地方公共品供给的理论研究
发布时间：2018-08-24 08:48
【摘要】：随着财政学向公共经济学的发展,作为公共支出理论主体的公共品理论日益 受到理论界的重视。同时,由于政府职能的转变,政府作为一方经济主体正逐渐 从一般竞争领域退出,重点转向为全社会提供高质量的公共产品与服务。并且由 于以财权和事权下放为标志的分权化改革的逐渐深入,这些公共产品与服务大多 是由地方政府供给的。因此,在此种宏观背景下研究地方公共品供给相关问题, 就显得尤为迫切和必要。 传统的公共品理论研究重在提出实现公共品有效供给的帕累托条件,如萨缪 尔森规则及其扩展形式。但对地方公共品来说,由于其本身具有的地域性、地方 政府的多样性以及各种要素在地区间的流动性,仅仅从规范研究的角度进行分析, 就显得过于单薄了。近现代的理论发展表明,对地方公共品的理论研究,大多是 围绕各种不同假设下地方公共品是否供给不足这个实证问题展开的。本文在理论 上的贡献,也是创新点之一,就在于从总体上对现有研究进行综合把握,发展出 一个包含流动性、税收竞争等因素的新古典一般均衡模型,不仅从理论上说明地 方公共品供给不足的问题,而且通过修正流动性等有关前提假设,阐明要素流动 性和政府间竞争对于克服地方公共品供给不足问题的重要意义。 本文对中国地方公共品供给现状的考察表明,中国地方政府在提供地方公共 品时具有系统的选择性偏差,即对某些地方公共品供给过度,而对另一些地方公 共品则供给不足。这种并非总量不足、而是结构失衡的特殊现象,通过新古典模 型方法是很难作出解释的。因此,作为本文主要创新点,我们将地方公共品分为 易于传递政绩信息的显性地方公共品(如开发区、城市广场等)与周期长、收效 慢、“百年树人”型的隐性地方公共品(如教育、医疗等),并摒弃了新古典模型 中关于“善良”政府的假设,转而在中国特殊国情背景下重新考察地方政府官员 的行为目标与约束机制。主要观点为:以中央和上级为中心的目标函数以及以政 绩为主要标准的干部考核机制,促使地方政府(官员)更加偏好于供给显性地方 公共品,从而出现地方公共品供给中的选择性偏差。 一个很明显的逻辑问题是,对显性地方公共品的供给是需要花费巨额成本的, 就算是各地方政府都有激励大量供给显性公共品(如“大干”、“快上”各种政绩 工程),但受到自身财力与预算的约束,这种现象理应不是一种全国性的普遍现象, I WP=4 否则有些较穷地区的地方财政岂非早就破产了?本文另一创新点就在于提出了地 方政府的成本软约束概念,指出选择性偏差所造成的福利损失根本不是由地方政 府(官员)本身负担的,它被居于强势地位的地方政府以各种形式和手段(如乱 摊派、乱集资等)转嫁给了地区公众。从这一点出发,我们就不难理解,在中国 有时候反而是越穷的地方越喜欢做“表面文章”了。与此相对应,我们通过运用 信息经济学中的信号传递模型,用形式化的语言阐明,在各地方政府竞相供给显 性地方公共品、并以此向中央政府传递政绩信息的过程中,一般理论所预测的分 离均衡并不存在,各地方政府实际上都陷入一种“囚徒困境”式的混同均衡。本 文进一步指出,造成地方政府成本软约束的根本原因在于地方公众对地方政府压 力机制的缺乏,这归根结底是民主制度特别是基层民主制度的问题。
[Abstract]:With the development of finance to public economics, public goods theory, as the main body of public expenditure theory, is becoming more and more important.
At the same time, due to the transformation of government functions, the government is gradually becoming an economic entity.
From the field of general competition, the focus shifted to the provision of high-quality public goods and services for the whole society.
With the gradual deepening of decentralization reform marked by the devolution of financial and administrative power, most of these public goods and services
It is provided by local governments. Therefore, in this macro context, we should study the supply of local public goods.
It is particularly urgent and necessary.
