银行商誉资本与货币竞争性发行——来自中国白银风潮前夕银行微观数据的经验证据

发布时间：2018-07-20 21:16

【摘要】：1976年哈耶克提出了货币非国家化理论,主张赋予私人银行独立的货币发行权以约束政府滥发货币的行为,但反对者认为追求私利的发钞行必将无限增发货币引致通胀。文章将银行的发行和信贷统一起来分析银行声誉如何影响其发行行为,研究表明:在竞争性发行条件下,声誉机制能够有效地约束发钞行的行为,银行因追求长远收益而稳健发行。进而,文章以银行的生存历史和是否为上海银行公会会员度量声誉,利用白银风潮前夕中国34家发钞行和150家银行的微观数据检验声誉机制的作用,研究发现:声誉越好的银行,兑换券发行越稳健;声誉为银行带来了诸多经营优势,如更多的实收资本、盈余积累和存款,以致声誉好的银行贷款规模更大,利润水平更高;发钞行确实是因追求长远收益而稳健发行。根据民国时期银行竞争性发行的历史经验,文章首次为货币非国家化理论提供了微观证据,也为当前的货币政策制定和人民币国际化提供了启示。
[Abstract]:Hayek put forward the theory of non-nationalization of money in 1976 and advocated giving independent currency issue power to private banks to restrain the government from issuing money indiscriminately. This paper unifies the issue of bank and credit to analyze how the reputation of the bank affects its issuing behavior. The research shows that under the condition of competitive issuance, the reputation mechanism can effectively restrain the behavior of the issuing bank. Banks issue steadily in pursuit of long-term profits. Furthermore, based on the existence history of banks and whether they are public members of Shanghai Bank, the paper uses the microcosmic data of 34 banknote issuers and 150 banks on the eve of the silver storm to examine the role of reputation mechanisms. It is found that the better the reputation, the more stable the issuing of convertible bonds, the more advantages the reputation brings to the banks, such as more paid-in capital, surplus accumulation and deposits, resulting in larger loan scale and higher profit level of the banks with good reputation. The money bank is indeed due to the pursuit of long-term income and steady issuance. Based on the historical experience of competitive issuance of banks during the Republic of China, the paper provides the microcosmic evidence for the theory of non-nationalization of currency for the first time, as well as the enlightenment for the current monetary policy formulation and the internationalization of RMB.
【作者单位】：华南师范大学经济与管理学院华南市场经济研究中心;上海财经大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金(12CJL010)
【分类号】：F832.9

【共引文献】