高管任期与会计稳健性研究
发布时间：2018-11-25 09:28
【摘要】：会计稳健性是关于会计盈余确认和计量的一项重要原则,是财务会计研究领域中的一个重要组成部分。在市场经济条件下,会计稳健性作为衡量会计信息质量的标准之一,不仅能够抑制企业管理层高估盈余的动机,还有助于缓解资本市场的信息不对称,进而降低企业的融资成本和投资风险。因此,对会计稳健性影响因素的研究一直都是国内外理论界和实务界广泛关注的问题。CEO和CFO作为对会计信息质量负最高责任和直接责任的关键高管,根据高阶理论,他们的个人背景特征如性别、年龄、学历、任期等,无疑都会对会计稳健性产生重要影响。但高管任期与高管其他背景特征相比,是影响企业财务行为和财务报告质量的关键因素。因此,本文认为研究高管任期与会计稳健性之间的关系有重要的理论意义和现实意义。本文通过理论分析和实证研究相结合的方法,旨在研究高管任期对会计稳健性的影响以及不同公司治理机制对二者关系的调节作用。在对2009-2016年深沪A股上市公司进行实证检验后,本文得出以下结论:(1)高管(CEO/CFO)现有任期与会计稳健性呈倒U型关系,高管(CEO/CFO)预期任期与会计稳健性正相关,并均在国有样本中表现更加明显。(2)CEO和CFO任期异质性可以提高会计稳健性水平,CEO和CFO任期异质性程度越高,会计稳健性水平越高,CFO任职早于CEO更有利于企业会计稳健性水平的提高,并均在非国有样本中表现的更加明显。(3)从全样本来看,董事会独立性在高管(CEO/CFO)任期(现有任期、预期任期和两者任期异质性)与会计稳健性的关系中没有显著的调节作用;但在非国有样本中有正向的调节作用。(4)机构投资者持股在高管(CEO/CFO)现有任期及CEO与CFO任期异质性与会计稳健性的关系中有正向的调节作用,这一关系在国有样本中表现的更加明显;在高管(CEO/CFO)预期任期与会计稳健性的关系中,在全样本中机构投资者没有显著的调节作用,但在非国有样本中有正向的调节作用。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important principle of accounting earnings recognition and measurement. It is an important part of financial accounting research field. Under the condition of market economy, accounting conservatism, as one of the standards to measure the quality of accounting information, can not only restrain the motivation of overvaluing earnings of enterprise management, but also help to alleviate the information asymmetry in capital market. Then reduce the financing cost and investment risk of the enterprise. Therefore, the research on the influencing factors of accounting conservatism has always been a widespread concern of the theoretical and practical circles at home and abroad. CEO and CFO, as the key executives with the highest and direct responsibility for the quality of accounting information, are based on the higher order theory. Their personal background, such as gender, age, education, tenure and so on, will undoubtedly have an important impact on accounting conservatism. However, executive tenure is a key factor affecting financial behavior and financial reporting quality compared with other background characteristics of executives. Therefore, the study of the relationship between executive tenure and accounting conservatism has important theoretical and practical significance. Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper aims to study the impact of executive tenure on accounting conservatism and the regulatory effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between them. Based on the empirical test of Shenzhen-Shanghai A-share listed companies in 2009-2016, this paper draws the following conclusions: (1) the current tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) is inversely U-shaped in relation to accounting conservatism. The expected tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) is positively correlated with accounting conservatism, and both of them are more obvious in state-owned samples. (2) CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity can improve accounting conservatism, and the higher the CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity is, The higher the level of accounting conservatism, the earlier CFO holds office than CEO, which is more favorable to the improvement of accounting conservatism in enterprises, and all of them are more obvious in non-state-owned samples. (3) from the perspective of the whole sample, The independence of the board of directors has no significant moderating role in the relationship between the term of CEO/CFO (current term, expected term and heterogeneity of tenure) and accounting conservatism; But there is a positive regulatory role in the non-state-owned sample. (4) Institutional investors hold shares in the current tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) and the relationship between CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity and accounting conservatism. (4) Institutional investors hold shares in the current tenure of senior management (CEO/CFO) and the relationship between CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity and accounting conservatism. This relationship is more obvious in the state-owned sample; In the relationship between expected tenure of CEO/CFO and accounting conservatism, institutional investors have no significant moderating role in the whole sample, but positive regulation in non-state-owned samples.
【学位授予单位】：桂林电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F272.91
本文编号：2355620
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important principle of accounting earnings recognition and measurement. It is an important part of financial accounting research field. Under the condition of market economy, accounting conservatism, as one of the standards to measure the quality of accounting information, can not only restrain the motivation of overvaluing earnings of enterprise management, but also help to alleviate the information asymmetry in capital market. Then reduce the financing cost and investment risk of the enterprise. Therefore, the research on the influencing factors of accounting conservatism has always been a widespread concern of the theoretical and practical circles at home and abroad. CEO and CFO, as the key executives with the highest and direct responsibility for the quality of accounting information, are based on the higher order theory. Their personal background, such as gender, age, education, tenure and so on, will undoubtedly have an important impact on accounting conservatism. However, executive tenure is a key factor affecting financial behavior and financial reporting quality compared with other background characteristics of executives. Therefore, the study of the relationship between executive tenure and accounting conservatism has important theoretical and practical significance. Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper aims to study the impact of executive tenure on accounting conservatism and the regulatory effect of different corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between them. Based on the empirical test of Shenzhen-Shanghai A-share listed companies in 2009-2016, this paper draws the following conclusions: (1) the current tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) is inversely U-shaped in relation to accounting conservatism. The expected tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) is positively correlated with accounting conservatism, and both of them are more obvious in state-owned samples. (2) CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity can improve accounting conservatism, and the higher the CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity is, The higher the level of accounting conservatism, the earlier CFO holds office than CEO, which is more favorable to the improvement of accounting conservatism in enterprises, and all of them are more obvious in non-state-owned samples. (3) from the perspective of the whole sample, The independence of the board of directors has no significant moderating role in the relationship between the term of CEO/CFO (current term, expected term and heterogeneity of tenure) and accounting conservatism; But there is a positive regulatory role in the non-state-owned sample. (4) Institutional investors hold shares in the current tenure of senior executives (CEO/CFO) and the relationship between CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity and accounting conservatism. (4) Institutional investors hold shares in the current tenure of senior management (CEO/CFO) and the relationship between CEO and CFO tenure heterogeneity and accounting conservatism. This relationship is more obvious in the state-owned sample; In the relationship between expected tenure of CEO/CFO and accounting conservatism, institutional investors have no significant moderating role in the whole sample, but positive regulation in non-state-owned samples.
【学位授予单位】：桂林电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F272.91
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