义乌市工业用地用途变更调控研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 23:00

本文选题：工业用地 + 土地用途变更　；参考：《浙江大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：伴随着经济的快速发展、城镇化的稳步推进以及城市基础设施的不断完善,城市内某些区段的工业用地的区位条件得到了显著改善。为赚取巨额差额利润,工业用地业主擅自改变其用途用作商业服务业或者出租、出售,这种现象不同程度地存在于各城市中。该类行为造成了国有资产的大量流失、破坏了城市的规划布局,从另一个角度讲,也带来了城市功能的完善。因而探索科学合理依规依法处置工业用地用途变更之对策具有现实意义。本文选取义乌市作为研究区域,在对义乌市域总体规划图和现状图进行对比分析的基础上,得到义乌市发生变更的工业用地在空间上的分布特征。在结合这些特征和典型案例分析以及梳理文献的基础上,得到导致义乌市工业用地用途变更的因素,即经济利益驱动、监督不力、规划前瞻性不足导致。对于前两者引起的变更,本文在探讨了博弈论在管控用途变更上的适用性之后,构建了委托—代理博弈模型、出让博弈模型、KMRW模型、监督博弈模型,通过对均衡结果的分析,探索控制工业用地用途变更的措施；而对于后者引起的变更,本文认为应及时修编规划、加快义乌市工业用地调整的步伐,进行有序置换,逐步完善城市功能。并就置换需要遵循的原则、置换的模式进行了探究,试图为义乌市工业用地调整工作提供参考。本文主要研究结论如下：基于委托—代理理论的视角指出政府间利益目标不一致、信息不对称、中央政府对地方政府的考核困难以及现行激励模式下的约束软化是地方政府缺乏合理利用工业用地动机的原因,针对这些原因,提出了相应对策。通过对出让博弈模型、KMRW声誉模型、监督博弈模型的建立与分析,发现吸引更多优质开发商参与工业用地的购买,并防范其“串谋”,加大对变更行为的惩罚力度、增大土地监管者的收益、减小监管成本、提高违法违规变更者对社会损害的认识等措施可以缩减变更用途的利润空间,从而限制该行为的发生。同时,要保障置换的顺利进行需要建立完整而合理的置换模式
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, the steady progress of urbanization and the continuous improvement of urban infrastructure, the location conditions of industrial land in some sections of the city have been significantly improved. In order to make a huge margin, industrial land owners change their use for commercial services or rent out for sale, which exists in cities to varying degrees. This kind of behavior causes the massive loss of state-owned assets, destroys the layout of the city, and from another angle, it also brings about the perfection of the function of the city. Therefore, it is of practical significance to explore the countermeasures of scientific and reasonable disposal of industrial land use changes according to regulations. This paper selects Yiwu as the research area, and on the basis of comparing and analyzing the overall planning map and the present situation map of Yiwu city, obtains the spatial distribution characteristics of the industrial land that has changed in Yiwu city. On the basis of analyzing these characteristics and typical cases and combing the literature, the factors that lead to the change of industrial land use in Yiwu are obtained, that is, economic benefit driving, weak supervision, and lack of foresight planning. After discussing the applicability of game theory in the change of management and control, this paper constructs a principal-agent game model, a transfer game model, a KMRW model, a supervisory game model, and an analysis of the equilibrium results. This paper probes into the measures to control the change of industrial land use, and as for the change caused by the latter, this paper holds that the planning should be revised in time, the pace of industrial land adjustment in Yiwu should be quickened, the orderly replacement should be carried out, and the urban function should be perfected step by step. This paper explores the principle and mode of replacement, and tries to provide reference for the adjustment of industrial land in Yiwu. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: from the perspective of principal-agent theory, it is pointed out that the interests of governments are not consistent, and the information is asymmetric. The difficulty of the central government in assessing the local government and the softening of the restriction under the current incentive mode are the reasons for the lack of rational use of industrial land by the local government. In view of these reasons, the corresponding countermeasures are put forward. By analyzing the KMRW reputation model and supervising the establishment and analysis of the game model, it is found that more high quality developers are attracted to participate in the purchase of industrial land, and to prevent their "collusion", and to increase the punishment of the change behavior. Such measures as increasing the income of land regulators, reducing the cost of supervision, and improving the awareness of the violators against the law on social damage can reduce the profit space of the changing uses, thus limiting the occurrence of the behavior. At the same time, it is necessary to establish a complete and reasonable replacement mode to ensure the smooth progress of replacement.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F301.2

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