The traditional theory of public goods focuses on putting forward Pareto's condition for effective supply of public goods, such as Samuel.
The rule of "Er son" and its extended form. But for local public goods, because of its regional characteristics,
The diversity of government and the mobility of various factors in different regions are analyzed only from the perspective of normative research.
The development of modern theories shows that most of the theoretical researches on local public goods are
This paper focuses on the empirical problem of whether local public goods are insufficient under various assumptions.
One of the innovations is to comprehensively grasp the existing research and develop it.
A neoclassical general equilibrium model with liquidity, tax competition and other factors is not only theoretically illustrative.
The problem of insufficient supply of public goods and the flow of factors are clarified by revising relevant assumptions such as liquidity.
The importance of sex and intergovernmental competition to overcome the problem of insufficient supply of local public goods.
This article examines the current situation of the supply of local public goods in China, which shows that local governments in China are providing local public services.
There is systematic selectivity bias, i.e. over-supply of public goods in some places and over-supply of public goods in others.
The total supply is insufficient. This is not a special phenomenon of insufficient aggregate but a structural imbalance.
Therefore, as the main innovation of this article, we divide local public goods into
Dominant local public goods (such as development zones, city squares, etc.) that are easy to convey performance information are long and effective.
Slow, "100 year old" hidden local public goods (such as education, medical treatment, etc.), and abandoned the neoclassical model.
China's assumption of a "good" government has shifted to re-examining local government officials in the context of China's special national conditions
Behavioral Goals and Restriction Mechanisms. The main viewpoints are as follows: the central and higher-level-centered objective function and the government-centered objective function
The cadre assessment mechanism, which is the main performance criterion, makes local governments (officials) more inclined to supply dominant places.
Public goods result in selective bias in the supply of local public goods.
One obvious logical problem is that the supply of dominant local public goods is costly.
Even local governments have incentives to supply large quantities of dominant public goods (e.g. big jobs and quick successes).
But constrained by its own financial and budgetary resources, this phenomenon should not be a universal national phenomenon.
I
WP=4
Otherwise, the local finance of some poorer areas will not have gone bankrupt long ago. Another innovation of this paper lies in the proposed land
The concept of cost soft constraints of local governments, pointing out that welfare losses caused by selective bias are not caused by local governments at all
The local government, which is responsible for its own position, is in various forms and means, such as chaos.
From the point of view, we can easily understand that in China
Sometimes the poorer the place, the more likely it is to be "superficial." In contrast, we use it
The signaling model in information economics, illustrated in formal language, is competing for prominence among local governments.
The score predicted by the general theory in the process of transferring performance information to the central government from local public goods
De-equilibrium does not exist, and local governments are in fact in a "prisoner's dilemma" of mixed equilibrium.
The paper further points out that the fundamental reason for the soft constraint of local government cost lies in the pressure of local public on local government.
The lack of force mechanism, in the final analysis, is the problem of democratic system, especially the democratic system at the grassroots level.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F062.6
本文编号：2200260
[Abstract]:With the development of finance to public economics, public goods theory, as the main body of public expenditure theory, is becoming more and more important.
At the same time, due to the transformation of government functions, the government is gradually becoming an economic entity.
From the field of general competition, the focus shifted to the provision of high-quality public goods and services for the whole society.
With the gradual deepening of decentralization reform marked by the devolution of financial and administrative power, most of these public goods and services
It is provided by local governments. Therefore, in this macro context, we should study the supply of local public goods.
It is particularly urgent and necessary.
The traditional theory of public goods focuses on putting forward Pareto's condition for effective supply of public goods, such as Samuel.
The rule of "Er son" and its extended form. But for local public goods, because of its regional characteristics,
The diversity of government and the mobility of various factors in different regions are analyzed only from the perspective of normative research.
The development of modern theories shows that most of the theoretical researches on local public goods are
This paper focuses on the empirical problem of whether local public goods are insufficient under various assumptions.
One of the innovations is to comprehensively grasp the existing research and develop it.
A neoclassical general equilibrium model with liquidity, tax competition and other factors is not only theoretically illustrative.
