融资约束下高管薪酬对企业创新投入的影响分析

发布时间：2018-03-08 08:20

本文选题：融资约束　切入点：高管薪酬　出处：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：经历了全球性的金融危机之后,全球经济重心东移,中国成为世界经济重要的增长极。然而,在发展社会主义市场经济的关键阶段,我国企业的经济效益相对较低,世界知名企业屈指可数,我国的产品明显缺乏国际竞争力。企业缺乏竞争力与企业创新不足存在较大关系,而企业的研发投入是保证企业创新持续的基本保障。由于创新具有周期长、调整成本较高等特点,当面临突然的创新活动停滞或者再延续等情况,会给企业带来不小的损耗。故而,保证不间断的创新对企业来讲非常重要。那么,关于影响企业创新的这些因素,对其进行分析就尤为重要。限制我国企业持续创新的因素很多。客观方面,包括企业的财务状况、融资方式以及资金使用情况等基于财务视角有关的因素,这些因素主要反映了企业研发投资的财务管理安排。企业进行创新需要大量的资金投入,同时也会承担较高的风险,在企业进行投资的过程中一般都面临融资约束和研发投资不足的问题。主观方面,如公司治理结构、管理层激励、高管特征以及公司规模等,反映了企业优化资源配置的治理制度安排对研发投资活动的影响。其中,高管作为公司事务的直接决策者,对企业的战略决策制定产生重要的影响,贯穿了企业进行资源配置和生产经营的各个阶段,从根本上决定了企业的发展方向和运行方式。创新活动作为企业实现发展的重要手段,很大程度上受到公司管理人的影响。基于此,本文尝试从融资约束的角度出发,探讨在此前提下公司高管薪酬对企业进行创新投入的影响问题。首先,本文对我国上市公司目前所处的投融资环境以及研发活动的投入状况进行了简要说明;其次,以融资约束和公司治理理论的现有研究成果为指导,立足于我国上市公司所处的金融环境,进行了融资约束下高管薪酬对企业创新投入影响的理论分析;最后,结合实证检验,定量分析了融资约束下高管薪酬在影响企业研发投入中发挥的作用。具体而言,本文使用理论分析与实证分析,研究重点是实证分析。实证部分基于中国中小板上市公司的面板数据构建相应的计量模型,并采用描述性统计、相关分析、回归分析和豪斯曼检验等方法,针对中国中小板上市公司融资约束、高管薪酬与企业创新的关联性运用实证进行检验。经过实证分析过程,发现融资约束下高管薪酬与企业创新投入之间存在显著的正相关关系。因而,本文认为在融资约束普遍存在的经济环境下,企业应该加强高管薪酬激励机制设计,通过提高对高管的薪酬激励水平进而促进中小企业加大研发投入力度,增强企业的创新发展能力。这对于改进我国上市公司对高管实施的激励机制、提高公司持续创新能力有一定的启示作用和实践指导意义。
[Abstract]:After the global financial crisis, the center of gravity of the global economy shifted eastward, and China became an important growth pole of the world economy. However, in the crucial stage of developing the socialist market economy, the economic benefits of Chinese enterprises are relatively low. There are only a handful of well-known enterprises in the world. Our products are obviously lacking in international competitiveness. There is a great relationship between the lack of competitiveness of enterprises and the insufficient innovation of enterprises. The R & D investment of enterprises is the basic guarantee to ensure the continuity of enterprise innovation. Because innovation has the characteristics of long period and high adjustment cost, when faced with sudden stagnation or continuation of innovation activities, It will bring great losses to the enterprise. Therefore, it is very important for the enterprise to guarantee continuous innovation. Well, about the factors that affect the innovation of the enterprise, It is particularly important to analyze it. There are many factors that limit the continuous innovation of Chinese enterprises. Objective aspects, including the financial situation of enterprises, financing methods and the use of funds, and other factors based on the financial perspective, These factors mainly reflect the financial management arrangements for enterprises'R & D investment. Enterprises need a large amount of capital investment to carry out innovation, and at the same time they will take on higher risks. In the process of investment, enterprises generally face the problems of financing constraints and underinvestment in R & D. subjective aspects, such as corporate governance structure, management incentives, executive characteristics and company size, etc. It reflects the influence of the governance system of optimizing the allocation of resources on R & D investment activities. As the direct decision makers of the company affairs, the executives have an important influence on the strategic decision making of the enterprises. It runs through all stages of enterprise resource allocation and production and management, and fundamentally determines the development direction and operation mode of the enterprise. As an important means to realize the development of the enterprise, the innovative activities are the important means of realizing the development of the enterprise. Based on this, this paper attempts to discuss the impact of executive compensation on innovation investment from the perspective of financing constraints. This paper gives a brief description of the investment and financing environment and the investment in R & D activities of listed companies in China. Secondly, it is guided by the existing research results of financing constraints and corporate governance theory. Based on the financial environment of listed companies in China, this paper makes a theoretical analysis of the effect of executive compensation on innovation investment under financing constraints. Quantitative analysis of the role of executive compensation in influencing R & D investment under financing constraints. Specifically, this paper uses theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. The empirical part is based on the panel data of Chinese small and medium board listed companies, and adopts descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, regression analysis and Hausmann test. The relationship between executive compensation and enterprise innovation is tested by empirical analysis in view of the financing constraints of Chinese small and medium-sized board listed companies and the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise innovation. It is found that there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and innovation investment under financing constraints. Therefore, this paper argues that under the prevailing economic environment of financing constraints, enterprises should strengthen the design of executive compensation incentive mechanism. By improving the incentive level of executive compensation and then promoting small and medium-sized enterprises to increase R & D investment and enhance the innovation and development ability of enterprises, this will improve the incentive mechanism of our listed companies to executives. Improving the company's ability of continuous innovation has certain enlightening effect and practical guiding significance.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F273.1;F832.51

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