上游企业定价能力与独占交易排他条件

发布时间：2019-02-16 19:06

【摘要】：上游企业对批发价格的定价能力会根据中间产品特征、上下游的纵向势力等因素而改变。不同的批发价格直接影响了下游企业在最终产品市场上的竞争力和销售利润,进而可能会影响独占交易排挤竞争对手的条件。针对这一假说,构建上游一家在位者和一家潜在进入者,下游两家竞争性买方的纵向市场结构模型,考察不同批发价格定价策略下,在位者排挤潜在进入者的条件。结果表明:不同批发价格定价策略下,独占交易排他的条件存在很大差异,但始终与下游竞争程度和在位者进入者的成本差异有关。特别地,当上游在位者与潜在进入者边际成本差异较小、且下游买方竞争较为激烈时,在位者总是可以成功排挤潜在进入者,可称这种情况为独占交易排他的稳健区域。实践中,独占交易的调查和甄别都较为困难,反垄断的执法成本较高,反垄断机构针对独占交易的规制重点应该放到下游市场竞争激烈且上游边际成本差异较小的产业中。
[Abstract]:The pricing ability of upstream enterprises to wholesale prices will change according to the characteristics of intermediate products, vertical power of upstream and downstream. Different wholesale prices have a direct impact on the competitiveness and sales profit of downstream enterprises in the final product market, and then may affect the conditions under which monopolistic transactions crowd out competitors. In view of this hypothesis, the vertical market structure model of one incumbent upstream, one potential entrant and two downstream competitive buyers is constructed, and the conditions under which the incumbent crowding out the potential entrant under different wholesale price pricing strategies are investigated. The results show that under different wholesale price pricing strategies, the conditions of exclusive transaction are very different, but they are always related to the degree of downstream competition and the cost difference of incumbent entrants. In particular, when the marginal cost difference between the upstream incumbent and the potential entrant is small, and the downstream buyer is more competitive, the incumbent can always successfully crowd out the potential entrant. In practice, the investigation and discrimination of monopolistic transactions are difficult, the law enforcement cost of antitrust is high, and the regulation focus of antitrust agencies for monopolistic transactions should be placed in industries where the downstream market competition is fierce and the upstream marginal cost difference is small.
【作者单位】：东北大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“抗衡势力背景下产业链纵向控制的机理研究”(项目编号:71472032,项目负责人:李凯);“跨国公司在华RPM策略实施动因、垄断势力纵向传导及规制路径研究”(项目编号:71473066,项目负责人:李世杰) 国家留学基金委员会建设高水平大学公派研究生项目(留金发[2016]3100) 2016年度辽宁省哲学社会科学规划基金项目“东北地区科技成果转化一体化模式研究”(项目编号:L16CJY006,项目负责人:孙涛)
【分类号】：F062.9

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