网络型产业的非对称管制与竞争

发布时间：2018-05-31 20:31

本文选题：网络型 + 产业　；参考：《西南财经大学》2003年博士论文

【摘要】：20世纪50、60年代以来，发达市场经济国家开始了席卷世界范围的自由化浪潮，在产业组织领域主要表现在两个方面：一是管制制度向激励制度转变；二是放松管制，减少政府对产业的干预。20世纪80年代末开始，随着经济体制改革的不断深入，我国在电力、电信等网络型产业的管制制度发生了很大的变化，为了促进竞争，不仅放松了进入管制，而且对行业内的主导厂商还实施了非对称管制政策。改革实践为理论研究提供了难得的“真实世界”的故事，从而引出了讨论管制与市场、网络型产业的管制与产业组织等方面的大量文献。中国学者的研究不仅仅停留在向国内引进大量的国外的最新研究成果，而且在把这些理论模型用于我国的改革实践，也取得了一定的进展。本文的研究针对这样的一个理论研究的现状，对于网络型行业的竞争所受到的特殊的约束以及政府管制的效果和制度变迁的路径的研究存在严重的不足。这种理论研究上的滞后，直接导致了对于管制政策改革方案的争议，虽然部分争议源于研究者试图服务于特定的利益集团。因此，本文的研究目的在于说明：自然垄断行业管制制度的绩效、制度变迁的均衡性以及制度变迁的局限条件和路径。这既是为了弥补不足，也是为了能够为争议提供一个可分析的框架。为此，本文试图构造一个市场结构动态演进的理论模型，并且把进入和在位主导厂商的策略性行为作为本文分析的行为内容，把政府管制制度作为主要的约束条件，重点说明自然垄断行业随政府管制政策的变化的市场结构的演变，并以此解释中国电信行业正在发生的变化并模拟预测将发生的进一步的改变。论文的第一部分是基础理论研究，主要说明政府管制和市场结构的分析框架，主要包括以下内容。市场结构的定义包括两个方面：一是市场集中度，二是进入壁垒。市场结构的演变可以从市场集中度的变化来考察，由此进入成为主要的行为内容。在一个传统上属于垄断性的行业上，进入会导致在位者的策略性阻止，因此，进入实际发生在在位者采取进入容纳的策略条件下。政府管制对此过程的影响主要通过改变策略性行为的成本而促进或抑制进入，而当进入实际发生后，为了加快市场竞争程度提高的速度，也就是说为了提高进入速度，政府可以采取非对称管制政策。该政策主要通过改变市场竞争者之间的竞争力而改变市场份额。这样的政策可以是政府基于公共利益的考虑，也可以是利益集团制度竞争的结果。从公共利益假定来看，非对称管制政策的福利意义取决于生产效率和配置效率的比较权衡。而从利益集团假设来看，非对称管制政策的推行则取决于它的配置效应。论文的第二部分引入进一步的约束，把分析集中在网络型产业，主要说明网络型产业的非对称管制，主要包括以下内容。网络型产业具有规模经济和范围经济的技术特征，这种特征的结果就是该行业具有自然垄断性质，但对网络型产业的自然垄断性质的认识必须建立在市场细分的基础上，不同的细分市场具有不同的技术特征。现在人们普遍认为网络型产业的自然垄断性质主要集中在基础网络的供给上。技术特征的作用使该市场具有非常高的市场集中度，但从技术上来说，高度集中的市场仍然可以具有可竞争性。可竞争性市场理论为网络型产业放松进入管制奠定了理论基础。而本文要回答的则是当进入不再具有制度壁垒，而技术和市场条件使进入有利可图的情况下，当进入实际发生后，政府对行业内主导企业和竞争性企业所采取的非对称的管制。从该行业的三个主要的技术特征入手，对于网络型产业的非对称管制的考察分成三部分说明。一是考察针对纵向一体化的管制政策，纵向一体化对竞争的影响主要反映在单向接入和互联互通问题上，政府管制可以构建不同的市场结构，但其竞争性都受到各种因素的局限；二是针对规模经济的管制政策。本文重点说明了规模经济对于进入的意义存在的争论之处，以及对于规模经济的管制政策。三是针对多样化经营的管制政策，在多样化经营中常见的策略行为是交叉补贴，因此，对于市场竞争者的不同的业务范围 WP=3 的限制对竞争有直接的影响。论文的第三部分是在中国电信行业改革中的分析应用。利用论文所设计的分析框架，重点说明了我国电信行业制度变迁的绩效，更重要的则是回答这一切是怎么发生的，即研究中国制度变迁的逻辑。主要的结论包括以下内容（1）管制制度变迁可以由公共利益假定下的管制者最优化选择模型说明，据此，放松进入管制的政策源于配置效率的提高可以弥补生产效率的损失。（2）管制制度变迁也可以由利益集团假定下的制度博弈说明，据此，放松进入管制的政策源于国有资产流动性要求，而产生于利益集团政治压力的作用。（3）网络型行业的竞争应该建立在数网竞争的基础上，但这一制度的均衡性将取决于利益集团进一步的竞争博弈。（4）非对称管制制度是在数网不竞争的制度下的选择。总的来说，，本文考察的是一个不断扩展的均衡模型：制度均衡——进入博弈均衡——进入速度均衡——市场结构动态均衡。下面用图示说明论文的理论结构：市场结构演变/市场绩效进入速度排他性行为
[Abstract]:Since the twentieth Century 50,60 era, the developed market economy countries have begun the wave of liberalization that swept the world. In the field of industrial organization, there are two main aspects in the industrial organization: one is the change of control system to the incentive system; two is deregulation, and the intervention of the government to the industry begins in the late 80s of the century, with the continuous reform of the economic system. In depth, China's control system of network industries, such as electricity and telecommunications, has changed greatly. In order to promote competition, it not only relaxes the entry control, but also implements the asymmetric control policy to the leading manufacturers in the industry.
The practice of reform provides a rare "real world" story for theoretical research, which leads to a great deal of literature on the control and market, the control of the network industry and the industrial organization. The research of Chinese scholars is not only about introducing a large number of recent foreign research results to the domestic, but also using these theoretical models. In view of the reform practice in China, some progress has been made. This paper, aiming at the present situation of such a theoretical study, has a serious deficiency in the study of the special constraints imposed on the competition in the network industry, the effect of government regulation and the path of institutional change. The controversy over regulatory policy reform is partly the result of researchers trying to serve specific interest groups.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explain the performance of the control system of the natural monopoly industry, the equilibrium of institutional change and the limitations and paths of the institutional change. This is not only to make up for the shortcomings, but also to provide an analytical framework for the dispute. Therefore, this article tries to construct a dynamic evolution of the market structure. On the basis of the model, and taking the strategic behavior of the entry and the reign leading manufacturer as the content of the analysis of this article, the government regulation system is taken as the main constraint condition, and the evolution of the market structure of the natural monopoly industry with the change of the government regulation policy is explained, and the changes that are happening in the China Telecom industry are explained and simulated. Further changes will be measured.