The problem of insufficient supply of public goods and the flow of factors are clarified by revising relevant assumptions such as liquidity.
The importance of sex and intergovernmental competition to overcome the problem of insufficient supply of local public goods.
This article examines the current situation of the supply of local public goods in China, which shows that local governments in China are providing local public services.
There is systematic selectivity bias, i.e. over-supply of public goods in some places and over-supply of public goods in others.
The total supply is insufficient. This is not a special phenomenon of insufficient aggregate but a structural imbalance.
Therefore, as the main innovation of this article, we divide local public goods into
Dominant local public goods (such as development zones, city squares, etc.) that are easy to convey performance information are long and effective.
Slow, "100 year old" hidden local public goods (such as education, medical treatment, etc.), and abandoned the neoclassical model.
China's assumption of a "good" government has shifted to re-examining local government officials in the context of China's special national conditions
Behavioral Goals and Restriction Mechanisms. The main viewpoints are as follows: the central and higher-level-centered objective function and the government-centered objective function
The cadre assessment mechanism, which is the main performance criterion, makes local governments (officials) more inclined to supply dominant places.
Public goods result in selective bias in the supply of local public goods.
One obvious logical problem is that the supply of dominant local public goods is costly.
Even local governments have incentives to supply large quantities of dominant public goods (e.g. big jobs and quick successes).
But constrained by its own financial and budgetary resources, this phenomenon should not be a universal national phenomenon.
I
WP=4
Otherwise, the local finance of some poorer areas will not have gone bankrupt long ago. Another innovation of this paper lies in the proposed land
The concept of cost soft constraints of local governments, pointing out that welfare losses caused by selective bias are not caused by local governments at all
The local government, which is responsible for its own position, is in various forms and means, such as chaos.
From the point of view, we can easily understand that in China
Sometimes the poorer the place, the more likely it is to be "superficial." In contrast, we use it
The signaling model in information economics, illustrated in formal language, is competing for prominence among local governments.
The score predicted by the general theory in the process of transferring performance information to the central government from local public goods
De-equilibrium does not exist, and local governments are in fact in a "prisoner's dilemma" of mixed equilibrium.
The paper further points out that the fundamental reason for the soft constraint of local government cost lies in the pressure of local public on local government.
The lack of force mechanism, in the final analysis, is the problem of democratic system, especially the democratic system at the grassroots level.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：F062.6
【引证文献】
相关期刊论文 前5条
1 韩建;;优化我国地方公共品供给结构的财政政策研究[J];河南财政税务高等专科学校学报;2012年01期
2 李郁芳;孙海婧;;代际公平与代际公共品供给[J];广东社会科学;2009年03期
3 彭正波;;地方公共产品供给决策中的公众参与研究[J];经济体制改革;2009年03期
4 袭著燕;郑波;;地方综合科研机构存在与发展的理论解释[J];科学与管理;2010年04期
5 黄华;杨永均;;政府行为的一种经济学解释[J];商业文化(学术版);2008年12期
相关博士学位论文 前3条
1 王红岩;公共项目经济评价体系研究[D];东北财经大学;2007年
2 储祖旺;中国高校筹资问题研究[D];华中科技大学;2006年
3 余璐;生态补偿的政府间供给议价[D];暨南大学;2009年
相关硕士学位论文 前8条
1 郭旭姣;区域间公共品利益外溢的财政分析[D];云南财经大学;2011年
2 黄信恒;我国独立学院筹资问题与对策研究[D];中南民族大学;2011年
3 楼静;改进财政支出方式：理论分析与政策建议[D];浙江大学;2007年
4 孙海婧;代际公共品供给与地方政府竞争的经济学分析[D];暨南大学;2007年
5 丁春玲;我国地方政府无序竞争行为的制度分析[D];内蒙古师范大学;2008年
6 黄河东;广西城市公共物品有效供给评价与对策研究[D];广西师范大学;2008年
7 刘擎;农村公共文化服务供给存在问题的对策研究[D];湖南师范大学;2012年
8 张凤彪;天津市全民健身公共支出研究[D];北京体育大学;2007年
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