高管薪酬结构、媒体报道与投资不足

发布时间：2018-01-03 13:45

本文关键词：高管薪酬结构、媒体报道与投资不足　出处：《浙江财经大学》2016年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资决策是企业财务管理的重要部分之一,它直接影响企业的生存和发展。近几年来,我国上市公司非效率投资现象越来越严重,这不仅损害了公司价值还影响企业的长期发展。委托代理问题使得企业的所有者和经营者之间存在利益冲突,管理层所做出的一些投资决策往往不是为了增加股东利益和企业价值,而是为了其自身利益。由于股东和管理者之间存在信息不对称现象,相对于股东来说处于信息优势方的管理层能够获得更多的投资信息,高管很有可能以此获利,为了其自身利益最大化而损害股东利益。有效的高管激励机制可以缓解由于所有权和经营权分离所引发的代理问题,也可以激励高管人员为企业价值最大化而做出努力。在当今信息化产业高速发展的互联网时代,媒体发展十分迅猛,并在社会、经济等各个方面扮演着重要的角色。媒体作为一种重要的信息中介,具有缓解信息不对称和公司治理的作用。一方面,媒体可以通过信息的收集、整理与分析传递给大众,从而降低信息使用者的搜集成本,降低信息不对称程度。另一方面,媒体可以通过法律、高管声誉和公众形象这三种渠道来发挥其公司治理作用(Dyck and Zingales,2002)。现有学者在实证检验时已发现我国上市公司存在投资不足行为,但是对投资不足及其影响因素的研究仍相对较少,所以应当引起更多的重视(周伟贤,2010)。在高管薪酬方面,已有文献表明高管薪酬与企业投资不足呈显著负向关系(辛清泉,2007),但还鲜有文献从薪酬结构的角度来探究其与投资不足的影响。因此本文从企业投资不足行为出发,检验高管薪酬结构与企业投资不足的关系,同时加入媒体报道这一变量,进一步实证检验媒体报道对高管薪酬结构与投资不足关系的影响。全文共分六章展开,各章主要内容如下:第一章是绪论,本章系统地阐述了本文研究的背景、研究意义、研究内容以及研究创新之处。第二章是文献综述。本章首先对投资不足影响因素的文献进行分析,其次总结高管薪酬对投资不足影响的研究,同时分析了媒体对投资效率影响的文献。最后对现有文献进行系统评述。第三章是理论分析与研究假设。本章首先对高管薪酬结构、媒体报道与投资不足的相关概念进行介绍;其次对委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、激励理论以及声誉机制进行论述,同时提出了本文的研究假设。第四章是研究设计。本章主要描述了数据的来源及样本的筛选过程,并构建本文的回归模型,同时对于模型所需要的主要变量进行说明。第五章是实证检验与结果分析。本章对样本数据进行计量分析,包括描述性统计、相关性检验及多元回归分析,并将实证结果结合实际情况进行分析。第六章是研究结论、建议与局限。本章全面梳理了文章的研究结论,并根据实际存在的具体问题提出了相应的政策建议,同时也指出本文研究的局限性。本文的研究得出以下结论:由于委托代理问题的存在,上市公司普遍存在非效率投资现象,其中投资不足的问题更为严重。在职消费占总薪酬比重与投资不足呈负相关关系,而货币薪酬对在职消费替代性与投资不足呈正相关关系,这说明当薪酬一定时在职消费较于货币薪酬会更有利于提高企业投资效率,但在职消费的使用需要受到一定的限制。媒体报道对投资不足产生负向影响,说明媒体监督能够有效改善企业投资不足现象,并且媒体报道变量的加入,增强了在职消费占总薪酬比重对投资不足的负向作用,减弱了货币薪酬对在职消费替代性与投资不足的正向关系。最后,针对本文得出的研究结论从三个角度提出相关政策建议。第一,完善企业高管薪酬激励机制的设计;第二,完善企业内部治理结构,建立健全监督管理机制;第三,重视媒体的监督与公司治理功能。本文的创新之处主要有:第一,现有文献较多从非效率投资整体出发,而对投资不足的研究相对较少,因此本文将投资不足作为研究的切入点,考虑各解释变量对投资不足的作用;第二,本文将在职消费占总薪酬比重与货币薪酬对在职消费的替代性作为薪酬结构的变量,衡量其对投资不足的影响,为投资不足的研究提供新的视角,同时也可以更加辩证的看待在职消费,发挥在职消费的积极作用。
[Abstract]:Investment decision-making is an important part of enterprise financial management, it directly affects the survival and development of enterprises. In recent years, China's inefficient investment of listed companies is becoming more and more serious, which not only damages the value of the company but also influence the long-term development of the enterprise. The principal-agent problem makes the conflict of interests between the owner and the operator of the enterprise. Some of the investment decision of management is not to increase shareholder value and enterprise value, but for its own interests. Because of the existence of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, shareholders in relation to the management information superiority can get more investment information, executives are likely to profit, for their own interests the damage to the interests of shareholders. Effective incentive mechanism can alleviate the caused by the separation of ownership and management agency problem, It can motivate executives to maximize the value of enterprises and efforts. In today's rapid development of information industry in the Internet era, the media development is very rapid, and in the social, economic and other aspects play an important role. The media as an important information intermediary, can alleviate the information asymmetry and the effect of corporate governance on the one hand. The media, through information collection, collation and analysis of transfer to the public, so as to reduce the cost of collecting the information users, reduce the degree of information asymmetry. On the other hand, the media can pass laws, executive reputation and public image of the three channels to play its role in corporate governance (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). The existing scholars have been found there is insufficient investment behavior of Chinese Listed Companies in the empirical test, but the study on the factors of insufficient investment and its influence is still relatively small, so we should pay more Attention (Zhou Weixian, 2010). In the executive pay, the literature shows a significant negative relationship between the lack of executive compensation and corporate investment (Xin Qingquan, 2007), but there is little literature from the salary structure perspective to explore the influence and the lack of investment. So this article from the under investment behavior of the relationship between executive inspection the salary structure and corporate