农户小额信用贷款事后道德风险因素博弈分析

发布时间：2018-07-10 00:55

  本文选题：农户 + 信用社　； 参考：《社会科学战线》2017年07期

【摘要】：农户小额信用贷款在解决农民贷款融资难的同时,由于信息不对称和核查成本过高,导致道德风险日益突出,成为农户小额信用贷款健康发展的瓶颈。文章基于博弈理论,构建了农户和信用社之间的博弈矩阵,分析了因农户谎报项目收益及恶意赖账的违约行为形成的事后道德风险的析出因素。研究结果显示,适当控制好贷款利率、贷款额度、贷款期限,加大对违约行为的处罚力度,控制好农户自有资金和贷款资金比例,加强对违约行为的核查力度可有效抑制农户事后道德风险,并从强化农户信用意识、构建信用担保机制、加强信用社内部制度建设、建立农业生产风险转移机制等方面给出控制农户事后道德风险的宏观政策建议。
[Abstract]:At the same time, because of the asymmetry of information and the high cost of verification, the moral hazard is becoming more and more prominent, which becomes the bottleneck of the healthy development of farmers' small credit loans. Based on the game theory, this paper constructs a game matrix between farmers and credit cooperatives, and analyzes the precipitating factors of moral hazard caused by farmers' false reporting of project income and maliciously defaulting behavior. The results show that the appropriate control of loan interest rates, loan quotas, loan duration, increase penalties for violations of the law, control the proportion of farmers' own funds and loan funds, To strengthen the verification of breach of contract can effectively restrain the subsequent moral hazard of farmers, and strengthen the credit consciousness of farmers, construct the credit guarantee mechanism, and strengthen the internal system construction of credit cooperatives. The macro policy suggestions on controlling farmers' afterwards moral hazard are put forward in the aspects of establishing agricultural production risk transfer mechanism and so on.
【作者单位】： 吉林大学商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(15YJC79152) 吉林省教育厅“十二五”社会科学研究规划项目(2014B004)
【分类号】：F832.43
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本文编号：2111387