资源枯竭型矿区土地再开发制度约束与优化研究

发布时间：2018-06-30 02:08

本文选题：资源枯竭矿区 + 土地再开发　；参考：《中国矿业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：由于矿产资源的枯竭致使大量工业用地处于低效利用状态,造成浪费。国家层面提出了节约集约用地制度的框架体系,枯竭矿区土地再开发逐渐成为国家和地方深入落实“创新、协调、绿色、开放、共享”理念的重大举措和破解资源约束的突破口。如何盘活存量土地资源,作为城市建设用地的积极有效补充已成为研究的重点。然而,我国工业用地再开发制度性约束不仅影响着土地利用潜力有效释放,往往还加剧了土地自然的约束性。国内学者对土地再开发制度性问题的剖析不够彻底,有待进一步深入。本研究采用制度经济学系统分析体系与方法,通过全面梳理我国存量土地再开发制度,明晰其约束性问题、创新制度设计,对于我国工业用地再开发具有重要的理论意义和实际价值。(1)本文首先基于利益相关者理论,根据利益的主体、客体与中介内涵,构建了以“利益相关者—利益相关者活动载体—利益相关者活动内容”为基本框架的资源枯竭型矿区土地再开发需求系统,并指出三者分别包含的具体内容;认为混合型组织模式最适合矿区土地再开发、利益冲突的本质在于土地发展权价值的争夺、矿区土地再开发的动力机制来源于城市功能与产业结构调整、企业转型发展、土地价值的显化。(2)通过系统梳理我国存量土地再开发制度变迁阶段可以发现,再开发模式由政府主导向市场机制转变的特点,原产权主体参与再开发增值收益分配成为趋势;且矿区土地划拨、授权经营、出让等多种用地方式并存,不同用地方式对应的权能、产权流转方式不同,再开发面临障碍不同,再开发的关键问题主要体现在煤炭企业的退出以及新市场主体的进入;根据以上分析比较,剖析了我国矿区土地再开发制度约束的缘由与本质,指出产权流转制度、土地发展权归属、增值收益分配制度等缺陷性制度问题。(3)从宏观与微观两个视角出发,剖析制度约束引致的枯竭型矿区土地再开发制度供求冲突;微观层面上,体现在直接利益相关者:中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与煤炭企业、地方政府与开发商对增值收益分配、信息获取、开发条件博弈的冲突;宏观层面,则是政府主导与市场机制、再开发路径与审批制度、产权处置与招拍挂、增值独享与利益共享、矿业权属与土地产权之间的冲突,也是制度供求冲突最本质原因。(4)以制度约束下的利益集团博弈为基础工具,运用制度演变的一般性博弈分析框架,构建中央政府—地方政府、地方政府—煤炭企业两两博弈模型,分析不同条件下利益主体的策略选择以及系统演化路径,阐释我国土地再开发制度变迁的内在机制;并依此为方向与理论依据,对枯竭矿区土地再开发制度进行优化设计,进而提升矿区土地再开发的可操作性。(5)选取枯竭型矿区土地再开发效率相对较高的晋城市古书院矿存量土地再开发为实证对象,分析了土地制度对古书院矿存量土地再开发造成的政策约束;且古书院矿存量土地再开发实践与本研究制度优化思路一致性较高,验证了研究结果的应用价值。
[Abstract]:Because of the depletion of mineral resources, a large number of industrial land is in low efficiency and waste. The framework system of saving and intensive land use system is put forward at the national level. The land redevelopment of the exhausted mining area has gradually become a major measure to implement the concept of "innovation, coordination, green, open and sharing" and the solution of resource constraints in the exhausted mining area. How to reinvigorate the stock of land resources as an active and effective supplement to the urban construction land has become the focus of research. However, the institutional constraints of the redevelopment of industrial land use not only affect the effective release of land use potential, but also aggravate the constraint of land nature. The institutional problems of land redevelopment by domestic scholars The analysis is not thorough enough and needs to be further deepened. This study adopts the system and method of institutional economics to analyze the system of the redevelopment of the stock land in our country, clarify its constraints, and design the innovation system, which has important theoretical and practical value for the redevelopment of China's industrial land. (1) first of all, it is based on profit. The stakeholder theory, based on the subject, object and intermediary connotation of interest, constructs a resource exhausted mining area redevelopment demand system based on "stakeholder stakeholder activity carrier - stakeholder activity content", and points out the specific contents of the three parties respectively, and thinks that the model of mixed organization is the most suitable. The essence of the conflict of interests lies in the contention of the value of the right to land development. The dynamic mechanism of the land redevelopment of the mining area comes from the adjustment of urban function and industrial structure, the transformation and development of enterprises, the display of the value of land. (2) the mode of redevelopment of the redevelopment of the redevelopment of the stock land in China can be found and the mode of redevelopment can be found through the system. From the characteristics of government led to the market mechanism, the main body of the original property rights to participate in the distribution of value-added income distribution become a trend; and mining land allocation, authorized management, transfer and other land ways coexist, different land mode corresponding to the right, property rights transfer mode is different, the second development faces different obstacles, the key problems of RE development are mainly reflected. The withdrawal of coal enterprises and the entry of the new market main body; according to the analysis and comparison, the reason and essence of the land redevelopment system constraints in the mining area are analyzed, and the defects system problems are pointed out, such as property rights transfer system, land development right ownership, value-added income distribution system and so on. (3) from the macro and micro two perspectives, the system is analyzed. On the micro level, the central government and local government, local government and coal enterprises, local governments and developers have conflict with the distribution of value-added income, information acquisition, development conditions, and the macro level, the government leading and market mechanism, Redevelopment path and examination and approval system, property rights disposal and bidding hang, value-added exclusive and benefit sharing, the conflict between mining ownership and land property rights, is also the most essential reason for the conflict of system supply and demand. (4) based on the game of interest groups under institutional constraints, the general game analysis framework of institutional evolution is used to construct the central government. The government, the local government - the 22 game model of the coal enterprise, analyzes the strategy choice of the stakeholders and the system evolution path under different conditions, explains the internal mechanism of the change of the land redevelopment system in our country, and optimizes the land reopening system in the exhausted mining area for the direction and the theoretical basis, and then improves the land of the mining area. The maneuverability of the re development. (5) to select the redevelopment of the stock land of the ancient book Academy in Jincheng, which has relatively high land redevelopment efficiency in the exhausted mining area, and to analyze the policy constraints caused by the land system on the redevelopment of the stock land of ancient academies, and the redevelopment practice of the ancient academy and the optimization of the research system. The high character has proved the application value of the research results.
【学位授予单位】：中国矿业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F301.2

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