煤矿应急协作的演化博弈及仿真分析

发布时间：2018-05-17 11:35

本文选题：煤矿 + 多主体　；参考：《矿业安全与环保》2017年04期

【摘要】：采用演化博弈论和数值仿真方法,引入应急协作的救援收益、救援收益增量、收益增量分配系数、违约金、机会主义所得及先期成本等效益因子,构建了煤矿应急救援中多主体协作的行为博弈模型。通过分析各效益因子对煤矿企业达成应急协作可能性的影响,探讨了不同企业之间进行协作的策略选择。研究发现:若企业双方不协作时的净机会主义所得均大于协作后的额外救援净收益,此时双方博弈结果均趋向于不协作,反之则双方均趋向于协作;企业双方选择协作的几率与救援收益增量、收益增量分配系数的合理配置及违约金呈正相关关系,与先期协作成本和机会主义所得呈负相关关系。
[Abstract]:By using evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation method, the benefit factors such as rescue benefit, rescue benefit increment, income increment distribution coefficient, penalty for breach of contract, opportunistic income and advance cost are introduced. The behavior game model of multi-agent cooperation in coal mine emergency rescue is constructed. By analyzing the influence of various benefit factors on the possibility of emergency cooperation in coal mining enterprises, this paper discusses the choice of strategies for cooperation among different enterprises. It is found that if the net opportunism of the two parties is greater than the net benefit of the additional rescue after cooperation, the game results of both sides tend to be non-cooperative, otherwise both sides tend to cooperate; The probability of cooperation is positively correlated with the increment of rescue income, the reasonable allocation of income increment distribution coefficient and the penalty for breach of contract, but it is negatively related to the cooperation cost and opportunistic income.
【作者单位】：上海海事大学经济管理学院;郑州大学管理工程学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71271194,71472171)
【分类号】：TD77

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