不同产权性质下并购对高管薪酬的影响研究

发布时间：2018-09-12 08:43

【摘要】：经济全球化大势下,市场竞争日趋激烈,并购成为扩张企业产能、优化公司治理、重组产业链、实现行业整合的有效手段。伴随我国企业优胜劣汰进程的加速和资本市场容量的攀升,我国企业间并购市场发展迅猛。在为我国并购市场的欣欣向荣欢欣鼓舞之时,也不禁让我们对企业并购的初衷和效果有所疑虑。并购初期,经济效益和企业价值一度作为解释并购动因的有力工具。然而,随着并购市场的发展和研究的深入,有学者提出高管存在利用职权寻租、牟取高额收益的动机。那么并购究竟是企业提升价值的工具还是高管谋求私利的手段呢?基于以上考虑,笔者提出了并购对高管薪酬影响这一研究议题。近年来我国如火如荼的并购市场和并购后持续攀升的高管薪酬引发了笔者关于二者关系以及企业并购结果的思考。鉴于此,笔者回顾了并购对高管薪酬影响的现有研究,梳理了委托代理理论、产权理论和并购动因理论等相关理论,提出并购对高管薪酬有正向影响这一假设,并归纳出如下两条影响路径:①并购导致公司规模扩张,进而影响薪酬;②并购导致公司业绩改善,进而影响薪酬。考虑到业绩变化可能具有一定的滞后性,笔者在并购时点研究的基础上,进一步检验了并购后高管薪酬的变化。同时,结合我国特殊的政治体制和经济制度,按照产权性质的不同,本文分别从短期货币性薪酬和包括股权激励的长期薪酬两个维度,探讨并购对高管薪酬的影响这一问题。这一问题的解决,不仅对高管激励机制、并购决策的制定以及公司治理结构的完善具有实践意义,而且填补了学术界对于民营企业和不同控制层级下国有企业间并购对高管薪酬影响问题的研究空白。本文研究分为以下六个部分:第一部分为绪论。首先陈述了本文的选题背景、研究意义,界定了文中涉及的相关概念,介绍了本文的研究目标和研究内容,阐述文中选用的相关研究方法,列出行文架构,指出本文创新点,对下文的分析起到了支持作用。第二部分为文献综述。笔者从高管薪酬、并购、业绩和规模四个要素着眼,梳理了业绩、规模对高管薪酬的影响以及并购对业绩、规模和高管薪酬影响的相关研究,将五条关系链有机结合起来,明确目前并购对高管薪酬影响的研究进程和动态,提出这一领域的研究空白和改进之处。第三部分为理论分析与研究假设。基于委托代理理论,笔者提出并购对高管薪酬有促进作用,且并购当年这一促进作用通过规模扩张实现。结合产权理论以及并购动因理论,笔者对并购后高管薪酬的变化路径予以剖析,提出国有企业通过规模扩张实现并购后高管薪酬的提升,而民营企业则通过绩效改善导致并购后高管薪酬增长这一创新观点。在此基础上,按照我国国有企业控制层级的差异深入探讨,提出央企并购后高管薪酬的提升通过规模扩张实现,地方国企并购后薪酬提升则与业绩改善和规模扩张同时正相关。第四部分为实证研究设计。本文选取了 2010-2013年所有发生并购的A股上市公司为样本,剔除小规模并购和一年内非同日多次并购。由于变量计算涉及并购前后两年,本文包含2008-2015年相关数据。根据上述六个假设,笔者分别构建相应研究模型,同时对模型涉及变量的定义和度量方式予以阐释。第五部分为实证分析。笔者首先研究了并购对高管薪酬的影响,在此基础上分别针对并购时点和并购后两种情况予以探讨。在并购后的研究中,将沪深A股上市公司划分为国有上市公司和民营上市公司分组检验,再将国有上市公司按隶属差异划分为中央和地方细分研究。本部分采用了描述性统计、多元回归等实证研究方法,验证了本文的六个假设,并采用替换变量的方式,证实了实证结果的稳健性。第六部分为总结和建议。根据实证结果,按照并购阶段和产权性质的不同,笔者提出本文的研究结论;同时立足于高管激励、并购决策和公司治理三方面,针对国有企业和民营企业分别提出了改进意见和建议。最后指明文章的不足以及未来可研究的方向。在继承现有研究成果的同时,本文有如下创新。(1)此前研究多为并购当年的短期绩效比较。不同于并购后企业规模的跳跃式增长,业绩的改善在短期内具有滞后性。为使研究更加全面、结果更具说服力,本文将并购对高管薪酬的影响划分为并购时和并购后两阶段。(2)考虑到产权性质对于公司治理和高管行为的影响,笔者对于上市公司按照产权性质的差异予以分组研究,并提出两个创新观点:①民营企业并购后高管薪酬提升通过业绩改善实现;②地方国企并购后规模扩张和绩效改善共同导致高管薪酬增加。
[Abstract]:Under the trend of economic globalization, the market competition is becoming more and more intense. Mergers and acquisitions have become an effective means to expand enterprise capacity, optimize corporate governance, restructure industrial chain and realize industry integration. In the early stage of M&A, economic benefits and enterprise value were once used as powerful tools to explain the motivation of M&A. However, with the development of M&A market and the deepening of research, some scholars have proposed that senior managers have the incentive to use their power to seek rent and obtain high profits. Based on the above considerations, the author puts forward the research topic of the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation. In view of this, the author reviews the existing research on the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation, combs the related theories such as principal-agent theory, property right theory and merger motivation theory, puts forward the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions have a positive impact on executive compensation, and sums up the following two impact paths: (1) mergers and acquisitions lead to the expansion of the company size, and then shadow Considering the lag of performance changes, the author further examines the changes of executive compensation after merger and acquisition on the basis of the study of merger and acquisition time points. At the same time, this paper divides into two parts according to the different nature of property rights according to the special political and economic systems in China. This paper discusses the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation from the perspectives of short-term monetary compensation