基于博弈论的知识产权质押价值评估
发布时间：2019-07-08 14:37
【摘要】：自2015年知识产权制度改革被提出以来,“知识产权”这一名词多次在国家的重大和重要会议上被提及。在打造文化强国和扶持中小企业发展两方面都扮演着重要角色的“知识产权”受到越来越多的关注。在经济发展的今天,在我国科技兴国的今天,创新是国家进步和发展的灵魂,国家的创新能为经济发展注入活力,从而促进其发展。然而,我国的经济发展也存在一个明显的特点,中小企业数量庞大,且这类企业贡献全国GDP的近67%。由于良莠不齐的中小企业发展状况不一,且扩大规模需要的资金渠道难获取,中小企业融资难的问题在我国越来越凸显。尤其是轻资产型的科技型中小企业,由于所等提供的不动产抵押物少,要想获得融资比其他企业更为困难。“知识产权质押融资”的模式能解决中小企业融资难的同时促进创新,因此,这一模式一经提出就受到了企业和政府极大的欢迎。然而,随着新模式的提出,越来越多的问题也逐渐显露,知识产权质押融资的实践还有很多问题等着我们去解决。在知识产权质押融资的实践中,知识产权质押价值的确定是一大难题。由于知识产权质押问题的研究处于起步阶段,可以参考的理论和实践资料都有限,难以形成统一的能同时让企业、银行、政府都满意的标准。鉴于此,本文借鉴了博弈论的理论,和纳什均衡分别从各利益相关方的角度,对知识产权质押融资中利益相关方的博弈进行分析。为了便于分析与理解,本文主要是从企业和银行两个角度来进行分析,并建立企业和银行的静态和动态博弈模型。通过模型分析知识产权质押融资中企业和银行的博弈关系,并通过模拟企业和银行的博弈的结果,结合案例分析对知识产权的质押价值进行评估。通过对银企关系的分析,找出制约知识产权质押模式发展的原因,给出相对合理的知识产权质押价值,为化解利益相关方之间的矛盾,促进合作提供一定的参考意见。
[Abstract]:Since the introduction of the reform of the intellectual property system in 2015, the "Intellectual Property" has been mentioned several times in major and important meetings of the State. The "Intellectual Property" that plays an important role in building a cultural power and supporting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises has attracted more and more attention. In the present day of the economic development, the innovation is the soul of the country's progress and development, and the innovation of the country can inject vitality into the economic development, thus promoting its development. However, the economic development of our country also has a clear characteristic, the number of small and medium-sized enterprises is large, and such enterprises contribute nearly 67% of the national GDP. The problems of small and medium-sized enterprises are becoming more and more prominent in our country because of the uneven development of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the difficult access to the capital channels needed for the expansion of the scale. In particular, small and medium-sized small and medium-sized enterprises of light asset type, due to the lack of the real property collateral provided by the company, it is more difficult to obtain the financing than other enterprises. The model of "intellectual property pledge financing" can solve the difficulty of the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, and promote innovation. Therefore, this model has been greatly welcomed by the enterprises and the government once it is put forward. However, with the development of the new model, more and more problems are gradually revealed, and the practice of the intellectual property pledge financing has many problems waiting for us to solve. In the practice of the pledge financing of intellectual property, the determination of the pledge value of the intellectual property is a big problem. Because the research of the issue of the pledge of intellectual property is in the initial stage, the theoretical and practical information that can be referenced is limited, it is difficult to form a unified standard which can satisfy both the enterprise, the bank and the government at the same time. In view of this, this paper, based on the theory of game theory and Nash equilibrium, analyzes the game of interest-related parties in the intellectual property pledge financing from the angle of the relevant parties. In order to facilitate the analysis and understanding, this paper mainly analyzes the two angles of the enterprise and the bank, and sets up the static and dynamic game model of the enterprise and the bank. Through the model analysis, the game relationship between the enterprise and the bank in the intellectual property pledge financing is analyzed, and the pledge value of the intellectual property is evaluated by combining the result of the game between the enterprise and the bank. Through the analysis of the relationship between the bank and the enterprise, the author finds out the reason for restricting the development of the intellectual property pledge model, and gives the relative reasonable pledge value of the intellectual property right, and provides some reference for resolving the contradiction between the stakeholders and promoting the cooperation.
【学位授予单位】：云南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.4;F276.3;F275
[Abstract]:Since the introduction of the reform of the intellectual property system in 2015, the "Intellectual Property" has been mentioned several times in major and important meetings of the State. The "Intellectual Property" that plays an important role in building a cultural power and supporting the development of small and medium-sized enterprises has attracted more and more attention. In the present day of the economic development, the innovation is the soul of the country's progress and development, and the innovation of the country can inject vitality into the economic development, thus promoting its development. However, the economic development of our country also has a clear characteristic, the number of small and medium-sized enterprises is large, and such enterprises contribute nearly 67% of the national GDP. The problems of small and medium-sized enterprises are becoming more and more prominent in our country because of the uneven development of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the difficult access to the capital channels needed for the expansion of the scale. In particular, small and medium-sized small and medium-sized enterprises of light asset type, due to the lack of the real property collateral provided by the company, it is more difficult to obtain the financing than other enterprises. The model of "intellectual property pledge financing" can solve the difficulty of the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, and promote innovation. Therefore, this model has been greatly welcomed by the enterprises and the government once it is put forward. However, with the development of the new model, more and more problems are gradually revealed, and the practice of the intellectual property pledge financing has many problems waiting for us to solve. In the practice of the pledge financing of intellectual property, the determination of the pledge value of the intellectual property is a big problem. Because the research of the issue of the pledge of intellectual property is in the initial stage, the theoretical and practical information that can be referenced is limited, it is difficult to form a unified standard which can satisfy both the enterprise, the bank and the government at the same time. In view of this, this paper, based on the theory of game theory and Nash equilibrium, analyzes the game of interest-related parties in the intellectual property pledge financing from the angle of the relevant parties. In order to facilitate the analysis and understanding, this paper mainly analyzes the two angles of the enterprise and the bank, and sets up the static and dynamic game model of the enterprise and the bank. Through the model analysis, the game relationship between the enterprise and the bank in the intellectual property pledge financing is analyzed, and the pledge value of the intellectual property is evaluated by combining the result of the game between the enterprise and the bank. Through the analysis of the relationship between the bank and the enterprise, the author finds out the reason for restricting the development of the intellectual property pledge model, and gives the relative reasonable pledge value of the intellectual property right, and provides some reference for resolving the contradiction between the stakeholders and promoting the cooperation.
【学位授予单位】：云南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.4;F276.3;F275
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