我国地方政府支出竞争与产业结构升级的关系研究

发布时间：2018-01-12 00:19

本文关键词：我国地方政府支出竞争与产业结构升级的关系研究　出处：《西北大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着我国分税制不断深化,地方政府支出竞争逐渐取代税收竞争成为我国政府竞争的主要方式。地方政府间开展支出竞争虽然能够提高公共物品和服务的供应效率,吸引生产要素的流入,促进地区经济的增长,但是在争夺资本和攀比政绩的双重激励背景下,不规范的策略性竞争行为导致地区间产业选择出现跟随,最终不利于产业结构合理化和高度化,阻碍经济的健康协调发展。本文以财政分权理论、要素流动理论和标尺竞争理论为基础,归纳了我国地方政府支出竞争的特点及成因,将政府间策略互动引入支出竞争,并具体分析了各类支出竞争对产业结构升级的影响路径。在理论分析的基础上,本文选取我国2007-2015年省级面板数据,通过建立空间杜宾模型对我国地方政府支出竞争的存在性及其产业结构效应进行了实证分析,得出以下结论:(1)我国真正意义上的地方政府支出竞争产生于分税制改革之后,并且表现出过度争夺资本和迎合上级考核的竞争特点;(2)我国地方政府支出竞争呈现出策略互补型的特点,即地方政府的支出在空间上存在模仿效应,并且在经济建设支出上表现得尤为明显;(3)地方政府支出竞争对产业结构升级有显著促进作用,而不同支出类型的竞争对产业结构升级的影响存在差异。科教文卫支出的空间策略性竞争能显著促进产业结构的升级;经济建设支出竞争则会限制产业结构的升级;而行政管理支出竞争和社会保障支出竞争对产业结构升级没有影响。基于上述结论,本文提出优化地方政府支出竞争的政策建议:(1)深化财政分权改革,加快政府职能转变;(2)健全官员晋升体制,消除人口流动壁垒;(3)注重支出空间效应,优化地方支出结构。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of China's tax distribution system. Local government expenditure competition has gradually replaced tax competition as the main way of government competition in our country. Although local governments can improve the efficiency of public goods and services supply and attract the inflow of production factors. Promote the growth of regional economy, but in the context of the dual incentive for capital and performance, non-standard strategic competition behavior leads to the emergence of inter-regional industrial choices follow. This paper is based on the theory of fiscal decentralization, the theory of factor flow and the theory of scale competition. This paper summarizes the characteristics and causes of local government expenditure competition in China, introduces inter-governmental strategy interaction into expenditure competition, and concretely analyzes the influence path of various kinds of expenditure competition on the upgrading of industrial structure. On the basis of theoretical analysis. Based on the provincial panel data from 2007 to 2015, this paper empirically analyzes the existence of local government expenditure competition and its industrial structure effect through the establishment of spatial Doberman model. The following conclusions are drawn: (1) the real competition of local government expenditure in our country comes from the reform of the tax sharing system, and it shows the characteristics of excessive competition for capital and catering to the higher examination; (2) the competition of local government expenditure in our country has the characteristics of complementary strategy, that is, the expenditure of local government has the effect of imitation in space, and it is especially obvious in the expenditure of economic construction; 3) the competition of local government expenditure has a significant effect on the upgrading of industrial structure. The influence of different expenditure types on the upgrading of industrial structure is different. The spatial strategic competition of science, education, culture and health expenditure can significantly promote the upgrading of industrial structure; The competition of economic construction expenditure will limit the upgrading of industrial structure; However, the competition of administrative expenditure and social security expenditure has no effect on the upgrading of industrial structure. Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the policy suggestion of optimizing local government expenditure competition: 1) deepening the reform of fiscal decentralization. Speeding up the transformation of government functions; 2) perfecting the promotion system of officials and eliminating barriers to population mobility; Pay attention to the space effect of expenditure, optimize the local expenditure structure.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F812.45;F121.3

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