研发联盟中专项投资对自身知识被侵占风险的影响研究

发布时间：2018-06-04 11:13

本文选题：专项投资 + 知识被侵占风险　；参考：《科学学与科学技术管理》2017年08期

【摘要】：专项投资是研发联盟中实现资源互补必不可少的部分。基于交易成本理论和社会交换理论,分析了研发联盟背景下企业专项投资对自身知识被侵占风险的影响,以及企业监督和善意信任对专项投资与知识被侵占风险之间关系的调节作用。通过对155家参与合作创新的制造业企业发放问卷来收集样本,采用多元统计分析方法对假设进行验证。结果表明:(1)企业专项投资与其知识被侵占风险之间存在正相关关系;(2)监督削弱了企业专项投资与其知识被侵占风险之间的正向关系;(3)善意信任会对"专项投资—知识被侵占风险"关系产生U型调节作用:即适度的善意信任会降低企业专项投资带来的知识被侵占风险,而过低或过高的善意信任都会放大专项投资带来的知识被侵占风险。
[Abstract]:The special investment is the essential part in the R & D alliance to realize the complementary resources. Based on transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, this paper analyzes the influence of enterprises' special investment on the risk of knowledge encroachment under the background of R & D alliance. The relationship between special investment and the risk of knowledge encroachment is regulated by enterprise supervision and goodwill trust. A questionnaire was sent out to 155 manufacturing enterprises involved in cooperative innovation to collect samples, and the hypothesis was verified by multivariate statistical analysis. The results show that: 1) there is a positive correlation between the enterprise's special investment and the risk of its knowledge encroachment. The supervision weakens the positive relationship between the enterprise's special investment and the risk of its knowledge being encroached. The "risk of knowledge encroachment" relationship has the function of U-type regulation: that is, moderate goodwill trust will reduce the risk of knowledge encroachment brought by the enterprise's special investment. Too little or too much good faith magnifies the risk of knowledge being encroached upon by investment.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472145)
【分类号】：F062.3

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