转移支付对中国企业发展和产业结构合理化的影响研究
发布时间:2018-02-04 19:21
本文关键词: 转移支付 企业发展 产业结构 出处:《厦门大学》2014年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:自从1994年我国实行分税制改革政策以来,中央政府财政收入大幅度增加,与此同时,中央政府将事权大量下放给地方政府,导致了政府间财力与事权的纵向不匹配,这使得中央政府实施的转移支付愈来愈受到人们的关注。转移支付的实施对于实现中国经济持续均衡发展具有重要的意义。但我国的转移支付在实施过程中,由于相关制度的不完善,存在着诸多问题,这些问题使得转移支付在调节地区发展差距的同时对我国经济的诸多方面都产生了一定的负面影响。本文主要考察转移支付对我国企业发展以及产业结构合理化所产生的影响。 首先,本文考察了转移支付对国有企业和民营企业发展的影响,通过建立一个国有企业、民营企业和地方政府的三部门模型进行分析,并以分税制改革后中国1994-2011年各省面板数据为基础,运用固定效应模型和随机效应模型进行实证检验。研究发现,地方政府在使用转移支付时会优先考虑对国有企业进行补贴。这样,转移支付的补贴使国有企业产生了道德风险而降低了效率,同时,对国有企业的补贴挤压了转移支付中用于提供公共服务的部分,从而影响了民营企业的发展,对整个经济造成了不良的影响。此外,本文还针对我国东中西部不同区域的情况做了比较与揭示。 其次,本文考察了转移支付对我国产业结构的合理化调整所起的作用。本文构建了一个简单的政府间博弈模型,理论分析了转移支付对产业结构所产生的影响,并利用中国1994-2011年省级面板数据进行了实证检验,发现转移支付对地区产业结构合理化产生了两方面效应,即一方面转移支付由于过度投资于能较快给当地带来GDP高增长的资本密集型产业而直接扩大了地区产业结构的偏离度;另一方面国有企业与转移支付的相互作用同时也会间接地阻碍地区产业结构的合理化调整。同样,本文还比较了我国东中西部的具体情况,发现西部地区转移支付对地区产业结构合理化的阻碍作用更大。 最后,在对理论和实证研究结果进行总结的基础上,本文就我国完善中央转移支付制度以及规范地方政府行为给出了几方面的政策建议。
[Abstract]:Since 1994, China has implemented the tax sharing reform policy, the central government revenue has increased significantly, at the same time, the central government will be a large number of decentralization to local governments. It leads to the vertical mismatch between the financial resources and the power of the government. This makes people pay more and more attention to the transfer payment implemented by the central government. The implementation of the transfer payment is of great significance for the sustainable and balanced development of China's economy. However, the transfer payment in China is in the process of implementation. Because of the imperfect system, there are many problems. These problems make the transfer payment have a certain negative impact on many aspects of our economy while adjusting the regional development gap. This paper mainly discusses the transfer payment to the development of Chinese enterprises and the rationalization of industrial structure. The impact. First of all, this paper examines the impact of transfer payment on the development of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, through the establishment of a state-owned enterprise, private enterprise and local government three-sector model to analyze. Based on the provincial panel data of China from 1994 to 2011 after the reform of the tax sharing system, the empirical test is carried out by using the fixed effect model and the stochastic effect model. Local governments will give priority to subsidies to state-owned enterprises when using transfer payments. Thus, the subsidies of transfer payments will cause moral hazard and reduce efficiency of state-owned enterprises at the same time. Subsidies to state-owned enterprises have squeezed the part of transfer payments used to provide public services, thus affecting the development of private enterprises and adversely affecting the economy as a whole. This paper also compares and reveals the situation of different regions in the east, west and west of China. Secondly, this paper examines the role of transfer payment in the rationalization of China's industrial structure. This paper constructs a simple intergovernmental game model. Theoretical analysis of the impact of transfer payments on the industrial structure, and the use of China 1994-2011 provincial panel data for empirical testing. It is found that transfer payment has two effects on the rationalization of regional industrial structure. On the one hand, transfer payment directly expands the deviation degree of regional industrial structure because of overinvestment in capital-intensive industries which can bring fast growth of GDP to local areas. On the other hand, the interaction between state-owned enterprises and transfer payments will also indirectly hinder the rationalization of regional industrial structure adjustment. It is found that the transfer payment in the western region hinders the rationalization of the regional industrial structure. Finally, on the basis of summing up the theoretical and empirical research results, this paper gives some policy suggestions on how to perfect the central transfer payment system and standardize the behavior of local government.
【学位授予单位】:厦门大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F812.45;F279.2;F121.3
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