目标考核、官员晋升激励与安全生产治理效果——基于中国省级面板数据的实证检验
发布时间：2018-09-18 15:20
【摘要】：本文旨在为我国安全生产目标考核制度的实施效果提供实证证据,着重考察官员晋升激励下,安全生产目标考核与省级官员个人特征对安全生产治理效果交互效应的影响。对中国30省份2001—2010年间面板数据的实证分析显示,目标考核显著降低了生产安全事故死亡人数和死亡率;但从长期来看,目标考核对于死亡人数和死亡率的政策持续效应存在差异。研究发现,官员任期与安全生产治理效果呈倒U型曲线关系,中央正式委员所辖省区的生产安全事故死亡人数更高。进一步的调节效应分析表明,官员历史晋升几率强化了目标考核与死亡人数间的负向关系,省长兼任中央候补委员则会削弱目标考核与死亡人数的负向关联。本文深化了对官员晋升激励下目标考核安全生产治理效果的认识,为从制度层面改进未来安全生产治理实践提供了有益启示。
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence for the implementation effect of safety production target assessment system in China, and to investigate the interactive effects of safety production target assessment and provincial officials' personal characteristics on the effect of safety production governance under the promotion and encouragement of officials. An empirical analysis of panel data from 30 provinces in China between 2001 and 2010 shows that the target assessment has significantly reduced the number of deaths and deaths from production safety accidents; but in the long run, There are differences in the policy persistence effects of target assessment on the number of deaths and mortality. It is found that the relationship between the term of office of officials and the effect of management of production safety is inversely U-shaped, and the death toll of production safety accidents is higher in the provinces under the jurisdiction of the official members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Further adjustment effect analysis shows that the historical promotion probability of officials strengthens the negative relationship between the target examination and the number of deaths, while the provincial governor serving as alternate member of the central government will weaken the negative correlation between the target examination and the number of deaths. This paper deepens the understanding of the effect of target assessment on the management of safety production under the promotion and encouragement of officials, and provides beneficial enlightenment for improving the practice of safety production governance in the future from the system level.
【作者单位】： 兰州大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71472079)
【分类号】：D630.3;X922.2
本文编号：2248319
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence for the implementation effect of safety production target assessment system in China, and to investigate the interactive effects of safety production target assessment and provincial officials' personal characteristics on the effect of safety production governance under the promotion and encouragement of officials. An empirical analysis of panel data from 30 provinces in China between 2001 and 2010 shows that the target assessment has significantly reduced the number of deaths and deaths from production safety accidents; but in the long run, There are differences in the policy persistence effects of target assessment on the number of deaths and mortality. It is found that the relationship between the term of office of officials and the effect of management of production safety is inversely U-shaped, and the death toll of production safety accidents is higher in the provinces under the jurisdiction of the official members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Further adjustment effect analysis shows that the historical promotion probability of officials strengthens the negative relationship between the target examination and the number of deaths, while the provincial governor serving as alternate member of the central government will weaken the negative correlation between the target examination and the number of deaths. This paper deepens the understanding of the effect of target assessment on the management of safety production under the promotion and encouragement of officials, and provides beneficial enlightenment for improving the practice of safety production governance in the future from the system level.
【作者单位】： 兰州大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71472079)
【分类号】：D630.3;X922.2
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