考虑组织形态演化的农民专业合作社利益分配问题研究
发布时间：2018-08-11 20:49
【摘要】：随着农村经济改革的步伐加快,农民专业合作社在组织形态上突破了由农户单一群体组织成立的模式,趋向于多主体联合发展模式;这一改变实现了不同主体间的要素整合,有利于提升合作社运营效率,对我国农村经济发展产生了深远的影响。但是,在新的组织形态下如何处理合作社在利益分配上的矛盾,仍然是制约合作社进一步发展的难题,也是实现我国农村经济改革目标必须妥善处理的问题。正是基于上述变化,优化合作社利益分配,以平衡不同主体之间的利益冲突,稳定相互合作的关系,成为合作社发展的重中之重。本文以演化博弈理论、合作及经济理论为基础,综合国内外相关研究成果;在考虑组织形态演化的前提下,针对我国合作社利益分配现状,提出文章的研究问题。主要而言,研究了以下三个方面的问题:第一,对我国合作社当前所处的阶段及其组织模式进行研究判断,总结了我国合作社在利益分配中的现实困境,即合作社过度重视货币性投资等稀缺性要素,弱化了普通农户投入要素的合理收益,并对造成这一现实困境的原因进行简单分析。第二,针对合作社利益分配博弈关系的核心群体,即普通农户与合作社,本文建立双种群演化博弈模型,分析影响双方博弈向“帕累托”最优状态演化的影响因素,最后通过数值仿真展示相关参数的变化对合作社利益均衡的影响。研究结果表明较高的规模经济、市场交易分险、农产品收购价值,有利于博弈向最优状态演化;而政府财政转移支付、合作社业务活动收益、普通农户盈余分配系数变动会影响合作社让利大小,进而对博弈演化的方向产生作用。第三,在分析相关参数对合作社利益分配博弈的影响基础上,文章从合作社、普通农户、政府三个角度,提出合作社利益分配优化建议。最后结合金寨县农民专业合作社的调研,分析当地合作社利益分配的现状及优缺点,提出当地合作社利益分配方面的改进对策,包括加强合作社盈余分配的管理,政府继续加强合作社利益分配引导工作,合作社在紧密连接成员基础上不断拓展自身业务等。
[Abstract]:With the quickening pace of rural economic reform, farmers'professional cooperatives have broken through the mode of single group organization of farmers and tended to the mode of multi-subject joint development; this change has realized the integration of factors among different subjects, is conducive to improving the operational efficiency of cooperatives, and has produced a far-reaching impact on rural economic development in China. However, under the new organizational form, how to deal with the contradictions in the distribution of interests of cooperatives is still a difficult problem that restricts the further development of cooperatives, and also a problem that must be properly handled in order to achieve the goal of rural economic reform in China. Conflict and stability of the relationship between cooperation have become the top priority in the development of cooperatives.Based on evolutionary game theory, cooperation and economic theory, this paper synthesizes the relevant research results at home and abroad.On the premise of considering the evolution of organizational form, this paper puts forward the research issues of the article in view of the current situation of the distribution of interests of cooperatives in China. The following three aspects are discussed: Firstly, the current stage and organizational model of Chinese cooperatives are studied and judged, and the realistic dilemma of Chinese cooperatives in the distribution of interests is summarized, that is, cooperatives pay too much attention to scarce elements such as monetary investment, which weakens the reasonable income of the input factors of ordinary farmers and causes this reality. Secondly, aiming at the core group of cooperatives'benefit distribution game, i.e. ordinary farmers and cooperatives, this paper establishes a dual-population evolutionary game model to analyze the influencing factors of the evolution from the game to the Pareto optimal state. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out to show the change and combination of relevant parameters. The results show that the higher scale economy, market transaction risk sharing, agricultural product acquisition value are conducive to the evolution of the game to the optimal state; while the government financial transfer payment, cooperative business activities income, the change of the surplus distribution coefficient of ordinary farmers will affect the size of cooperative yields, and then the evolution direction of the game. Thirdly, on the basis of analyzing the influence of relevant parameters on the game of benefit distribution of cooperatives, the paper puts forward suggestions on the optimization of benefit distribution of cooperatives from the three angles of cooperatives, ordinary farmers and the government. Finally, combining with the investigation of farmers'professional cooperatives in Jinzhai County, the paper analyzes the present situation, advantages and disadvantages of benefit distribution of local cooperatives, and puts forward the suggestions. The measures to improve the benefit distribution of local cooperatives include strengthening the management of the surplus distribution of local cooperatives, continuing to strengthen the guiding work of the benefit distribution of local cooperatives, and expanding the business of local cooperatives on the basis of close links with their members.
【学位授予单位】：江苏大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F321.42
本文编号：2178200
[Abstract]:With the quickening pace of rural economic reform, farmers'professional cooperatives have broken through the mode of single group organization of farmers and tended to the mode of multi-subject joint development; this change has realized the integration of factors among different subjects, is conducive to improving the operational efficiency of cooperatives, and has produced a far-reaching impact on rural economic development in China. However, under the new organizational form, how to deal with the contradictions in the distribution of interests of cooperatives is still a difficult problem that restricts the further development of cooperatives, and also a problem that must be properly handled in order to achieve the goal of rural economic reform in China. Conflict and stability of the relationship between cooperation have become the top priority in the development of cooperatives.Based on evolutionary game theory, cooperation and economic theory, this paper synthesizes the relevant research results at home and abroad.On the premise of considering the evolution of organizational form, this paper puts forward the research issues of the article in view of the current situation of the distribution of interests of cooperatives in China. The following three aspects are discussed: Firstly, the current stage and organizational model of Chinese cooperatives are studied and judged, and the realistic dilemma of Chinese cooperatives in the distribution of interests is summarized, that is, cooperatives pay too much attention to scarce elements such as monetary investment, which weakens the reasonable income of the input factors of ordinary farmers and causes this reality. Secondly, aiming at the core group of cooperatives'benefit distribution game, i.e. ordinary farmers and cooperatives, this paper establishes a dual-population evolutionary game model to analyze the influencing factors of the evolution from the game to the Pareto optimal state. Finally, numerical simulation is carried out to show the change and combination of relevant parameters. The results show that the higher scale economy, market transaction risk sharing, agricultural product acquisition value are conducive to the evolution of the game to the optimal state; while the government financial transfer payment, cooperative business activities income, the change of the surplus distribution coefficient of ordinary farmers will affect the size of cooperative yields, and then the evolution direction of the game. Thirdly, on the basis of analyzing the influence of relevant parameters on the game of benefit distribution of cooperatives, the paper puts forward suggestions on the optimization of benefit distribution of cooperatives from the three angles of cooperatives, ordinary farmers and the government. Finally, combining with the investigation of farmers'professional cooperatives in Jinzhai County, the paper analyzes the present situation, advantages and disadvantages of benefit distribution of local cooperatives, and puts forward the suggestions. The measures to improve the benefit distribution of local cooperatives include strengthening the management of the surplus distribution of local cooperatives, continuing to strengthen the guiding work of the benefit distribution of local cooperatives, and expanding the business of local cooperatives on the basis of close links with their members.
【学位授予单位】：江苏大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F321.42
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