and long-term compensation including equity incentives. This paper is divided into the following six parts: The first part is the introduction. First of all, it states the background of this paper, research significance, defines the relevant concepts involved in this paper, introduces the research objectives and content of this paper, and elaborates the relevant selected in this paper. The second part is a literature review. The author focuses on the four elements of executive compensation, mergers and acquisitions, performance and size, combs the impact of performance, size on executive compensation and the impact of mergers and acquisitions on performance, size and executive compensation. The third part is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis. Based on the principal-agent theory, the author puts forward that M&A can promote executive compensation, and that M&A can promote executive compensation in the same year. Based on the property right theory and the motivation theory of merger and acquisition, the author analyzes the change path of executive compensation after merger and acquisition, and puts forward the innovative viewpoint that state-owned enterprises can improve executive compensation after merger and acquisition through scale expansion, while private enterprises can increase executive compensation after merger and acquisition through performance improvement. According to the differences of control levels of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper proposes that the promotion of executive compensation after mergers and acquisitions of central enterprises is realized by scale expansion, while the promotion of salary after mergers and acquisitions of local state-owned enterprises is positively related to both performance improvement and scale expansion. Listed companies are the sample, excluding small-scale mergers and acquisitions within a year and multiple non-same-day mergers and acquisitions. Because the variables involved in mergers and acquisitions before and after two years, this paper contains the relevant data from 2008 to 2015. The author first studies the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive compensation, and then discusses the timing of mergers and acquisitions and the situation after mergers and acquisitions. This part uses descriptive statistics, multiple regression and other empirical research methods to verify the six hypotheses of this paper, and uses substitution variables to confirm the robustness of the empirical results. The sixth part is a summary and suggestions. At the same time, based on executive incentives, merger and acquisition decision-making and corporate governance, the paper puts forward suggestions for the improvement of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises respectively. In order to make the research more comprehensive and the results more convincing, this paper divides the impact of M&A on executive compensation into two stages: M&A and post-M&A. (2) Considering the nature of property rights on corporate governance and M&A. The author classifies the listed companies according to their property rights, and puts forward two innovative viewpoints: 1) the promotion of executive compensation in private enterprises after M&A is realized through performance improvement; 2) the expansion of local state-owned enterprises after M&A and performance improvement together lead to the increase of executive compensation.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F272.92;F271

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