所有权性质、股权结构与过度投资

发布时间：2018-05-26 23:36

本文选题：过度投资 + 所有权性质　；参考：《西北大学》2016年硕士论文

【摘要】：过度投资指企业投资于净现值为负的项目。研究证明过度投资是普遍存在的。由于我国的特殊政治背景,国有股一股独大,国有企业与私有企业在投资行为上表现差异很大。尤其是国有企业在所有者缺位的情况下,往往会发生过度投资行为。另外,中央政府控制的国有企业和地方政府控制的国有企业也因为管理部门不同,投资行为带有不同社会经济的特征。本文探讨了所有权性质、股权结构对过度投资的影响。首先,从委托代理关系、信息不对称问题和行为金融学角度归纳了过度投资的诱因、制约因素和计量模型。其次,从理论分析探究所有权性质、股权结构与过度投资的相关性,同时也关注了独立董事对过度投资的影响。最后,采用Richardson计量模型衡量过度投资,以2012-2014年制造业上市公司为样本,通过描述性统计、相关性分析、多元回归分析实证检验假设,得出结论：(1)国有公司过度投资的程度高于私有公司。(2)相较中央企业而言,地方企业过度投资的水平更高。(3)第一大股东持股比例和过度投资具有负相关的关系,意味着第一大股东持股比例越高过度投资程度越低,大股东起到了治理作用。(4)股权制衡度和过度投资不相关,说明股权制衡度未起到治理作用。(5)机构投资者持股比例与过度投资正相关,表明机构投资者持股并不能抑制过度投资,反而促进了过度投资。(6)独立董事比例与过度投资关系不明确,表明独立董事制度没有起到公司治理作用。本文认为：要想提高投资效率抑制过度投资,对国有企业而言,政府要减少对国有企业的干预,减少国有股持股比例,让国有企业成为独立的经济体；改善以GDP为主的政府官员考核制度；分离国资委的监督权和经营权；改善国有企业管理层的薪酬制度和行政任命制度。对上市公司而言,借助类别表决机制和限制利害关系股东表决机制提高决策的有效股权制衡度。
[Abstract]:Overinvestment refers to companies investing in projects with negative net present value (NPV). Research has proved that overinvestment is common. Due to the special political background of our country, the state-owned shares are dominant, and the investment behavior of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises is very different. In particular, state-owned enterprises in the absence of owners, often occur excessive investment behavior. In addition, state-owned enterprises controlled by central government and state-owned enterprises controlled by local governments also have different social and economic characteristics because of different management departments. This paper discusses the property of ownership and the influence of ownership structure on overinvestment. First of all, from the perspective of principal-agent relationship, information asymmetry and behavioral finance, this paper summarizes the incentives, constraints and measurement models of overinvestment. Secondly, from the theoretical analysis to explore the property of ownership, equity structure and overinvestment, but also pay attention to the independent director's influence on overinvestment. Finally, using Richardson econometric model to measure overinvestment, taking the manufacturing listed companies as a sample from 2012-2014, through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis empirical test hypothesis. It is concluded that the degree of overinvestment of state-owned companies is higher than that of private firms.) compared with the central enterprises, the level of overinvestment of local enterprises is higher than that of central enterprises.) the proportion of the largest shareholders holding shares has a negative correlation with overinvestment. This means that the higher the holding ratio of the first largest shareholder, the lower the degree of overinvestment, and the larger shareholder plays a governance role.) the degree of equity checks and balances is not related to overinvestment. It shows that the degree of equity balance does not play a governance role.) the proportion of institutional investors holding shares is positively related to overinvestment, which indicates that institutional investors holding shares can not restrain overinvestment. On the contrary, the ratio of independent directors and over-investment is not clear, indicating that the independent director system does not play a role in corporate governance. In order to improve the investment efficiency and restrain excessive investment, the government should reduce the intervention of state-owned enterprises, reduce the proportion of state-owned shares, and let state-owned enterprises become an independent economy. Improve the evaluation system of government officials based on GDP; separate the supervision and management power of SASAC; improve the salary system and administrative appointment system of the management of state-owned enterprises. For listed companies, the voting mechanism of class voting and the voting mechanism of restricted shareholders can improve the effective degree of equity balance in decision-making.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F275;F276.1;F271

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