多方博弈下起重作业人员有意不安全行为致因分析

发布时间：2018-05-05 01:26

本文选题：起重作业 + 致因分析　；参考：《中国安全生产科学技术》2017年05期

【摘要】：为有效制定起重作业人员有意不安全行为防范措施,降低人为事故发生可能性,结合演化博弈理论,探讨不同策略选择下施工企业内部管理方、监管方及作业方的得益变化,建立各方期望效益函数;依据复制动态方程,构建多方演化博弈模型,分析各方策略选择演化趋势及均衡点,剖析作业人员有意不安全行为致因,并分别从各方角度制定作业人员有意不安全行为预防措施。结果表明:作业人员有意不安全行为不仅与自身风险、成本有关,且受管理方、监管方决策影响;管理方增加安全投入,提升作业人员事故损失承担比例;监管方选择合理监管方式严格监管作业行为;作业人员进行行为决策时权衡风险、成本、收益及各方决策,将有效减少作业人员有意不安全行为的发生。
[Abstract]:In order to effectively formulate preventive measures for intentional unsafe behavior of hoisting workers and reduce the possibility of man-made accidents, combined with evolutionary game theory, the benefits of internal management, regulators and operators of construction enterprises under different strategies are discussed. According to the replicating dynamic equation, the multi-party evolution game model is constructed, the evolutionary trend and equilibrium point are analyzed, and the cause of intentional unsafe behavior of operators is analyzed. The preventive measures of intentional unsafe behavior of operators were formulated from the angle of each side. The results show that the intentional unsafe behavior of the operators is not only related to their own risks and costs, but also influenced by the decisions of the management and the regulators, and the management increases the safety investment and increases the proportion of the operators' accident losses. The supervisor chooses the reasonable supervision way to strictly supervise the operation behavior, and the operators weigh the risk, cost, benefit and the decision of all parties when they make the behavior decision, which will effectively reduce the occurrence of intentional unsafe behavior of the operator.
【作者单位】：三峡大学水利与环境学院;水电工程施工与管理湖北省重点实验室;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(51379110);国家自然科学基金(51609128)
【分类号】：X943

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