信托公司为什么“刚性兑付”——基于声誉机制的解释
发布时间：2018-10-21 10:53
【摘要】：本文在KMRW声誉模型的基础上,构建了"监管机构—信托公司—投资者"三方多阶段博弈模型来研究信托公司"刚性兑付"问题。分析认为,由于投资者缺乏识别和定价能力,以及监管机构的准入审批和评级机制,使信托公司可以利用监管机构的"信用背书",在前期通过"刚性兑付"建立声誉,进而在未来获取超额收益,因此"刚性兑付"成为信托公司的必然选择。利用68家信托公司2010-2015年度数据,实证分析发现当期声誉与下一期收益呈现出显著正相关关系,好声誉能够为信托公司带来更高收益。对此,应当从加强投资者教育、转变监管方式、强化信托公司治理三个方面来打破"刚性兑付"。
[Abstract]:On the basis of KMRW reputation model, this paper constructs a three-stage game model of "Superintendence-Trust company-investor" to study the problem of "rigid payment" of trust companies. The analysis shows that because investors lack the ability to identify and price, as well as the admission approval and rating mechanism of the regulatory bodies, trust companies can use the "credit endorsement" of the regulators to build up their reputation through "rigid payment" in the early stage. Then in the future to obtain excess income, so "rigid payment" has become the inevitable choice of trust companies. Based on the data of 68 trust companies from 2010 to 2015, the empirical analysis shows that there is a significant positive correlation between current reputation and the next period of income, and good reputation can bring higher returns for trust companies. Therefore, we should strengthen investor education, change the mode of supervision and strengthen the governance of trust companies to break the "rigid payment".
【作者单位】： 山东大学经济研究院;
【分类号】：F832.39
[Abstract]:On the basis of KMRW reputation model, this paper constructs a three-stage game model of "Superintendence-Trust company-investor" to study the problem of "rigid payment" of trust companies. The analysis shows that because investors lack the ability to identify and price, as well as the admission approval and rating mechanism of the regulatory bodies, trust companies can use the "credit endorsement" of the regulators to build up their reputation through "rigid payment" in the early stage. Then in the future to obtain excess income, so "rigid payment" has become the inevitable choice of trust companies. Based on the data of 68 trust companies from 2010 to 2015, the empirical analysis shows that there is a significant positive correlation between current reputation and the next period of income, and good reputation can bring higher returns for trust companies. Therefore, we should strengthen investor education, change the mode of supervision and strengthen the governance of trust companies to break the "rigid payment".
【作者单位】： 山东大学经济研究院;
【分类号】：F832.39
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