investment, also joined the media coverage of this variable, to test the impact of media on the structure of executive compensation and the lack of investment relations. The paper is divided into six chapters, the main contents of each chapter are as follows: the first chapter is the introduction, this chapter systematically elaborates the research background, research significance, research the content of research and innovation. The second chapter is literature review. This chapter firstly inadequate investment factors analysis of the literature research, secondly summarizes the executive compensation for investment is not enough influence, the same Analysis of the impact of media on investment efficiency. Finally, the literature systematic review of existing literature. The third chapter is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. This chapter begins with the structure of executive compensation related concepts are introduced. The lack of media coverage and investment; secondly, the principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, incentive theory and reputation mechanism discuss and put forward the hypothesis of this research. The fourth chapter is the research design. This chapter mainly describes the data sources and sample selection process, and constructs the regression model of this paper, at the same time for the main variables required by the model are described. The fifth chapter is the empirical test and analysis results. This chapter on the sample data of measurement the analysis, including descriptive statistics, correlation test and multiple regression analysis, and empirical results are analyzed with the actual situation. The sixth chapter is the conclusion of the study, suggestions and limitations. This chapter comprehensively analyzes the research conclusion, and put forward the corresponding policy recommendations according to the specific practical problems, but also pointed out the limitations of this study. This study draws the following conclusions: due to the existence of principal-agent problem, listed companies generally have the phenomenon of inefficient investment, the investment shortage is more serious the job consumption is less than the total compensation and the proportion of investment is negatively correlated, but the monetary compensation for on-the-job consumption substitution and under investment are positively related, indicating that when the salary when compared with on-the-job consumption monetary compensation will be more conducive to improve the efficiency of business investment, but the use of on-the-job consumption needs is limited. The negative media reports to illustrate the impact on investment, media supervision can effectively improve the phenomenon of insufficient investment, and the media variables added, enhance the on-the-job consumption The proportion of total compensation costs accounted for the lack of investment and negative effect, weakened the positive relationship between monetary compensation for lack of alternative investment and consumption. Finally, according to the conclusion of this article puts forward relevant policy suggestions from three aspects. First, to improve the design of executive compensation incentive mechanism; second, improve the internal governance the structure, establish and improve the supervision and management mechanism; third, pay attention to media supervision and corporate governance function. The main innovations of this article are: first, the existing literature more from the non efficiency investment of the whole research on the shortage of investment is relatively small, so the lack of investment as a starting point, considering the effect of explanatory variables on the insufficient investment; second, the proportion of total compensation on-the-job consumption and monetary compensation for non pecuniary compensation alternative as compensation structure variables, the measure of insufficient investment The influence is to provide a new perspective for the research on underinvestment, and at the same time, it can also take a more dialectical view of the on-the-job consumption and play the active role of on-the-job consumption.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F272.92;F275

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