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从行为博弈视角探讨几个经典博弈模型的改进

发布时间:2018-06-06 13:47

  本文选题:行为博弈论 + 社会性偏好 ; 参考:《云南大学》2012年硕士论文


【摘要】:随着实验经济学和制度经济学的兴起,博弈论出现了新的发展方向;而最新的心理学理论又为博弈论的发展注入了新的活力.经济主体的参与者,通常以经济利益作为其行为选择的主要因素,但除此之外,还会受到诸如公平偏好等的影响. 在实践中,由于人们有限的记忆制约了他们的思考,人们一般不会重复多于两级的劣策略剔除行为.这就与经典博弈中的博弈者具备共同知识这一假设矛盾.不仅如此,许多研究者还利用实验、心理学等研究发现博弈者不是完全理性的,在博弈过程中,还会受社会性偏好、公平心理等的影响.这说明经典博弈的两个重要假设比较难实现,他们只能看作是理想状态下才会出现的情况. 行为博弈论在模型中加入情绪、有限理性以及学习等因素来探讨参与者在实际中将如何行动、如何评价结果等问题,使问题比较符合实际. 本文通过对行为博弈的公平博弈和学习模型进行改进,得出使其更加符合人们决策时的心理过程模型.第一个模型通过引入三个参数:λi,αi,βi,(λi表示博弈中对个人利益的看重程度,0λi1;αi表示博弈者对对方的同情程度,0αi1;βi表示博弈者对对方的嫉妒程度,0βi1)量化博弈者的总体收益.第二个模型运用贝叶斯学习理论讨论经验对参与者的影响.然后用两个新模型对已有博弈实验结果进行检验,发现新模型对结果有很好的拟合性,最后将新模型由于实际生活中较热的话题:高校学生助学贷款问题、教师对学生因材施教问题,为相关人员提供可行性建议,使其缩短均衡的时间,避免无效的社会均衡,从而得到有效的占优均衡.
[Abstract]:With the rise of experimental economics and institutional economics, game theory has a new direction of development, and the latest psychological theory has injected new vitality into the development of game theory. The participants of economic subjects usually take economic interests as the main factor of their behavior choice, but in addition, they are also affected by such as fairness preference. In practice, because people's limited memory restricts their thinking, people generally do not repeat more than two levels of bad strategy elimination behavior. This contradicts the hypothesis that the players in classical games have common knowledge. Not only that, many researchers also use experiments, psychology and other studies found that game players are not completely rational, in the game process, will also be affected by social preferences, fair psychology and so on. This shows that the two important hypotheses of classical games are difficult to realize, and they can only be regarded as the case in ideal state. Behavioral game theory adds emotion, limited rationality and learning factors to the model to explore how participants will act in practice and how to evaluate the results so as to make the problem more realistic. By improving the fair game and learning model of behavior game, this paper obtains a psychological process model to make it more in line with people's decision making. In the first model, three parameters are introduced: 位 _ I, 伪 _ I, 尾 _ I (位 _ I denotes the degree of importance of personal interest to the game is 0 位 _ I; 伪 _ I is the degree of sympathy of the gamer to the other side; and 尾 _ I means the degree of envy of the gamer towards the other side is equal to 0 尾 _ I). The second model uses Bayesian learning theory to discuss the influence of experience on participants. Then two new models are used to test the results of the existing game experiments, and it is found that the new model has a good fit for the results. Finally, the new model is due to the hot topic in real life: the problem of student loan in colleges and universities. Teachers teach students in accordance with their aptitude, provide feasible suggestions for relevant personnel, make them shorten the time of equilibrium, avoid invalid social equilibrium, and thus obtain effective dominant equilibrium.
【学位授予单位】:云南大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2012
【分类号】:O225;F069.9

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