中国煤矿安全监察监管演化博弈有效稳定性控制

发布时间：2018-04-28 11:47

  本文选题：煤矿安全监察监管 + 有效稳定性控制　； 参考：《北京理工大学学报(社会科学版)》2015年04期

【摘要】：针对中国煤矿安全监察监管过程中复杂动态博弈且多方参与的问题,通过分析煤矿安全监察监管系统的演化博弈关系,构建国家监察机构、地方监管机构和煤矿企业3个种群所组成的演化博弈模型,并将基于系统动力学的计算机仿真手段与动态演化思想相结合,对上述演化博弈模型进行求解与均衡点稳定性分析。结果发现:中国煤矿安全监察监管的演化博弈过程出现反复波动、震荡发展的趋势,表明博弈过程不存在演化稳定策略。进而对此问题进行博弈的有效稳定性控制情景研究,提出动态惩罚—激励控制情景,并对此控制情景下的演化博弈稳定性进行仿真分析与理论证明,结果发现在动态惩罚—激励控制情景下系统演化博弈过程的波动性得到有效控制,即博弈过程存在演化稳定策略,且在此稳定策略均衡状态下煤矿企业违法行为得到有效控制。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the problem of complex dynamic game and multi-participation in the process of coal mine safety supervision and supervision in China, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game relation of coal mine safety supervision and supervision system, and constructs the national supervision organization. An evolutionary game model composed of three populations of local regulatory bodies and coal mining enterprises is proposed. The computer simulation method based on system dynamics is combined with the idea of dynamic evolution to solve the above evolutionary game model and to analyze the stability of equilibrium points. The results show that the evolution game process of coal mine safety supervision in China has the tendency of repeatedly fluctuating and fluctuating, which indicates that there is no evolutionary stability strategy in the game process. Then the effective stability control scenario of the game is studied, and the dynamic penalty-incentive control scenario is put forward, and the stability of the evolutionary game under the control scenario is simulated and proved theoretically. The results show that the volatility of the system evolution game process is effectively controlled under the dynamic penalty-incentive control scenario, that is, the game process has an evolutionary stability strategy, and the illegal behavior of the coal mining enterprise is effectively controlled under the stable strategy equilibrium state.
【作者单位】： 中国矿业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目“多因素耦合作用下煤矿事故复杂性机理及其风险度量研究”(71271206) 江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目“煤矿安全监察监管演化博弈系统分析及仿真与控制研究”(KYZZ_0377) 国家留学基金资助项目“国家建设高水平大学公派研究生项目”(20140642018)
【分类号】：TD76
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本文编号：1815154