关联担保的债务风险转移

发布时间：2018-06-04 21:15

本文选题：关联担保 + 诉讼风险　；参考：《中国工业经济》2017年08期

【摘要】：担保机制是资本市场中的一个重要的增信机制。关联担保是信用机制缺失和信贷市场不发达的背景下内生的,在中国具有普遍性。关联担保是把"双刃剑",可以提高企业融资规模,降低投资不足程度,但也会导致信用过度使用,出现风险失控。日趋严厉的监管政策下,关联担保的经济后果如何?系统研究关联担保与关联方之间的风险转移及其约束机制具有重要的实践意义。本文以2003—2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究上市公司对关联方提供的担保额与担保方债务诉讼风险的关系。实证结果表明,上市公司为下属公司或子公司提供的关联担保越高,其面临的诉讼风险越大。进一步的研究发现,在公司治理较好或外部约束较强的环境下,关联担保与诉讼之间的关系较弱,甚至负相关。外部约束机制如地区法制化程度和审计质量、内部治理因素如财务杠杆、投资机会和大股东持股比例都会影响上述关系。研究表明,更完善的约束机制能使关联担保发挥更多的正面效果,降低债务风险,使担保双方实现共赢与发展。
[Abstract]:Guarantee mechanism is an important credit increasing mechanism in capital market. Affiliated guarantee is endogenous in the absence of credit mechanism and underdeveloped credit market. It is universal in China. Affiliated guarantee is a double-edged sword, which can increase the scale of enterprise financing and reduce the degree of underinvestment, but it will also lead to excessive use of credit and risk loss. What are the economic consequences of associated guarantees under increasingly stringent regulatory policies? It is of great practical significance to systematically study the risk transfer and its binding mechanism between associated guarantee and related party. This paper studies the relationship between the amount of guarantee provided by the listed company to the related party and the litigation risk of the secured party based on the sample of China A-share listed company from 2003 to 2014. The empirical results show that the higher the affiliated guarantee provided by listed companies for their subsidiaries or subsidiaries, the greater the litigation risk they face. Further studies show that the relationship between related guarantee and litigation is weak or even negative in the environment of good corporate governance or strong external constraints. External restraint mechanisms such as the degree of regional legalization and audit quality, internal governance factors such as financial leverage, investment opportunities and the proportion of major shareholders will affect the above relationships. The research shows that the more perfect constraint mechanism can make the affiliated guarantee play more positive effects, reduce the debt risk, and make both parties achieve win-win and development.
【作者单位】：中央财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“选择性执法——基于债务诉讼的经验证据”(批准号71572210)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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