对自然垄断产业规制方案的理论比较

发布时间：2018-05-29 09:26

本文选题：自然垄断 + 低效能规制方案　；参考：《东北财经大学》2005年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来中国对于自然垄断产业的规制的研究逐渐展开。自然垄断产业作为中国经济中的一个特殊的领域,一直以来是采用国有化的内部规制的方式进行经营管理。由于自然垄断产业的特殊性,长期以来,改革并没有深刻地触及到这个领域。随着近二十年来科学技术、生产力水平的迅速发展和进步,在自然垄断产业中原来具有自然垄断因素的部分在逐渐减少,原有的内部化的规制方式越来越不适应新的规制要求。人们对于有没有必要继续对自然垄断产业进行规制以及外部经济性规制方案的选择问题产生了困惑,这也促进了规制理论的进一步发展,并且促使了本文的产生。人们开始在提高内部效率与促进资源配置效率之间不断寻求平衡。国外规制理论以及规制实践的发展推动着中国对自然垄断领域的规制改革。对于经济性规制理论中国有化的内部规制、放松规制问题以及社会性规制(例如环境保护等),本文不做重点研究。本文将研究重点放在了对自然垄断产业经济性规制方案的选择上面,即低效能规制方案以及高效能规制方案的选择。本文采用成本——收益比较法来进行分析。在应用这个方法的过程中,本文重点考虑了信息不对称、规制俘虏、寻租问题、规制滞后、补贴成本、产品质量以及安全等问题。本文以此来分析规制的成本和规制的收益,以求更加深刻地揭示低效能规制方案与高效能规制方案的区别与联系。在比较规制成本和规制方案的过程中,本文从两种角度进行了分析。第一种是沿用植草益的分析方法从消费者利益得失的角度来分析,第二种是大体沿用施蒂格勒的分析方法,从福利经济学的角度来进行分析。它们都是在衡量规制的收益和规制的成本谁大谁小。从这两个角度来分析所得的结果基本上是一致的。本文的创新之处可以归结为以下三点:第一,文中第二部分第五节低效能规制方案的成本——收益比较中在植草益所阐述的全社会的福利损失方面,如图2-1,本文认为还不止这些损失。它应当加上另外一个三角形的资
[Abstract]:In recent years, the research on the regulation of natural monopoly industry in China has been carried out gradually. As a special field in Chinese economy, natural monopoly industry has been managed by the internal regulation of nationalization. Because of the particularity of natural monopoly industry, the reform has not touched this field deeply for a long time. With the rapid development and progress of science and technology and the level of productivity in the past two decades, the part of the natural monopoly industry with natural monopoly factors is gradually decreasing, and the original internal regulation mode is less and less suitable for the new regulation requirements. People are confused about whether it is necessary to continue to regulate the natural monopoly industry and the choice of external economic regulation scheme, which also promotes the further development of regulation theory and the emergence of this paper. People began to seek a balance between improving internal efficiency and promoting resource allocation efficiency. The development of foreign regulation theory and regulation practice promotes the regulation reform in the field of natural monopoly in China. This paper does not focus on the internal regulation of nationalization in the theory of economic regulation, deregulation and social regulation (such as environmental protection, etc.). This paper focuses on the choice of economic regulation scheme of natural monopoly industry, that is, the choice of low efficiency regulation scheme and high efficiency regulation scheme. In this paper, cost-benefit comparison method is used to analyze. In the process of applying this method, the problems of information asymmetry, regulation capture, rent-seeking, regulation lag, subsidy cost, product quality and safety are considered in this paper. This paper analyzes the cost of regulation and the benefit of regulation in order to reveal the difference and relationship between low-efficiency regulation and high-efficiency regulation. In the process of comparing regulation cost and regulation scheme, this paper analyzes from two angles. The first is to analyze the benefits of planting grass from the perspective of consumers' interests, and the second is to use Stiegler's method to analyze from the perspective of welfare economics. They are all measuring the benefits of regulation and the cost of regulation who is bigger than who is small. The results obtained from these two angles are basically consistent. The innovations of this paper can be summed up as follows: first, in the cost-benefit comparison of the low-efficiency regulation scheme in the whole society, the loss of welfare of the whole society is discussed in the second part and the fifth section of the paper. As shown in Fig. 2-1, this article considers more than these losses. It should be financed by another triangle.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：F062.9

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