当前位置:主页 > 经济论文 > 经济理论论文 >

公平交易协议与协议公平性研究

发布时间:2018-04-14 08:08

  本文选题:公平交易 + 公平性 ; 参考:《北京邮电大学》2008年博士论文


【摘要】: 电子商务是一项很重要的经济活动,其中公平高效的进行交易是它的基本要求,而公平交易协议则是实现这一要求的基本保障。公平交易协议是研究如何在两个互不信任的网络实体之间公平、有效的交易电子数据的一种安全协议,它要确保交易的过程中应使任何一方在任何时候都不占有任何优势,交易的最终结果是要么双方都得到对方的物品,要么双方都没有得到对方的物品。如何设计出更加公平、高效的公平交易协议,则是公平交易研究最主要的内容。 本文以公平交易中应用最广泛的两方交易为主要研究内容,在系统了解当前公平交易主要研究进展的基础上,对无需可信第三方(TTP)的公平交易协议与带有TTP的公平交易协议都做了较为深入的研究,分别提出了两个较为实用的公平交易协议。并在此基础上,从如何更好的约束当事人交易行为、如何更能体现出交易公平性的角度考虑,首先提出一个满足行为可追究性的通用协议框架,为后面奖惩机制中明确当事人行为责任提供了基础。接着提出了激励公平性的概念,并基于此设计了一个具有奖惩激励功能的公平交易协议。本文的主要研究成果及创新点总结如下: (1)基于完美的并发签名,提出了一个无需TTP的公平交易协议。在双方起初交换两个模糊签名及相关交易数据的时候,任何人都无法辨认是谁签了哪一个签名,直到发起方公布一个秘密信息,两个签名才同时绑定到各自的签署方,之后另一方发送解密商品的密钥,从而让双方都能公平的得到对方的物品。而且本协议无需可信第三方(TTP)的参与即可让交易双方公平的交易数据条目,避免了两方勾结的可能性以及可信第三方参与协议的瓶颈。 (2)基于构造的已承诺签名,提出了一个具有惩罚功能的乐观公平交易协议。首先基于Fischlin签名构造了一个可验证承诺的签名方案,并在标准复杂模型中证明了该方案的安全性,然后基于该签名方案设计了一个具有惩罚功能的乐观公平交易协议,在保证交易公平的同时,对双方有出错的行为进行惩罚。由于惩罚思想的引入,交易双方的行为得到了更好的约束,协议变得更加公平、简洁和有效,并且协议很好的保证了交易的时效性、不可滥用性等其他重要性质。 (3)提出了一种满足行为可追究性的通用协议框架。该框架利用了安全模块防篡改的特性,通过对协议执行中的每个状态赋值,然后每次状态转移都对状态值以及协议中接收的或要发送的内容进行Hash迭代运算,记录下了协议运行过程中的每一步操作,最终保留结束状态的Hash值作为验证当事人行为的证据。该框架实现了协议每一步行为的可追究性,这对当事人是否执行了某一操作,是否该为某一争议的结果负责,是一种强有力的判断工具。该通用框架只有Hash运算,运算量并不高,保证了任何一个协议使用它都不会受太大的影响。 (4)提出了一种基于信任积分奖惩激励机制的公平交易协议。该协议首次把奖惩激励机制引入公平交易协议,基于改进的Beth信任模型进行设计,通过对成功的交易给与双方奖励,而对失败的交易,一视不同的情况,给与主动退出方一定程度的惩罚,鼓励协议参与方积极的完成每次交易。该协议不仅保证了通常意义上的公平性,而且也达到了这种奖惩意义上的公平性。同时该协议是基于安全模块设计的,利用了交叉验证理论,不仅可以交易数字签名,也可以交易其他的数字条目,是一个通用性的公平交易协议。
[Abstract]:Electronic commerce is a very important economic activity, including fair and efficient trading is its basic requirement, and even bargain agreement is the guarantee to achieve this requirement. The agreement is to study how to even bargain between the two mutual distrust network entity justice, there is a security protocol of the electronic data transaction efficiency it should be made to ensure that any party at any time should not take any advantage in the process of trading, the final result of the exchange is either both parties get their goods, or the two sides did not get their goods. How to design a more fair and efficient, even bargain agreement is, the main research contents even bargain.
In this paper, the most widely used in the even bargain two party transactions as the main research content in the system, understand the basis of current research progress even bargain, for without the trusted third party (TTP) of the protocol with TTP protocol and even bargain even bargain to do a more in-depth study, which presents two practical even bargain agreement. And on this basis, from the constraints of party transactions and how to better, how to better reflect the fair point of view, we propose a general framework to meet the behavior can be held in nature, provide the basis for the incentive mechanism behind behavior responsibility clear. Then put forward the concept of fairness and incentive. Based on the design of a reward incentive function even bargain agreement. The main research results and innovation points are summarized as follows:
