中央和地方的双重政策保护与产能过剩

发布时间：2018-06-26 23:16

本文选题：双重政策保护 + 产能过剩　；参考：《财经研究》2017年11期

【摘要】：是不是只要政府予以企业保护就一定会导致产能过剩?针对此问题文章建立了一个简明的理论模型,并运用固定效应模型、倾向得分匹配法以及事件冲击DID方法进行了实证检验,探究了地方政府在"官员晋升锦标赛"体制下运用财政补贴,与中央政府的产业鼓励政策一起给企业提供双重政策保护,从而导致产能过剩的整个机制。结论表明:(1)单一的政策保护并不会引发严重的产能过剩,中央政府的产业鼓励政策和地方政府的财政补贴政策的双重叠加才是导致产能过剩的真正原因;(2)当中央政府明确经济增长任务后,那些所在地政府迅速推出地方版财政刺激计划的企业更容易发生产能过剩;(3)相比较而言,双重保护的效果在国有企业中更为明显。
[Abstract]:Does it mean that as long as the government protects enterprises, it will lead to overcapacity? In this paper, a concise theoretical model is established, and the fixed effect model, the tendency score matching method and the event shock Did method are used to carry out an empirical test. This paper probes into the whole mechanism of local governments applying financial subsidies under the system of "official promotion championship", together with the industrial encouragement policy of the central government, to provide the enterprises with dual policy protection, thus leading to the whole mechanism of overcapacity. The conclusions are as follows: (1) single policy protection does not lead to serious overcapacity. The superposition of the central government's industrial encouragement policy and the local government's fiscal subsidy policy is the real cause of overcapacity. (2) when the central government defines the task of economic growth, Companies whose local governments quickly rolled out local fiscal stimulus packages are more likely to experience overcapacity; (3) the effect of dual protection is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises than in state-owned enterprises.
【作者单位】：上海商学院商务经济学院;上海大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573171) 上海市哲学社会科学青年项目(2016EJB001)
【分类号】：F120

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