“过度化执行”:基层政府与农村低保政策的执行逻辑

发布时间：2018-08-19 15:55

【摘要】：我国农村低保政策的运行主要体现为基层政府的政策执行活动。通过对河北省北县、南县和宁县的调查发现,该政策的执行过程存在着明显的阶段性:初期的过度放宽与后期的过度收紧。这种阶段性的变动反映了基层政府在农村低保政策执行中的"过度化执行"逻辑,即人为放大上级政府所设定的行政目标,上级要求"应保尽保"则过度放宽办理条件,上级要求适度收紧则过度收缩甚至完全终止办理。这一执行逻辑的出现源于我国政府强力性、多层级的人事与财政控制、虚弱性的行政过程监督造成的基层政府"重结果而轻过程"的行为特征,以及自上而下的政绩考核与晋升竞争机制,使得基层政府形成对上级设定的政策目标层层加码以确保足额超额完成任务、凸显政绩的行政"冲动"。
[Abstract]:The operation of the rural minimum security policy in China is mainly reflected in the policy implementation activities of the grass-roots government. Through the investigation of North County, South County and Ningxian County of Hebei Province, it is found that there are obvious stages in the implementation process of this policy: initial excessive relaxation and late excessive tightening. This periodic change reflects the "excessive execution" logic of grass-roots governments in the implementation of the rural minimum security policy, that is, artificially amplifying the administrative objectives set by the higher government, while the higher authorities' demands that "should be fully protected" excessively relax the management conditions. The superior asks for moderate tightening, excessive contraction or even complete termination. The emergence of this executive logic originates from the behavior characteristics of the grass-roots government "emphasizing the results rather than the process" caused by the strong nature of our government, multi-level personnel and financial control, and weak administrative process supervision. As well as the top-down performance assessment and promotion competition mechanism, make the grass-roots government to set the policy goals layer by layer to ensure the full completion of the task, highlight the administrative achievements of the "impulse".
【作者单位】：北京科技大学文法学院;华北电力大学法政系;
【基金】：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“基层行政体制与农村低保政策执行研究”(FRF-TP-15-048A2)
【分类号】：D63;F323.89

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