基于博弈视角下煤矿安全生产与政府监管的演化与互惠分析

发布时间：2018-01-29 05:09

本文关键词： 煤矿安全生产事故政府监管演化博弈互惠博弈　出处：《东北财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：煤矿安全生产问题在相当长的时间内都给正在高速发展的中国经济留下了挥之不去的阴影,无论是从重特大事故的发生频率来看,还是从居高不下的伤亡率来讲,其所产生的影响已经超过了安全生产本身的范畴,上升到事关政治社会稳定、建设和谐社会大局的高度。统计数据显示,自2001年1月1日至2012年12月31日,全国大小煤矿共发生安全生产事故28509起,死亡人数达到50975,百万吨煤死亡率高达2.11。我国以煤炭为主的能源生产和消费结构,以及经济发展长期以来对煤炭资源的依赖,使得煤炭安全问题越发引起全社会的关注,就像一把无形的重担压在安全监管部门、产煤大省政府的肩上。当逐条对发生煤炭安全事故的企业自身原因和外部因素进行分析时,我们发现一系列导致煤炭安全事故的原因都直指向企业的安全监管问题。此处的监管不仅包括企业自身的安全监督和安全自查,更重要的是来自企业外部的,与煤矿企业相互独立的监管力量—政府的监管。本文针对煤矿安全监管问题,运用演化博弈和互惠博弈理论研究煤矿安全监管机构和煤矿企业之间的博弈引发的煤矿安全问题。具体研究工作包括如下四点：第一,将煤矿安全监管机构和煤矿企业视为个体之间的博弈,运用互惠博弈理论进行研究,分析煤矿企业和监管机构之间的互惠效用问题。结果表明：煤矿发生安全事故的概率受煤矿企业违规开采的超额收益,监管机构的监管成本以及煤矿企业安全投入的收益净值的影响。因此,为降低煤炭监管失败的概率进而提高煤炭生产的安全水平,应该从降低煤矿安全监管成本,抑制煤矿非法开采所获得的超额收益,提高煤矿企业的安全投入收益净值为主。第二,建立了煤矿企业与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,分析煤矿生产安全事故周期性波动的演化机理。煤矿安全监管演化系统在混合策略均衡点附近的运动轨迹是以均衡点为圆心的极限环；随着煤矿生产安全监管力度的周期性波动,煤矿生产事故发生比例也将出现周期性波动。第三,结合云南曲靖“11·10”矿难事故的案例进行数值分析,剖析了地方政府煤矿安全监管失败的主要因素结合数值,设定煤矿生产事故率的上限值后,影响地方政府煤矿安全监管失败的两个主要因素是系统演化混合均衡点的位置(地方政府监管机构误判煤矿违规超采收益)和周期性波动的振幅(煤矿企业和地方政府监管机构的策略选择初值)。第四,得出结论及提出促进煤矿安全监管的相关政策建议。国外对于博弈论的研究无论从理论研究层面与应用层面都己趋于成熟,而国内对于演化博弈论的研究主要侧重于方法应用层面。在煤矿安全监管的博弈方面,主要集中于政府与煤矿企业,没有根据安全经济利益相关者进行全面的总结和分析,特别是对于对煤矿企业和监管机构之间的互惠效用博弈关系分析讨论。本文在分析我国现行煤矿安全监管问题的基础上,运用演化博弈和互惠博弈理论对煤矿安全监管中的关系进行分析,用互惠的方法研究煤矿安全监管,用演化博弈的方法分析煤矿生产安全事故周期性波动的演化机理,以及导致地方政府安全监管失败的主要因素,并根据所得结论提出提高煤矿安全监管效能的建议对策。
[Abstract]:The coal mine safety production problem has left a lingering shadow for China ' s economy , which is developing at high speed for quite a long time , whether from the frequency of heavy - scale accident or the high casualty rate , it has already exceeded the safety production itself , and has raised the concern of the whole society , such as the coal - based energy production and consumption structure , and the long - term dependence on coal resources . The supervision not only includes the safety supervision and safety self - inspection of the enterprise itself , but also the supervision power of the independent of the coal mine enterprises . According to the problem of coal mine safety supervision , the coal mine safety problem caused by game between coal mine safety supervision institution and coal mine enterprise is studied by using evolutionary game theory and mutual benefit game theory . First , the coal mine safety supervision organization and the coal mine enterprise are regarded as the game between the individual and the mutual benefit game theory is applied to the research . The result shows that the probability of the coal mine safety accident is influenced by the excess return of the coal mining enterprise ' s illegal exploitation , the supervision cost of the supervision institution and the net income net investment of the coal mine enterprise . Secondly , the evolutionary game model of coal mine enterprises and government regulators is established to analyze the evolution mechanism of the periodic fluctuation of coal mine safety accidents . The movement locus of the coal mine safety supervision and evolution system near the equilibrium point of the mixed strategy is the limit ring with the equilibrium point as the circle center . Thirdly , according to the numerical analysis of the case of " 11.10 " mine disaster in Qujing of Yunnan Province , the author analyzes the main factors of the failure of coal mine safety supervision in the local government and sets up the upper limit value of the accident rate of the coal mine , and the two main factors that affect the failure of the coal mine safety supervision in the local government are the position of the system evolution mixed equilibrium point ( the local government supervision institution misjudged the illegal earnings of the coal mine ) and the amplitude of the periodical fluctuation ( the initial value of the strategy of the coal mining enterprise and the local government regulatory agency ) . Fourthly , the author draws a conclusion and puts forward some relevant policy suggestions to promote coal mine safety supervision . On the basis of analyzing the problems of coal mine safety supervision , this paper focuses on the analysis of the relationship between coal mine safety supervision and coal mine safety supervision by using evolutionary game theory and mutual benefit game theory , and analyzes the relationship between coal mine safety supervision and coal mine safety supervision .

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F224.32;F426.21;X936

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