中国封建王朝包容性制度向攫取性制度渐变之原因——王朝兴衰的新制度经济学分析
发布时间：2018-10-30 17:12
【摘要】：中国封建王朝包容性制度虽然对全社会有益,但对统治者的政权稳定弊多利少,它可能降低统治者相对于潜在竞争者或利益集团对全社会经济剩余的实际占有率。只有当统治者认为潜在竞争者或利益集团的威胁较小时,不压制王朝制度包容性的成长才是统治者较理性的选择。若潜在竞争者或利益集团看起来受益于包容性的经济增长过程而变得强大,统治者的核心激励则是强化向下攫取或管制以釜底抽薪式地降低他们不臣或蠹蚀的隐患。而统治者过分压制利益集团反而刺激了利益集团分利性的增长,二者遂陷入竞相向下攫取的恶性竞争,使全社会制度攫取性螺旋式上升,王朝便亡于这种恶性循环。
[Abstract]:Although the inclusive system of Chinese feudal dynasty is beneficial to the whole society, it does more harm than good to the regime stability of the rulers, and it may reduce the actual share of the rulers relative to the potential competitors or interest groups to the whole social economic surplus. It is only when rulers consider that the threats of potential competitors or interest groups are relatively small, and not suppressing the inclusive growth of dynastic systems is a more rational choice for rulers. If potential competitors or interest groups appear to benefit from an inclusive economic growth process, the central incentive for rulers is to strengthen downward grabbing or regulation to reduce their vulnerability to corruption. On the contrary, the ruler suppressed the interest group too much and stimulated the interest group to increase, so they fell into the vicious competition, which led to the rise of the whole social system grab spiral, and the dynasty died in this kind of vicious circle.
【作者单位】： 南京大学商学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“基于新制度经济学视角的中国封建王朝兴衰周期律研究”(项目号:15BJL063)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F129
，
本文编号：2300643
[Abstract]:Although the inclusive system of Chinese feudal dynasty is beneficial to the whole society, it does more harm than good to the regime stability of the rulers, and it may reduce the actual share of the rulers relative to the potential competitors or interest groups to the whole social economic surplus. It is only when rulers consider that the threats of potential competitors or interest groups are relatively small, and not suppressing the inclusive growth of dynastic systems is a more rational choice for rulers. If potential competitors or interest groups appear to benefit from an inclusive economic growth process, the central incentive for rulers is to strengthen downward grabbing or regulation to reduce their vulnerability to corruption. On the contrary, the ruler suppressed the interest group too much and stimulated the interest group to increase, so they fell into the vicious competition, which led to the rise of the whole social system grab spiral, and the dynasty died in this kind of vicious circle.
【作者单位】： 南京大学商学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“基于新制度经济学视角的中国封建王朝兴衰周期律研究”(项目号:15BJL063)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F129
，
本文编号：2300643
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