(1) based on perfect concurrent signature, proposed a TTP free exchange agreement. Even bargain two fuzzy signature and related transaction data in both sides at first, no one can identify who has signed a signature which, until the sponsors announced a secret information, two signatures can bind to the signing parties, after the other party sends a decryption key commodity, so that both sides can get their fair items. And this Agreement without trusted third party (TTP) involved in the transaction data can make both sides fair items, avoid the possibility of bottleneck of collusion between the two party and a trusted third party participate in the agreement.
(2) based on verifiable committed signature, has proposed a penalty function based on Fischlin protocol. The optimistic even bargain signature to construct a verifiable committed signature scheme in the standard model, and the complex security proof of the scheme, then based on the signature scheme is designed with a penalty function the optimistic even bargain agreement, to ensure the fair at the same time, to punish both wrong behavior. Because of the introduction of punishment idea, transaction to get better agreement constraints, more fair, simple and effective, and very good agreement to ensure the timeliness of transactions, not abuse other important the nature and so on.
(3) proposed a satisfying accountability universal protocol framework. This framework makes use of the characteristics of the security module is tamper proof, by assigning each state in the implementation of the agreement, and then each state transition of state value and Agreement received or to be sent in Hash iteration, record the operation of each step of the running process of the protocol, the end state retains the final Hash value as proof of parties' behavior. This framework realizes the each step behavior of accountability, the parties whether to execute an operation, whether the one responsible for controversial results, is a powerful to judge the tool. It has only Hash operation, the operation is not high, ensuring that any one protocol use it will not be much affected.
(4) proposed a trust agreement even bargain reward incentive mechanism based on the integral of the agreement for the first time. The incentive mechanism is introduced to design even bargain agreement, based on the improved Beth trust model, based on the success of the transaction both sides give rewards, and to a failure of the transaction, depending on the situation, to take the initiative to withdraw from the party to a certain extent the punishment, encouraging agreement parties to complete each exchange actively. This protocol not only ensures fairness in the usual sense, but also achieves fairness in the sense of bonus Malus. At the same time, the agreement is based on the module design, using the theory of cross validation, can not only exchange digital signatures can also exchange digital other items, is a universal agreement even bargain.

【学位授予单位】:北京邮电大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2008
【分类号】:F062.6;F224

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前5条

1 卿斯汉 ,李改成;公平交换协议的一个形式化模型[J];中国科学E辑;2005年02期

2 周永彬,张振峰,卿斯汉,季庆光;基于RSA签名的优化公平交换协议[J];软件学报;2004年07期

3 卿斯汉;电子商务协议中的可信第三方角色[J];软件学报;2003年11期

4 卿斯汉;安全协议20年研究进展[J];软件学报;2003年10期

5 王芷玲;张玉清;杨波;;公平交换协议设计原则[J];中国科学院研究生院学报;2006年04期

相关博士学位论文 前2条

1 邢育红;公平交换协议分析方法研究[D];山东大学;2005年

2 沈炜;用于公平交换的若干协议和规范的研究与应用[D];浙江大学;2003年



本文编号:1748408

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/jingjililun/1748408.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户ba540***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com