buyer's customers will significantly enhance the optimistic bias of analysts' forecasts; second, the degree of institutional ownership at the firm level has a supervisory effect, and significantly reduces the optimistic bias of analysts' forecasts; Third, on the margin, the increase of institutional shareholding ratio has a significant correction to the bias of analysts' optimism caused by buyer's customer pressure. This study has a clear reference significance for regulators to further regulate the transmission of capital market information and how investors understand the analyst forecast.
【作者单位】：华中科技大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“智力资本、公司行为与公司价值(71372130)”与“机构投资者、交易制度与信息效率(71173078)”的资助
【分类号】：F832.51

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