非对称信息下的环境污染经济分析

发布时间：2018-05-02 00:33

本文选题：非对称信息 + 环境保护　；参考：《厦门大学》2008年硕士论文

【摘要】： 随着我同经济持续快速增长,环境问题日益突出并因此受到广泛关注。保护与改善环境,实现经济的可持续发展已经成为我国的基本国策。但是当前的政策焦点在于如何不断增加环境治理资金的投入来实现改善环境质量的目标,而不是在于关注现行环境政策的低效率以及政府问政策实施过程中的制度性问题,而这两方面问题却是制约我国环境改善的重要因素。本文的目标就是运用信息经济学、博弈论等方法探求以上问题的根本原因并且提出切实有效的解决方案。本文的创新之处在于: (1)从完全信息和非对称信息角度对包括收费、补贴和可交易排污权在内的环境污染控制政策工具进行定性和定量比较,提出非对称信息下补贴改进模型,从理论上证明可交易排污许可证对四类污染物治理的市场效率等同。 (2)将污染控制的随机因素纳入模型当中,建立地区内多厂商博弈模型,从根源上解决生产厂商保留自身信息回避污染控制的“搭便车”问题。 (3)分析中央与地方政府关于环境保护政策的博弈行为,从静态和动态的角度探讨政策的选择和执行。将政府“信誉”引入动态博弈模型中,得出具有实际意义的政策结论。 (4)针对我国的现实国情,比较市场化程度发达的国家与我国在政治体制、经济制度、技术水平等方面的差异,结合本文所分析的模型提出更合适我国的环境政策体系。本文借鉴发达国家环境治理的成功经验,结合我国转型发展阶段的现实国情,把经济分析方法和博弈理论引入环境决策机制,将环境经济政策与行政命令控制型政策很好的结合起来,分析我国政府与企业之问,企业与企业之间及政府与政府之间的关于环保的博弈关系,形成一套在非对称信息下更为有效率更具灵活性的环境政策体系,对解决我国的环境问题无疑有重大的现实意义。
[Abstract]:As our economy continues to grow rapidly, environmental issues have become increasingly prominent and have attracted widespread attention. To protect and improve the environment and realize the sustainable development of economy has become the basic national policy of our country. However, the current policy focus is on how to continuously increase the investment of environmental governance funds to achieve the goal of improving environmental quality, rather than focusing on the inefficiency of current environmental policies and the institutional problems in the process of implementing the policies. However, these two problems are the important factors restricting the improvement of our country's environment. The aim of this paper is to use the methods of information economics and game theory to find out the root causes of the above problems and to put forward practical and effective solutions. The innovations of this paper are: 1) qualitatively and quantitatively compare the environmental pollution control policy tools, including fees, subsidies and tradable emission rights, from the perspective of complete information and asymmetric information, and propose an improved model of subsidies under asymmetric information. It is proved theoretically that the market efficiency of tradable emission permits for the treatment of four kinds of pollutants is the same. (2) the stochastic factors of pollution control are brought into the model, and the multi-vendor game model in the region is established to solve the problem of "hitchhiking" in which manufacturers retain their own information to avoid pollution control. (3) analyzing the game behavior of central and local governments on environmental protection policy, and discussing the choice and implementation of policy from static and dynamic point of view. The government "reputation" is introduced into the dynamic game model, and the policy conclusions of practical significance are obtained. 4) according to the actual situation of our country, comparing the differences of political system, economic system and technical level between the developed countries and our country, and combining with the model analyzed in this paper, the author puts forward a more suitable environmental policy system of our country. Based on the successful experience of environmental governance in developed countries and the reality of China's transition and development, this paper introduces the economic analysis method and game theory into the environmental decision-making mechanism. Combining the environmental economic policy with the administrative order control policy, this paper analyzes the game relationship between the government and the enterprise, between the enterprise and the government, and between the government and the government. The formation of a more efficient and flexible environmental policy system under asymmetric information is undoubtedly of great practical significance to the solution of environmental problems in China.
【学位授予单位】：厦门大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：X196

【引证文献】