我国区域经济一体化过程中地方政府间博弈均衡研究

发布时间：2018-06-17 07:03

本文选题：区域经济一体化 + 地方政府　；参考：《东北大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：在区域经济一体化进程不断深化的今天,地方政府纷纷发挥互补优势、强化组织合作、探索制度创新,以推动区域经济一体化,致力于从区域整体优势的增长中寻求自身的建设发展。然而,长期在财政分权和GDP政绩考核导向影响下的地方政府,追逐自身利益的理性思维根深蒂固。即使参与区域合作的地方政府都将获得一部分合作增益,但是在面临自身辖区的经济发展、公众福利尤其是地方官员晋升之时,区域内有限的资源仍成为地方政府之间不断竞争、竞相争夺的重中之重。长此以往,区域经济一体化进程必然受阻。因此,研究地方政府间博弈均衡,促进区域经济一体化健康可持续发展,有必要提到议事议程。本文采用文献分析法、博弈研究法、实证分析与规范分析相结合等研究方法对我国区域经济一体化过程中地方政府博弈均衡进行研究。主要研究内容有五个部分。第一部分为绪论,从选题的背景意义入手提出本文研究的必要性,对研究方法、研究内容、可能的创新点给予必要的说明,并对国内外学者的相关文献做出整理与简要评述。第二部分为理论概述,对与地方政府竞争与博弈均衡研究的相关概念和理论进行简要梳理,主要涉及到区域经济理论、地方政府竞争理论、博弈论理论三大方面。第三部分为地方政府间非合作博弈行为及其后果,从经济重复建设、招商引资“竞争”和地方保护主义三个地方政府非合作博弈的客观现实出发,对其表现和危害进行了阐述。第四部分为地方政府经济行为的博弈模型分析,重点通过地方政府联盟博弈模型和地方政府竞合选择模型两个角度对地方政府合作的可行性和主要影响因素进行研究。第五部分为结论与政策建议,对本文的研究结论进行总结,并提出促进区域经济一体化过程中地方政府合作的政策建议。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of the regional economic integration process, local governments have developed complementary advantages, strengthened organizational cooperation and explored institutional innovation in order to promote regional economic integration. It is committed to seek its own construction and development from the growth of regional overall advantages. However, under the influence of fiscal decentralization and GDP performance assessment for a long time, local governments have deep-rooted rational thinking of pursuing their own interests. Even if the local governments involved in regional cooperation will gain some of the benefits of cooperation, but in the face of economic development in their own areas, public welfare, especially local officials promoted, The limited resources in the region still become the top priority of the competition among the local governments. In the long run, the process of regional economic integration will inevitably be blocked. Therefore, it is necessary to study the game equilibrium between local governments and promote the healthy and sustainable development of regional economic integration. This paper studies the game equilibrium of local government in the process of regional economic integration in China by the methods of literature analysis, game analysis, empirical analysis and normative analysis. The main research content has five parts. The first part is the introduction, from the background significance of the topic proposed the necessity of this study, research methods, research content, possible innovations to give a necessary explanation, and domestic and foreign scholars to make a summary of the relevant literature and a brief review. The second part is an overview of the theory, briefly combing the concepts and theories related to the study of local government competition and game equilibrium, mainly involving three aspects: regional economic theory, local government competition theory, and game theory. The third part is the non-cooperative game behavior between local governments and its consequences. From the three objective realities of repeated economic construction, investment "competition" and local protectionism, the performance and harm of non-cooperative game between local governments are expounded. The fourth part is the game model analysis of local government economic behavior, focusing on the feasibility and main influencing factors of local government cooperation from two angles: local government alliance game model and local government competition and selection model. The fifth part is the conclusion and policy recommendations. It summarizes the conclusions of this paper and puts forward some policy suggestions to promote the cooperation of local governments in the process of regional economic integration.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D625;F127

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