过度自信、补偿性契约与生鲜电商三边道德风险规制研究

发布时间：2018-04-23 07:29

本文选题：过度自信 + 补偿性契约　；参考：《商业经济与管理》2017年07期

【摘要】：基于生鲜电商运营决策中的复杂性和过度乐观倾向,文章将过度自信引入到电商、农户和产地经纪人的三边道德风险分析框架,分析了电商企业过度自信水平对各方收益的影响及对电商、产地经纪人和农户道德风险的影响机理,探讨了补偿性契约设计对三边道德风险的规制作用。研究发现,电商企业的过度自信对契约结构具有双重作用,一方面可以增加农户收益水平,降低农户的违规程度;另一方面也降低了产地经纪人的努力水平,增加了代理成本。补偿性契约设计可以有效规避三边道德风险,不仅可以减少电商企业的道德风险;同时,也有助于缓解产地经纪人的道德风险,降低农户的违规程度。
[Abstract]:Based on the complexity and over-optimistic tendency in the decision making of fresh e-commerce operators, this paper introduces overconfidence into the trilateral moral hazard analysis framework of e-commerce, farmers and provenance brokers. This paper analyzes the influence of the level of overconfidence of e-commerce enterprises on the income of all parties and the influence mechanism of moral hazard on e-commerce, provenance brokers and farmers, and probes into the regulatory effect of compensatory contract design on trilateral moral hazard. It is found that the overconfidence of e-commerce enterprises plays a dual role in the contract structure. On the one hand, it can increase the level of farmers' income and reduce the level of farmers' violation; on the other hand, it can also reduce the level of efforts of the brokers from the origin and increase the agency cost. Compensatory contract design can effectively avoid trilateral moral hazard, not only can reduce the moral hazard of e-commerce enterprises, but also help to alleviate the moral hazard of the broker from the origin, and reduce the degree of violation of farmers.
【作者单位】：山东科技大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“多任务委托代理关系下国企高管行为策略选择及优化研究”(71371111) 山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金项目“上市公司经理权力影响效应及其治理机制研究”(BS2013SF019) 山东科技大学科研创新团队支持计划(2015TDJH103)
【分类号】：F323.7;F724.6

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