初始排污权拍卖分配方式研究

发布时间：2018-01-14 13:22

本文关键词：初始排污权拍卖分配方式研究　出处：《南京林业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：排污权交易制度目前已在多个国家实行，取得了较好的环境治理效果。我国自2007以来，也逐步在全国11个省份设立了国家级排污权交易试点。国内外关于排污权交易制度的研究，主要集中在以下几个方面：初始排污权分配问题、区域间排污权分配和交易问题、排污权交易的监管问题和排污权交易市场中的市场势力问题等。关于排污权交易制度最大的争议是初始排污权的分配问题。因为初始排污权的分配不仅涉及企业的成本，而且关系到社会有关团体的利益，在很大程度上决定了排污权交易制度的运行效率。本文首先对排污权交易制度及其主要的初始分配方式进行了研究。目前，关于初始排污权的分配方式，主要有免费分配、拍卖和定价出售这几种形式。采用拍卖方式对排污权进行分配从公平性、有效性、收益等各方面都要优于其它两种方式。因此，本文对排污权拍卖中常见的拍卖方式进行了研究，并指出向上叫价式拍卖（ascending auction）要优于密封式拍卖(sealed-bid auction)等拍卖形式。在各种向上叫价式拍卖中，，升价时钟拍卖和Ausubel拍卖得到了一些学者的推荐。特别是Ausubel拍卖这种新改进的拍卖方式，它是为解决投标者掩藏价值这一问题而创制的，对其研究还比较少。本文将在相关学者研究的基础上，假设市场为只存在两个厂商的寡头垄断市场，建立一个涉及排污权市场和产品市场相联系的分析模型。在给定相关市场条件的情况下，我们以升价时钟拍卖和Ausubel为例，模拟拍卖的拍卖过程，并对这拍卖方式下的分配结果进行比较研究。拍卖结果表明，拍卖机制可以对排污权进行有效的分配，使得污染较重的厂商通过竞价获得更多的排污权，即支付更多的污染治理费用，同时在产品市场中将获得较少的市场份额和收益。升价时钟拍卖和Ausubel拍卖相比较，在Ausubel拍卖中厂商将获得较高的收益，但政府的拍卖收入却较少。在排污权交易的实践当中，浙江省一直走在全国的前列，初步建立了一些管理机构和排污权交易市场。本文最后将以浙江省为案例，对初始排污权分配采用拍卖分配方式进行实证研究。研究表明，我国目前还不具备大规模采用拍卖方式来分配排污权的条件，应当循序渐进地推进初始排污权的拍卖。我们并结合浙江省排污权市场的现状，提出了排污权拍卖过渡性方案。
[Abstract]:Emission trading system has been implemented in many countries, and has achieved good environmental control effect. China has been since 2007. Domestic and foreign research on emission trading system is mainly focused on the following aspects: initial emission rights allocation. Interregional emissions allocation and trading. Regulation of emission trading and market power in emission trading market etc. The biggest dispute about emission trading system is the allocation of initial emission rights, because the allocation of initial emission rights is not only related to enterprises. The cost of. And related to the interests of social organizations, to a large extent determines the operating efficiency of emission trading system. First of all, this paper studies the emission trading system and its main initial allocation methods. At present, the allocation of initial emission rights is mainly free of charge. Auction and pricing of these forms. The use of auction to distribute emission rights from fairness, effectiveness, revenue and other aspects are better than the other two ways. In this paper, the common auction of emission rights auction methods are studied. It is also pointed out that the upward auction auction is superior to the closed auction auction in the form of sealed-bid auction. In various upward bidding auctions. Rising clock auction and Ausubel auction have been recommended by some scholars, especially Ausubel auction, which is a new and improved auction method. It was created to solve the problem of the hidden value of bidders, and the research on it is still relatively few. This paper will assume that the market is an oligopoly market with only two firms on the basis of the relevant scholars' research. An analytical model involving the relationship between emission market and product market is established. Given the relevant market conditions, we simulate the auction process with the example of rising clock auction and Ausubel. The auction results show that the auction mechanism can effectively distribute the emission rights, so that the polluter get more emission rights through bidding. That is, pay more pollution control costs, at the same time in the product market will get less market share and income. Higher price clock auction compared with Ausubel auction. In Ausubel auctions, manufacturers will get higher returns, but the government will receive less. In the practice of emission trading, Zhejiang Province has been in the forefront of the country, initially established a number of regulatory bodies and emissions trading market. Finally, this paper will take Zhejiang Province as an example. The empirical study on the initial emission allocation by auction shows that China does not have the conditions to use auction to distribute emission rights on a large scale at present. The auction of initial emission rights should be promoted step by step, and a transitional scheme of emission rights auction is put forward according to the current situation of emission rights market in Zhejiang Province.
【学位授予单位】：南京林业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：X196;F724.59

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