制度环境、政府补贴与企业非效率投资

发布时间：2018-05-18 04:17

本文选题：政府补贴 + 制度环境　；参考：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：投资活动是企业经营活动的重要组成部分,高效的企业投资是企业资源配置的合理性的有力体现。目前我国正处在产业转型升级的关键时期,完善的市场经济体系还没有完全建立,企业的投资行为受到来自外部制度环境多方面的影响,非效率投资现象普遍存在。政府补贴对于企业的投资活动中发挥着重要的刺激和引导作用。那么,不同产权性质的企业获得的政府补贴是否会对企业投资效率产生不同的影响?在不同的制度环境下,政府补贴对于企业投资效率的影响又会有什么不同?鉴于此,本文把政府补贴对企业投资效率的影响作为研究对象,在第二章对现有的研究成果进行归纳论述的基础上,第三章进行了理论分析并据此提出研究假设。本文在委托代理理论和信息不对称理论的基础上,将非效率投资行为划分为过度投资与投资不足,分别分析政府补贴对于不同产权性质的企业投资效率的影响机制,然后加入外部制度环境因素,分析在不同的制度环境水平下,政府补贴对于企业投资效率的影响的不同表现形式,并据此提出本文的研究假设。在第四章提出本文的实证研究设计,本文选择了 2007年-2015年的新会计准则实施后的A股上市公司样本,经过数据筛选后得到12520个有效样本数据.本文数据来自于CSMAR数据库和巨潮资讯网下载的财务报告获。借鉴现有理论和研究成果建立模型,利用Excel对数据进行整理后借助SPSS22.0与Stata12.0检验政府补贴与企业投资效率之间的关系,并在第五章中通过描述性统计分析和回归分析对实证结果进行解读。在理论分析和实证检验的基础上,本文得出以下的研究结论:政府补贴对企业的投资效率有显著的影响作用。一方面政府补贴能够加剧国有企业的过度投资行为,但对国有企业的投资不足行为无显著影响;另一方面政府补贴能够加剧非国有企业的投资不足行为,但对非国有企业的过度投资行为无显著影响。在制度环境较差的地区,对于国有企业来说,政府补贴加剧了国有企业的过度投资行为和投资不足行为,而对于非国有企业来说,政府补贴加剧了非国有企业的投资不足行为。而在制度环境较好的地区,政府补贴对于国有企业和非国有企业的非效率投资行为均无显著影响;总而言之,政府补贴对于国有企业的过度投资行为和投资不足行为均有正向的作用,而政府补贴仅对非国有企业的投资不足行为有正向的影响作用。通过研究得到的结论,本文认为政府和企业可以从以下三个方面改善外部经济环境和投资效率,政策建议如下:一是建立完善的政府补贴分配机制;二是转变政府职能、加强法制和金融体系建设;三是完善公司内部治理机制,加强对管理层的监管和激励。
[Abstract]:The investment activity is an important part of the enterprise management activity, and the efficient enterprise investment is the rational embodiment of the enterprise resource allocation. At present, our country is in the key period of industrial transformation and upgrading, the perfect market economy system has not been completely established, the investment behavior of enterprises is influenced by many aspects from the external institutional environment, and the phenomenon of inefficient investment exists generally. Government subsidies play an important role in stimulating and guiding enterprises' investment activities. So, will the government subsidies obtained by enterprises with different property rights have different effects on the investment efficiency of enterprises? In different institutional environments, how will government subsidies affect the efficiency of enterprise investment? In view of this, this paper takes the effect of government subsidy on the investment efficiency of enterprises as the research object, on the basis of summarizing and discussing the existing research results in the second chapter, the third chapter makes a theoretical analysis and puts forward the research hypotheses accordingly. Based on the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory, this paper divides the inefficient investment behavior into overinvestment and underinvestment, and analyzes the influence mechanism of government subsidies on the investment efficiency of enterprises with different property rights. Then the external institutional environmental factors are added to analyze the different forms of the effects of government subsidies on the investment efficiency of enterprises under different institutional environment levels, and the research hypotheses of this paper are put forward accordingly. In the fourth chapter, the empirical research design of this paper is put forward. The sample of A-share listed companies after the implementation of the new accounting standards from 2007 to 2015 is selected in this paper. After data screening, 12520 valid sample data are obtained. The data in this article are obtained from the financial reports downloaded from the CSMAR database and the Giant Tide Information Network. Based on the existing theories and research results, this paper establishes a model, uses Excel to collate the data, and tests the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise investment efficiency by means of SPSS22.0 and Stata12.0. In the fifth chapter, the empirical results are interpreted by descriptive statistical analysis and regression analysis. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper draws the following conclusions: government subsidies have a significant impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises. On the one hand, the government subsidy can aggravate the excessive investment behavior of the state-owned enterprises, but it has no significant effect on the underinvestment behavior of the state-owned enterprises; on the other hand, the government subsidy can aggravate the underinvestment behavior of the non-state-owned enterprises. However, there is no significant effect on the over-investment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises. In areas with poor institutional environment, for state-owned enterprises, government subsidies aggravate the over-investment behavior and underinvestment behavior of state-owned enterprises, while for non-state-owned enterprises, government subsidies aggravate the underinvestment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises. However, in areas where the institutional environment is better, government subsidies have no significant impact on the inefficient investment behavior of both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. Government subsidies have a positive effect on the overinvestment behavior and underinvestment behavior of state-owned enterprises, while government subsidies only have a positive effect on the underinvestment behavior of non-state-owned enterprises. Through the conclusion of the study, this paper holds that the government and enterprises can improve the external economic environment and investment efficiency from the following three aspects: first, to establish a sound mechanism for the allocation of government subsidies; second, to transform the functions of the government. Strengthen the legal system and financial system construction; third, perfect the internal governance mechanism of the company, strengthen the supervision and incentive to the management.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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