海洋主权博弈背景下的渔权分置与渔民行为选择问题研究

发布时间：2018-08-31 17:49

【摘要】：《联合国海洋法公约》(以下简称《公约》)、中韩、中日、中越渔业协定等海洋协议的相继签署,使渔民在我国传统捕鱼区域上的捕鱼权力受到了限制。渔业协议将我国与临海国之间的海域划分成多个小范围的水域,如中韩之间的海域被划分为暂定措施水域、过渡水域等水域。这种区域划分将渔民传统捕鱼权分解成多个细小的权利,在具体的水域上,我国渔民享有由一种或者多种权利组成的权利束,在不同的水域享有权利束有所不同,如,在暂定措施水域我国渔民只享有进入权、提取权和部分管理权,本文将此现象定义为渔权分置。我国政府在对渔业经济进行管理时提出的渔业政策:捕捞许可证制度、数量控制制度、管理制度等,不同主体拥有的权利约束也有所不同,如,在管理制度要求下,私有渔权享有进入约束权、提取约束权、管理约束权,共有渔权享有进入约束权、提取约束权,俱乐部渔权享有进入约束权、提取约束权、转让约束权。本文详细总结了不同约束制度下我国海洋渔权的分置情况。通过进一步分析渔权分置的影响路径时发现,我国渔民在海洋中的捕鱼成本、利润水平、安全性均受到影响,渔民为了基本的生产、生活,相关的捕鱼行为也随之改变。多方面调查后得知,渔民趋向于通过违法捕鱼来平衡渔权丧失带来的利益损失,如,在禁渔区或禁渔期捕鱼、无证捕捞、在他国专属经济区捕捞作业等。本文将部分渔权丧失后,渔民与政府关系简化为政府制定政策、渔民行为变化、政府主权规制、渔民行为理性化的动态博弈过程,通过对结果进行博弈分析后得知渔民在短期内会通过不合理捕鱼行为来提高个人经济利润,政府会选择积极的监督管制以维护集体的利益,此时达到博弈均衡状态。为此在本文最后一部分,对比国内外渔业政策,针对我国的国情和不足提出政策建议,以期实现渔民和集体经济权益的双赢局面,同时约束渔民不合理捕鱼行为,减少与他国渔业冲突,并实现我国海洋资源的可持续发展。
[Abstract]:The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) and the successive signing of such ocean agreements as China, South Korea, China, Japan, and China-Vietnam Fisheries Agreements have restricted fishermen's fishing rights in China's traditional fishing areas. This division divides the fishermen's traditional fishing rights into several small rights. In specific waters, fishermen in China enjoy a bundle of rights consisting of one or more rights. The bundles of rights in different waters are different. For example, in the waters of the provisional measures, fishermen in China only enjoy access. This paper defines this phenomenon as the division of fishing rights. The fishery policies put forward by the Chinese government in the management of fishery economy are as follows: fishing license system, quantity control system, management system and so on. The rights and restrictions of different subjects are also different. For example, under the requirements of the management system, the private fishing rights enjoy advancement. In this paper, the division of marine fishing rights under different restriction systems is summarized in detail. The cost, profit level and safety of Chinese fishermen in the ocean are all affected, and the fishermen's fishing behavior has changed for the sake of basic production and life. After the loss of some fishing rights, the relationship between fishermen and the government is simplified as a dynamic game process in which the government formulates policies, changes in fishermen's behavior, government sovereignty regulation and rationalization of fishermen's behavior. In the last part of this paper, the author compares the Fishery Policies at home and abroad, and puts forward some policy suggestions aiming at the national conditions and shortcomings of our country, in order to realize the win-win situation of fishermen and collective economic rights and interests, and restrain fishermen from not doing so. Reasonable fishing behavior, reduce conflicts with other countries, and achieve sustainable development of marine resources in China.
【学位授予单位】：烟台大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F326.4

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