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交易扩展中的信用——一个制度与组织的视角

发布时间:2018-01-28 22:52

  本文关键词: 信用 交易扩展 制度 组织 合作均衡 出处:《浙江大学》2004年博士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:人类的交易是基于信用的交易,信用的范围也就制约了人类交易的范围。人类的理性会在博弈中形成一系列旨在扩大人类的信用范围的制度和组织,并进而扩展交易范围。因此,人类交易扩展的过程是一个信用扩展的过程。但是,长期以来信用问题一直未进入主流经济学的研究。随着信息经济学、博弈论、新制度经济学和演化经济学等领域的兴起,关于不对称信息条件下交易者相互诚实合作机制的形成问题开始得到经济学家的广泛关注,并取得可观成果。本文正是运用这些成果,从制度与组织的视角讨论交易扩展过程中的信用形成机制。 本文将信用理解成交易主体共同合作的预期及合作策略均衡。而保证交易信用的制度和组织正是博弈策略均衡的体现。人类所有的交易可最为基本的区分为四个扩展层次,交易前提、代际交易、熟人社会交易、匿名社会交易。 财产权利是所有交易的前提。财产权利的相互认可和尊重是信用的结果,其信用均衡成立的条件包括占有成为共同知识、有足够比例的针对失信者的惩罚策略个体以及对信用秩序享受的搭便车行为必须控制在足够低的水平。 代际交易是维系人类繁衍重要保证,它的信用依赖于家庭这一制度安排。家庭尤其是核心家庭的主要功能之一是形成了有效的代际学习机制,使得隔代约束成为可能,并因此确保了在自利条件下,代际投资信用均衡的形成。 熟人社会或者传统社会交易的信用主要依赖于双边机制和多边机制约束。双边机制约束下,,可识别的商号形成是其重要的条件。而行会和商团出现则形成了有效运作的多边机制,并因而保证了行会和商团内部交易的信用。 匿名交易中的信用依赖于第三方权威机构,其信用程度则依赖于这个权威机构的使用成本。而在充分的可选择性条件下,权威机构的信用是可以得到保证的。在保证权威机构信用的条件中,专制型权威机构的信用保障条件最苛刻,民主型权威次之,开放型权威机构的信用保障条件最为简单。
[Abstract]:Human transaction is based on the trade of credit, and the scope of credit restricts the scope of human transaction. Human rationality will form a series of institutions and organizations aimed at expanding the scope of human credit in the game. Therefore, the process of human transaction expansion is a process of credit expansion. However, for a long time, the credit problem has not entered the mainstream of the study of economics. With the information economics, game theory. With the rise of new institutional economics and evolutionary economics, the formation of mutual honest cooperation mechanism of traders under asymmetric information has been widely concerned by economists. Using these achievements, this paper discusses the credit formation mechanism in the process of transaction expansion from the perspective of institution and organization. In this paper, credit is understood as the expectation of mutual cooperation of trading subjects and the equilibrium of cooperative strategy. The system and organization of ensuring trading credit are just the embodiment of game strategy equilibrium. All human transactions can be divided into four basic categories. Extend the hierarchy. Transaction premise, intergenerational transaction, acquaintance social transaction, anonymous social transaction. Property right is the premise of all transactions. Mutual recognition and respect of property rights is the result of credit. A sufficient proportion of penalty strategies for dishonest individuals and hitchhiking for credit order must be controlled at a sufficiently low level. Intergenerational transaction is an important guarantee to maintain human reproduction, and its credit depends on the institutional arrangement of family. One of the main functions of family, especially nuclear family, is to form an effective intergenerational learning mechanism. The intergenerational constraint makes it possible, and thus ensures the formation of intergenerational investment credit equilibrium under the condition of self-interest. The credit of acquaintance society or traditional social transaction mainly depends on bilateral mechanism and multilateral mechanism constraint. The formation of identifiable trade names is an important condition, and the emergence of guilds and business groups forms a multilateral mechanism for effective operation, and thus ensures the credit of intra-trade transactions between guilds and business groups. The credit in anonymous transaction depends on the third party authority, and its credit degree depends on the cost of using the authority. The credit of authoritative organizations can be guaranteed. In the condition of ensuring the credit of authoritative organizations, the credit guarantee conditions of autocratic authoritative institutions are the most harsh, followed by democratic authority. The credit guarantee condition of the open authority is the simplest.
【学位授予单位】:浙江大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2004
【分类号】:F014

【引证文献】

相关期刊论文 前1条

1 王丽霞;张赫;;构建第三方参与的海内外侨胞信任机制[J];中国行政管理;2011年03期

相关博士学位论文 前2条

1 杨兴凯;政府组织间信息共享信任机制与测度方法研究[D];大连理工大学;2011年

2 郭志光;电子商务环境下的信用机制研究[D];北京交通大学;2012年

相关硕士学位论文 前2条

1 张钫;东亚新兴债券市场的风险问题研究[D];上海社会科学院;2006年

2 张晨t$;企业规模、所有制形式与还贷行为的关系[D];南京理工大学;2007年



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