碳排放政策下的供应链定价与减排

发布时间：2018-01-28 04:17

本文关键词： 定价与减排决策博弈论碳税碳交易总量控制　出处：《华东经济管理》2017年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文章以供应链的减排量和价格为研究对象,建立了制造商主导的斯坦伯格两阶段动态博弈模型,探讨了碳税、碳交易、总量控制目标政策下由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链的定价与减排优化问题。研究表明:碳排放政策下制造商和零售商的定价策略相反,随着排放政策变得严厉,制造商提高批发价格而零售商降低边际利润;产品初始绿色程度、减排成本系数和碳排放价格是影响供应链定价和减排的重要因素。供应链初始绿色程度低时碳排放价格对供应链减排量的影响存在阈值效应。文章还从供应链层面比较了三种排放政策的减排效力,发现即使减排政策不同,只要安排适当也可以实现同样的减排目标,但效果优劣有碳交易、碳税、总量控制的次序之分。
[Abstract]:Taking the emission reduction and price of supply chain as the research object, this paper establishes a two-stage dynamic game model of Steinberg, which is dominated by manufacturers, and discusses carbon tax and carbon trading. The pricing and emission reduction optimization of a supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under the total quantity control target policy. The research shows that the pricing strategy of manufacturer and retailer is opposite under the carbon emission policy. As emissions policies become tougher, manufacturers raise wholesale prices and retailers reduce profit margins; Initial green degree of product. The cost coefficient of emission reduction and the price of carbon emission are the important factors that affect the pricing and emission reduction of supply chain, and the threshold effect of carbon emission price on the emission reduction of supply chain exists when the initial green degree of supply chain is low. The effectiveness of the three emission policies was compared. It is found that even if the emission reduction policies are different, the same emission reduction targets can be achieved as long as appropriate arrangements are arranged, but the effects are divided into carbon trading, carbon tax, and order of total control.
【作者单位】：暨南大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71273114)
【分类号】：F274;X196
【正文快照】： 一、引言为了应对全球变暖的气候压力,各国纷纷出台了形式不一的碳排放机制,碳排放政策下企业管理面对更多的制约因素,企业运营决策变得更加复杂,需要瞄准包括碳排放在内的最小成本或最大利润的模型的研究,用来告诉经理们碳排放政策可能如何影响运营决策(Saif Benjaafar等,201

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