我国上市公司治理结构对股价信息影响研究

发布时间：2018-06-16 00:47

本文选题：股价信息 + 公司治理　；参考：《上海社会科学院》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：股价信息是指股价在历史盈余信息之外对未来盈余进行预测的信息部分,从有效市场理论的角度看来,股价信息的高低往往意味着市场效率的高低。从学者们的研究来看,大量文献从如何度量、决定因素以及经济后果等方面对股价信息进行研究分析。本文在整理分析学者们的研究基础上,主要进行了两方面的研究,一是对我国历年股价信息进行测度,二是立足公司治理结构因素,分析公司层面因素对股价信息的影响。在股价信息测度方面,本文采用非同步性波动的方法对股价信息进行了测算,从本文测算的结果来看,我国A股市场股价信息增量明显。整体来看,我国A股市场在测算的17年中有12年处于上升状态;从各个板块来看,中小板、创业板的股价信息质量略高于主板;从各个行业来看,化工、机械、传媒等行业的股价信息较高,银行、非银金融、钢铁等行业的股价信息较低。在公司治理结构因素对股价信息的影响研究方面,本文首先使用委托代理模型进行分析,使用了简单委托代理模型、带议价能力的委托代理模型以及双重委托代理模型三种模型,并在模型的基础上,结合学者的研究,提出了十二条假设,并为这些假设设计实证模型。本文使用面板数据方面对这些模型进行了实证分析,并最终得出以下结论:第一,管理层薪酬与股价信息之间存在着负相关的关系。随着管理层议价能力的提高,管理层进行盈余管理的能力与动力都相应提高,相应的公司信息披露减少,导致股价信息降低。第二,提高管理层持股将是提高股价信息、降低管理层薪酬负敏感度的有效措施。管理层持股能够有效提高管理层与公司股东之间的利益一致性,从而能够促使管理层提高公司信息的披露,从而提高股价信息含量。第三,就股权结构而言,大股东持股比例的提高将有效提高股价信息含量,同时,股权制衡的提高也有利于股价信息含量的提高。第四,就监督而言,从本文的实证结果来看,无论是交叉上市还是独立董事,都不能起到提高股价信息的作用。第五,股权激励并不能提高股价信息。
[Abstract]:Stock price information refers to the information part of stock price forecasting future earnings in addition to historical earnings information. From the perspective of efficient market theory, stock price information often means the level of market efficiency. From the research of scholars, a large number of literatures analyze the stock price information from the aspects of how to measure, determinant factors and economic consequences. Based on the research of scholars, this paper mainly researches on two aspects: one is to measure stock price information over the years in China, the other is to analyze the influence of company level factors on stock price information based on corporate governance structure. In the aspect of stock price information measurement, this paper uses the method of non-synchronous fluctuation to measure the stock price information. From the result of this paper, we can see that the increment of stock price information in A-share market of our country is obvious. On the whole, the A share market in China has been on the rise for 12 of the 17 years measured; from the view of each plate, the stock price information quality of the small and medium-sized boards and the gem is slightly higher than that of the main board; from the point of view of various industries, the chemical industry, machinery, Media and other sectors of the stock price information, banking, non-bank finance, steel and other industries share price information is low. In the research of the influence of corporate governance structure factors on stock price information, this paper first uses the principal-agent model to analyze, and uses a simple principal-agent model. There are three kinds of models with bargaining power and two kinds of principal-agent models. On the basis of these models and combined with the research of scholars, twelve hypotheses are put forward, and empirical models are designed for these hypotheses. This paper uses panel data to make an empirical analysis of these models, and finally draws the following conclusions: first, there is a negative correlation between management compensation and stock price information. With the improvement of management's bargaining power, the management's ability and motive force of earnings management are improved accordingly, and the corresponding company information disclosure is reduced, which leads to the decrease of stock price information. Second, improving management ownership will be an effective measure to improve stock price information and reduce the negative sensitivity of management compensation. Management shareholding can effectively improve the benefit consistency between the management and the shareholders of the company so as to promote the management to improve the disclosure of company information and thus increase the share price information content. Thirdly, as far as the ownership structure is concerned, the increase of the proportion of major shareholders will effectively improve the information content of stock price, at the same time, the increase of equity balance is also conducive to the improvement of information content of stock price. Fourth, as far as supervision is concerned, the empirical results of this paper show that neither cross-listing nor independent directors can improve stock price information. Fifth, equity incentive can not improve stock price information.
【学位授予单位】：上海社会科学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

【相似文献】