集体建设用地流转中各利益主体博弃关系研究

发布时间：2018-11-08 17:03

【摘要】：近年来,随着我国工业化、城镇化和现代化进程的不断深入,土地逐渐成为了最稀缺的资源之一。尤其是作为人们居住、工作、生活基础的建设用地,在人口向城市周边大量迁移的情况下,更是价值飙升。在高额地租的吸引下,从上世纪80年代起,集体建设用地逐渐出现在土地交易市场,为用地企业带来了新的选择。一开始,集体建设用地流转由于其不合法性,只能在地下市场进行交易。然而,从近几年开始,集体建设用地流转开始大量在各大城市周边出现,并得到了一部分地方政府的许可。广东、河北等省份甚至先后出台了《集体建设用地流转办法》。在越来越多的实践中,我们逐渐发现,集体建设用地的流转对于提高村民收入、解决三农问题有着很好的促进作用。因此,党中央在十八届三中全会上,决定给予集体建设用地流转合法的地位。集体建设用地流转从地下到合法,是一个自下而上的政策变革过程,是参与各方出于利益的考虑而进行的博弈行为。因此,在梳理集体建设用地流转参与各方的行为和立场时,博弈论是一种非常适合的分析工具。在十八届三中全会前,国内学界在对集体建设用地流转行为未来出路的探索中,多选择从博弈论的角度来进行研究。本文也选择博弈论的视角,对集体建设用地流转合法后,中央政府、地方政府、村集体组织、用地企业、村民群体五方相关利益群体之间的相互作用和利益均衡进行深入的分析和探讨。本文首先根据利益各方的特征,对其利益所在以及效用偏好进行了讨论;然后,又利用完全信息静态博弈和完全信息动态博弈,分别构建了中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与村集体组织、地方政府与用地企业、村集体组织与用地企业、村集体组织与村民群体五个博弈模型,借此来探讨集体建设用地流转中各方可能采取的行为以及未来的发展。从各利益群体的角度,可以得到如下结论:①中央政府可能会放松对具体流转行为的监管,在集体建设用地流转中放任地方政府行政;②地方政府会选择阻碍当地流转行为,以保证其财政收益;③用地企业、村集体组织和村民群体则会更多地参与流转,以赚取高收益。文章最后,根据博弈结果为完善未来的流转市场而提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the deepening of industrialization, urbanization and modernization, land has gradually become one of the most scarce resources. Especially as people living, working, living the basis of construction land, in the case of population migration to the periphery of the city, the value is soaring. Under the attraction of high land rent, collective construction land has gradually appeared in the land market since 1980s, which has brought new choice to land enterprises. At first, collective construction land transfer because of its illegality, can only be traded in the underground market. However, from the beginning of recent years, the circulation of collective construction land began to appear in large numbers around the major cities, and has been approved by some local governments. Guangdong, Hebei and other provinces have even promulgated the "collective construction land transfer measures." In more and more practice, we gradually find that the circulation of collective construction land plays a good role in improving villagers' income and solving the problems of agriculture, countryside and farmers. Therefore, the Party Central Committee in the third Plenary session of the 18th Central Committee, decided to give collective construction land transfer legal status. The transfer of collective construction land from underground to legal is a process of policy reform from bottom to top, and it is a game behavior carried out by the parties involved in the consideration of interests. Therefore, game theory is a very suitable tool for analyzing the behaviors and positions of all parties involved in collective construction land transfer. Before the third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, in the exploration of the future outlet of collective construction land transfer, domestic scholars chose to study it from the angle of game theory. This article also chooses the game theory angle of view, after the collective construction land circulation legal, the central government, the local government, the village collective organization, the land use enterprise, The interaction and balance of interests among the five related interest groups of villagers are deeply analyzed and discussed. In this paper, firstly, according to the characteristics of the parties, the interests of the interests and utility preferences are discussed. Then, by using the static game of complete information and the dynamic game of complete information, we construct the central government and local government, local government and village collective organization, local government and land enterprises, village collective organization and land use enterprise, respectively. There are five game models between village collective organization and villager group to discuss the possible behavior and future development of collective construction land circulation. From the perspective of various interest groups, we can draw the following conclusions: 1 the central government may relax the supervision of specific circulation behavior and allow local government administration in the circulation of collective construction land; (2) the local government will choose to block the behavior of local circulation in order to ensure its financial income, and (3) the land enterprises, village collective organizations and villagers' groups will participate more in the circulation to earn high income. Finally, according to the result of the game, some policy suggestions are put forward to perfect the circulation market in the future.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F301.2

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