粮食安全中的利益主体博弈分析

发布时间：2018-01-15 09:52

本文关键词：粮食安全中的利益主体博弈分析　出处：《长白学刊》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：中央政府、粮食主产区政府和粮食主销区政府作为不同的经济利益主体,基于粮食安全问题有机地联系在了一起。中央政府与粮食主产区政府作为不同层级的政府,发展终极目标函数存在差异,利益取向不完全一致,由于激励政策设计的欠缺与信息不对称,二者之间呈现"非合作博弈"模式;粮食主产区政府和主销区政府作为同一层级的政府,都以自身利益最大化为依据懫取行动,但由于利益得失、取舍的关联性而形成"非合作博弈"。中央政府、粮食主产区政府和主销区政府作为国家粮食安全的利益相关者,都有各自的利益诉求,利益失衡是各主体非合作博弈形成的关键,而构建相应的利益协调机制,补偿利益失衡方,引导或满足各利益主体的合理利益诉求与追求,使利益主体处于平衡发展状态,是现实合作博弈的重要路径。
[Abstract]:The central government, the government of the main grain producing areas and the governments of the main grain distribution areas are different economic interests. Based on the problem of food security, the central government and the government of the main grain-producing areas, as different levels of government, the development of the ultimate objective function is different, the interests of the orientation is not exactly the same. Because of the lack of incentive policy design and information asymmetry, there is a "non-cooperative game" model between them. As the same level of government, the government of the main grain producing area and the government of the main selling area take action based on the maximization of their own interests, but because of the gain and loss of their interests and the relevance of the choice and decision, they form a "non-cooperative game". The central government. As the stakeholders of the national food security, the government of the main grain producing area and the government of the main marketing area have their own interest demands. The imbalance of interests is the key to the formation of non-cooperative game among the main bodies, and the corresponding interest coordination mechanism is constructed. It is an important path for realistic cooperative game to compensate for the imbalance of interests, to guide or satisfy the reasonable interest demands and pursuit of each interest body, and to make the interest subject in a balanced development state.
【作者单位】：东北农业大学马克思主义学院;东北农业大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“城乡统筹视阈下农地使用权流转制度创新研究”(12YJA ZH157) 国家软科学研究计划重大合作项目“粮食主产区利益补偿及其机制创新”(2014GXS2D016) 国家自然科学基金项目“东北地区促进农地流转与农民增收机制及政策研究”(71341049)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F326.11
【正文快照】： 一、引言多数学者主要利用完全信息条件下的动态博弈方法,讨论了粮食生产利益相关者,如粮食主产区的地方政府与种粮农户[1]、粮食主产区政府和主销区政府[2]、主产区政府、主销区政府和中央政府[3]、中央政府、地方政府和农民之间的博弈[4][5]。有学者运用粮食安全三螺旋模型,

【相似文献】