The first part of this paper is basic theory research, which mainly explains the framework of government regulation and market structure, mainly including the following contents. The definition of market structure includes two aspects: first, market concentration and two are entry barriers. The evolution of market structure can be examined from the change of market concentration, thus entering into the main Behavior content. In a traditionally monopolistic industry, entry will lead to the strategic stop of the incumbent. Therefore, the effect of government regulation on the process is promoted or suppressed mainly by changing the formation of strategic behavior. After birth, in order to speed up the market competition, that is to say, in order to increase the speed of entry, the government can adopt asymmetric control policy. This policy can change market share by changing the competitiveness of market competitors. This policy can be considered by the government based on the public interest, or the interest group system. The result of degree competition. From the public interest assumption, the welfare meaning of the asymmetric control policy depends on the comparative tradeoff between production efficiency and allocation efficiency. From the interest group hypothesis, the implementation of asymmetric control policy depends on its configuration effect.
The second part of the paper introduces further constraints, focusing on the network industry, mainly explaining the asymmetric control of the network industry, mainly including the following contents. The network industry has the technical characteristics of scale economy and scope economy. The result is that the industry has the nature of natural monopoly, but it is on the network industry. The understanding of the nature of natural monopoly must be based on the market segmentation, and the different market segments have different technical characteristics. Now it is generally believed that the nature of the natural monopoly of the network industry is mainly concentrated on the supply of the basic network. The role of the technical characteristics makes the market very high market concentration, but it is from the technology. A highly concentrated market can still be competitive. Competitive market theory lays a theoretical foundation for the relaxed entry of network industries. The answer to this article is the government, when the entry of technology and market conditions is profitable, when there is no institutional barriers. The asymmetric regulation adopted by the leading enterprises and competitive enterprises in the industry. From the three main technical features of the industry, the investigation of the asymmetric control of the network industry is divided into three parts. One is to investigate the vertical integration control policy. The effect of vertical integration on competition is mainly reflected in unidirectional access. On the issue of interoperability, government regulation can build different market structure, but its competitiveness is limited by various factors; two is the control policy for economies of scale. This paper focuses on the argument of the significance of economies of scale for the significance of entry and the control policy for economies of scale. Three is aimed at diversification. The control policy of battalion is a common strategic behavior in diversification, which is cross subsidy. Therefore, different business scope for market competitors.
WP=3
The restrictions have a direct impact on competition.
The third part of the paper is the analysis and application of the China Telecom industry reform. Using the analytical framework designed by the paper, the paper focuses on the performance of the institutional change of the telecommunication industry in China. The more important thing is to answer how this is happening, that is, the logic of the study of China's institutional change. The main conclusions include the following content (1) control system The change can be explained by the optimal choice model of the regulator under the assumption of public interest. Accordingly, the policy of relaxing the entry control derives from the improvement of the efficiency of the configuration. (2) the change of the regulation system can also be explained by the institutional game under the assumption of the interest group. Accordingly, the policy of relaxing entry control is derived from the state assets. Liquidity requirements, and the role of the political pressure of interest groups. (3) the competition of network industry should be based on the competition of several networks, but the equilibrium of this system will depend on the further competition game of interest groups. (4) the asymmetric regulation system is the choice under the system of no competition in the number of networks.
In general, this article examines a constantly expanding equilibrium model: Institutional Equilibrium - entering game equilibrium - entering a speed equilibrium - the dynamic equilibrium of the market structure. The following illustration shows the theoretical structure of the paper.
Market structure evolution / market performance
Speed of entry
exclusive practice
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2003
【分类号】：F062.5

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