基于演化博弈的危化品安全监管情景推演研究

发布时间：2018-04-19 01:11

本文选题：危险化学品 + 演化博弈　；参考：《中国安全生产科学技术》2017年01期

【摘要】：针对危化品安全生产监管问题,基于演化博弈理论构建危化品安全监管演化博弈模型,并将危化品事故发生率引入模型,对比分析危化品企业与地方政府监管部门行为策略的演化稳定均衡。在此基础上进行情景推演模拟仿真,研究表明:危化品事故发生率,对危化品企业和地方政府监管部门的策略选择有显著影响,当危化品事故发生概率低于某一临界值时,危化品企业和监管部门都会疏忽安全投入和监管;地方政府承受危化品事故经济损失和信誉损失增大时,危化品安全监管系统演化呈现出周期性波动;引入上级政府惩罚机制情景下,当上级政府惩罚力度高于危化品企业未投入安全生产受到的处罚和地方政府安全监管成本时,其最终都选择安全投入和严格监管策略。研究结论为政府监管危化品安全生产提供新的思路和对策建议。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the problem of hazardous chemicals safety production supervision, the evolutionary game model of dangerous chemicals safety supervision is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, and the accident rate of dangerous chemicals is introduced into the model.Comparative analysis of dangerous chemicals enterprises and local government regulatory departments of the evolution of stable equilibrium of behavior strategies.On the basis of the simulation, the results show that the occurrence rate of hazardous chemicals accidents has a significant effect on the strategy selection of hazardous chemicals enterprises and local government regulators, and when the probability of dangerous chemicals accidents occurs below a certain critical value,Dangerous chemicals enterprises and regulatory departments will neglect safety investment and supervision; when local governments bear the economic loss and credit loss of dangerous chemicals accidents, the evolution of dangerous chemicals safety regulatory system shows periodic fluctuations.Under the situation of introducing the punishment mechanism of higher government, when the punishment intensity of higher government is higher than that of dangerous chemicals enterprises and the cost of safety supervision of local government, they all choose safety investment and strict supervision strategy in the end.The conclusion provides new ideas and suggestions for the government to supervise the safety of dangerous chemicals production.
【作者单位】：山东工商学院公共管理学院;南开大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71603109,71372100);国家自然科学基金重大培育项目(91024002) 山东省自然科学基金(ZR2016GB04)
【分类号】：TQ086.52

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