基于模糊理论的绿色制造商评价与政府监管策略研究

发布时间：2018-09-08 18:15

【摘要】：传统制造模式创造了大量的物质财富,可是由于资源利用效率相对较低,同时产生了大量的废弃物。由于近代人类大量使用化学燃料,如石油、煤炭、天然气等,使得大气中二氧化碳的浓度在过去100多年里由270毫升每立方米上升到350毫升每立方米,到21世纪中期将达到600毫升每立方米。由此产生的大气污染、水体污染和土壤污染等直接影响到人类的生存问题,如近些年来的海啸、雾霾等恶劣天气等都是环境污染的直接后果。大量废弃物的产生加剧了社会资源的短缺,环境与人类的矛盾要求制造业遵循与环境相容的原则。绿色制造是一个综合考虑环境影响和资源效率的现代制造模式,其社会收益远远大于私人收益。而单纯的市场机制不能为绿色制造模式提供公平竞争和生存的环境,因此政府就有必要采取一定的措施来弥补市场机制的缺陷,在对绿色制造商绿色度评价的基础上,采取相应的激励和监管策略,从而减少污染物排放和资源能源的浪费,进而改善人类的生存环境,实现可持续发展。绿色制造商评价与政府监管策略作为一项较为复杂的决策问题,在实际评价与监管中,涉及的因素复杂、指标较多,要对绿色制造商的绿色度进行准确评估是不容易的,往往只能给出不精确的、模糊的评估,即决策信息是模糊的。本文引入模糊理论在一定程度上解决了这个问题,有关政府与绿色制造商之间博弈的研究,采用模糊数代替精确数也会更符合实际情况。本文首先从对绿色制造商评价的管理意义和作用着手,在对传统制造商评价的基础上,综合考虑绿色指标,对绿色制造商的产品绿色度进行了综合评价。在评价指标的选取上,建立了目标层、准则层、指标层等三层评价体系；在指标权重的处理上,采取了模糊理论与层次分析法相结合的方法,采用模糊理论中的三角模糊数对判断矩阵进行模糊化处理；在建立评判矩阵的时候,分别对定量指标和定性指标采取不同的方法,对定量指标采用半梯形分布与梯形分布来确定其隶属度函数,对于定性指标,采用对专家评判进行模糊化处理来确定其隶属度向量,从而得到三角模糊评判矩阵；最后利用模糊层次分析法对三层评价体系进行集成,最终得到绿色制造商的综合评价层级和最终得分。其次,在政府对绿色制造商的产品绿色度进行模糊评价的基础上,建立了政府与绿色制造商的模糊博弈模型。通过对各不同数据的分析,对政府与绿色制造商的不同策略进行讨论,根据各个数据指标策略的不同,将博弈结果分为纯策略纳什均衡和混合策略纳什均衡两类。通过对博弈均衡的综合分析,讨论了最理想的均衡结果(不检查,采取)和相应的管理策略；然后利用三角结构元方法对具体实例分为纯策略和混合策略两种情况进行分析求解,从而验证了分析结果的正确性和可行性。最后,综合前面的讨论对政府的监管策略和绿色制造商的管理策略进行了总结,并给出了若干针对性的实施建议。
[Abstract]:Traditional manufacturing models have created a lot of material wealth, but because of the relatively inefficient use of resources and a large amount of waste, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has risen from 270 milliliters per cubic meter to 350 milliliters in the past 100 years due to the extensive use of chemical fuels such as oil, coal, natural gas, etc. Every cubic metre will reach 600 milliliters per cubic metre by the middle of the 21st century. The resulting air pollution, water pollution and soil pollution directly affect human survival problems, such as tsunamis, haze and other adverse weather in recent years are the direct consequences of environmental pollution. The contradiction between environment and human beings requires the manufacturing industry to follow the principle of environmental compatibility.
Green manufacturing is a modern manufacturing mode which considers both environmental impact and resource efficiency. Its social benefits are far greater than private benefits. However, the pure market mechanism can not provide a fair competition and living environment for green manufacturing mode. Therefore, the government must take certain measures to make up for the shortcomings of the market mechanism. On the basis of manufacturer's greenness evaluation, relevant incentive and supervision strategies are adopted to reduce pollutant emissions and waste of resources and energy, thereby improving human living environment and achieving sustainable development. It is not easy to evaluate the green degree of green manufacturer accurately because the factors are complex and the indexes are many. It can only give an inaccurate and fuzzy evaluation, that is, the decision information is fuzzy. Number instead of exact number will be more realistic.
This paper begins with the management significance and function of the green manufacturer evaluation, and comprehensively considers the green index on the basis of the traditional manufacturer evaluation. In the processing, the fuzzy theory and the analytic hierarchy process are combined to fuzzify the judgment matrix, and the triangular fuzzy number in the fuzzy theory is used to fuzzify the judgment matrix. The membership function of green manufacturer is defined by fuzzy treatment of expert judgment to determine its membership vector, and the triangular fuzzy judgment matrix is obtained. Finally, the fuzzy analytic hierarchy process is used to integrate the three-tier evaluation system, and the comprehensive evaluation hierarchy and final score of green manufacturer are obtained.
Secondly, based on the government's fuzzy evaluation of green manufacturer's product greenness, a fuzzy game model between government and green manufacturer is established. Different strategies between government and green manufacturer are discussed through the analysis of different data, and the game results are divided into pure strategies according to the different strategies of each data index. Nash Equilibrium and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium are classified. Through the comprehensive analysis of the game equilibrium, the optimal equilibrium result (not checked, adopted) and corresponding management strategy are discussed. Then the triangular structured element method is used to analyze and solve the two cases, which are pure strategy and mixed strategy, and the analysis results are verified. Finally, the government's supervision strategy and green manufacturer's management strategy are summarized based on the previous discussion, and some suggestions are given.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F224;D630;F124.5

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